



NCIHL

NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

REPORT SUBJECT

LEGAL ANALYSIS DOCUMENTING ISRAEL'S GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW



TIME PERIOD

Progress Report



PREPARED BY

The National Committee on
International Humanitarian Law



ISSUED IN

2026

REPORT THEMES



Forced
Displacement



Targeting of
Civilian Objects



Targeting of
Medical and
Humanitarian
Services



Targeting of
Hospitals and
Health Facilities



Targeting of
Journalists and
Media Workers



Targeting of
Civil Defense
and Rescue
Personnel



Targeting of
Civilians and
Large-Scale
Damage



Targeting of
Cultural
Properties



Destruction of
Infrastructure,
Bridges, and
Crossings

Table of Contents

Section Number	Topic	Pages
	Introduction	4 - 6
One	Legal Analysis Documenting the Grave Violations by “Israel” of the Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities	7 - 48
Two	Documentary Report on the Targeting of the Bridges and Crossings of the Litani River in Southern Lebanon	49 - 71
Three	The Targeting of a Residential Apartment in Talal Ain Saadeh – Metn on 5 April 2026	72 - 90
Four	Targeting Medical Services in the Town of Mayfadoun - Nabatieh District	91 - 103
Five	Targeting Civil Defense Personnel in Majdal Zoun – South Lebanon	104 - 126
Six	The Killing of Journalist Amal Khalil and the Injury of Journalist Zeinab Faraj in the Town of Tayri – South Lebanon	127 - 144
Seven	The Attacks of 8 April 2026: Large-Scale Indiscriminate Attacks against Civilian Properties	145 - 174
Eight	Documentary Report on the Forcible Displacement of Civilians in Lebanon as a Result of Evacuation Orders, Broad Warnings, and Military Operations that Made Staying or Returning Unsafe	175 - 205
Nine	Report on Damage to Hospitals and Health Facilities in Lebanon in the Context of Israeli Attacks	206 - 238
Ten	Targeting of Cultural and Archaeological Property	239 - 268

Appendices and Supporting Materials

A USB flash drive containing the preserved evidentiary materials and screenshots corresponding to each item of evidence.

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Introduction

- 1- This report presents an organized documentation of a number of incidents indicating grave violations of international humanitarian law in Lebanon as a result of the “Israeli” aggression. It was prepared within the framework of the work of the National Committee for International Humanitarian Law in documenting the facts. Its legal basis rests on the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, as a treaty framework binding on “Israel”, and on the rules of customary international humanitarian law. It does not rely on the Additional Protocols as treaties binding on Israel, since Israel has not ratified them, except to the extent that some of their provisions reflect customary rules that are applicable. The report does not merely reproduce incidents as they appeared in open sources; rather, it breaks each incident down into its factual and legal elements, including the nature of the target, the geographic linkage, the type of harm, the protected status of persons or objects, and their connection to the rules of distinction, proportionality, and precautions required during military operations, as well as the protection of the wounded and sick and of personnel working in the medical and humanitarian fields.
- 2- The report focuses on incidents that occurred after 2 March 2026, without separating them from the broader context of the conflict in Lebanon since 8 October 2023. These incidents are not isolated from the wider course of violations attributed to Israel in Lebanon, particularly in terms of the repeated targeting of civilians, civilian objects, journalists, paramedics, and medical units. This sequence shows that the subsequent incidents do not appear to be individual occurrences, but rather successive links in a single pattern in which the nature of the targets, the methods of targeting, and the cumulative civilian impact recur. The report includes general documentation of violations, together with sections devoted to journalists, Civil Defense personnel and vehicles, medical services, large-scale attacks, bridges and crossings, and protected civilian objects. These incidents were therefore treated as interconnected files whenever the type of

target, the method of attack, the scale of civilian impact, or the narrative offered to justify the attack recurred.

- 3- Each incident addressed in the report has an independent evidence file. Depending on what was available, each file includes the original links, screenshots of publication pages, visual materials, statements by official or human rights bodies, and any elements that assist in establishing the place, time, and context of the incident. These materials were preserved to avoid their loss, alteration, or future inaccessibility, and were linked to the geographic location whenever the material allowed, whether through the place name, visible landmarks, corroboration among sources, or available maps and images. These files are not a formal appendix to the report; they constitute the evidentiary basis on which the report relies, allowing each incident to be reviewed through its preserved original material, publication screenshot, link, and supporting verification elements.
- 4- This report is not based on a single narrative or isolated item of evidence. Each incident is read through the totality of the materials connected to it and through the extent to which they are consistent with other independent, official, or visual sources. The evidentiary strength increases when the original link converges with the screenshot, the visual material, the official statement or testimony, or the verifiable geographic location. Through this linkage, the incident moves from a passing news item to material capable of legal assessment.
- 5- By its nature, this report is not a judicial investigation and is not a substitute for technical expertise or competent official investigations. It does, however, provide documented and organized material on which further work may be built, through the preservation of evidence, the identification of facts, and their connection to the applicable rules. It preserves the national legal memory, helps consolidate a unified national method for documenting and analyzing violations, and allows the material to be used in any national or international process

concerned with the protection of civilians and accountability for grave violations of international humanitarian law.

- 6-** This report was designed to be used, as needed, either as an integrated unit presenting the general pattern of violations, or as independent thematic sections that may be consulted in their respective fields, particularly with regard to the protection of journalists, medical services, and Civil Defense. Each section retains its own evidentiary file and legal analysis without being detached from the general framework that brings the incidents together within a single pattern of violations. Some deliberate repetition has been retained in the presentation of facts, legal rules, or evidentiary linkage elements whenever required by methodological or legal necessity. This repetition is not intended to prolong the text, but to ensure the independence of the sections and their usability as standalone parts when needed, and to show that certain evidence and facts may support more than one legal characterization, depending on their relevance to the rules protecting civilians, journalists, medical personnel, Civil Defense, hospitals, cultural objects, and civilian objects

Section I

Legal Analysis Documenting the Grave Violations by “Israel” of the Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities

Introduction

- 1- This file was prepared on the basis of documented field facts collected in the context of the “Israeli” attacks witnessed in Lebanon. It aims to assess those facts legally in order to determine whether these acts amount, in substance, to grave violations of international humanitarian law or to crimes falling within the scope of international criminal responsibility. This assessment relies directly on the binding rules of international humanitarian law, whether treaty-based or customary, as enshrined in the Geneva Conventions and in customary international humanitarian law.
- 2- The documented facts show that the hostile operations carried out by the “Israeli army” were marked by the repeated use of disproportionate force, particularly air power, within Lebanese territory. The available evidence clearly indicates that the attacks were not confined to isolated points, but affected densely populated residential areas in Beirut, the southern suburbs, and various areas of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa, where civilians were actually present at the time of the attacks or in their immediate vicinity.
- 3- The field information confirms that these attacks were not separate or incidental events. Their recurrence and geographic distribution show that they formed part of a continuing operational pattern involving repeated targeting of residential buildings and essential civilian infrastructure in Lebanon, resulting in extensive destruction and civilian injuries.
- 4- Legally, once the situation is characterized as an armed conflict, the rules of international humanitarian law apply in full, especially the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions. In the operations under review, these principles require the “Israeli army” to limit attacks strictly to military

objectives, to prevent excessive harm to civilians, and to take all feasible measures to reduce harm to civilians and civilian objects.

- 5- Accordingly, this raises a serious question as to the extent to which these obligations were respected. The recurrence of attacks in civilian environments in Lebanon, the documented presence of civilians at the time of the attacks, and the scale and spread of the destruction all indicate that the civilian impact was not incidental in the narrow sense, but was a foreseeable result given the nature of the operations carried out.
- 6- On this basis, this file focuses on establishing a practical legal framework for assessing the facts as reflected in the documented materials and linking them directly to the binding standards of international humanitarian law, with a view to confirming that these acts, when assessed as a whole, constitute grave violations and acts that may fall within the scope of international criminal responsibility.

Methodology

- 7- This file adopts an evidentiary methodology based on clear steps for preserving, examining, and linking materials to the facts. Its purpose is to protect open-source materials from loss or distortion and to ensure their verifiability so that they remain fit for legal use. In doing so, the report is guided by the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations, particularly with regard to source preservation, contextual verification, cross-checking of evidence, and transparency of proof.
- 8- At the first stage, each video was treated as an independent evidentiary unit and preserved in its available original form. This includes retaining the original link, documenting the publication platform, and recording any accompanying contextual information, even where limited. The significance of this step lies in keeping the chain of evidence traceable and ensuring that each item can be independently verified.

- 9- Where the indicators allow, the time frame of each video is assessed on the basis of visible elements, such as the geographic environment, the sequence of events, and their consistency with known timelines of reported incidents, while noting that this assessment remains dependent on the clarity of the available indicators.
- 10- The content of each video is then examined to verify its coherence and to determine whether there is any cutting or editing that affects the sequence of events. The consistency between image and sound and the progression of scenes are checked, as is whether the sequence of events is continuous or interrupted. The visible effects are also compared with known patterns of attack outcomes. Particular attention is given to environmental indicators, such as the nature of buildings, the layout of streets, the presence of civilian objects, and the presence of persons, given the importance of these elements in identifying the character of the environment shown in the scenes.
- 11- Contextual verification then follows, through an examination of the environment and location. This includes studying the urban fabric, including the density and distribution of residential buildings, the presence of infrastructure such as roads and bridges, and signs of civilian activity. These elements help determine the civilian character of the location shown in the material. In parallel, the pattern of damage is analysed, including structural collapses in buildings, the distribution of debris, and blast effects, in order to understand the nature and scale of the attack, while respecting the limits of what can be drawn from the available materials.
- 12- The material is then compared with other independent, official, or visual sources. No conclusion is based on an isolated video; it is built on the materials and testimonies that intersect with it, including post-attack scenes, witness statements, and, where available, accounts from medical teams and rescue personnel. This linkage allows the reconstruction of facts on the basis of more than one evidentiary source. Visual evidence is supported by witness statements describing the same or similar facts, and is further reinforced by the accounts of

medical and rescue professionals, strengthening verification regarding human losses, injury patterns, and field conditions. Nevertheless, this assessment remains tied to the nature and limits of the available materials.

- 13- Testimonies are extracted and reorganized within a clear evidentiary framework. Statements contained in audiovisual materials are not treated as general narratives; they are converted into specific evidentiary assertions, tested for internal coherence, and compared with visual evidence and other testimonies. In this way, testimonies do not remain general statements, but become evidentiary elements capable of comparison and linkage with the relevant legal elements.
- 14- At the final stage, the evidence is linked to the relevant rules of international humanitarian law. This includes identifying how each evidentiary element, whether visual or testimonial, relates to the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. The report thus moves from raw material to legal characterization through a path based on defined evidentiary links, without attributing to the evidence more than it can bear.
- 15- The report also distinguishes between the reliability of the source and the probative value allowed by the evidence. A source may be reliable in origin, yet its probative value may remain limited if context is missing or supporting elements are absent. For that reason, each evidentiary element is assessed separately along these two dimensions, ensuring that conclusions are not overstated while also preserving the inferential value of the available materials. This distinction maintains a cautious and graduated evidentiary standard that reflects the nature and limits of field work.
- 16- Together, these steps establish a clear evidentiary path in which evidence preservation, verification, comparison, legal linkage, and technical military assessment are integrated within a single analytical framework. This approach enables the construction of a factual narrative based on what could be

documented, capable of being directly connected to the relevant legal standards, while taking into account the nature and environment of field work.

Evidence

Evidence One

www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPM6jZuSQpM

17- The video shows an attack on a multi-storey building located on a densely populated residential street in Beirut. Clear indicators of the civilian character of the location are visible, including parked cars, adjoining building facades, and spaces used for civilian purposes at street level. No military site or deployment is visible in the scene. The attack caused structural collapse consistent with the effects of a high-explosive munition, indicating that the strike occurred in an environment predominantly civilian in nature.

Evidence Two

www.youtube.com/watch?v=MnfRSy_CAA4

18- The video documents testimonies regarding repeated night attacks, accompanied by clear footage of civilians fleeing. The testimonies show the concurrence of explosions with the movement of residents and the presence of civilians at the moment of attack, as well as the immediate humanitarian consequences. The recurrence of attacks in the same area also indicates continuous targeting or successive attacks affecting the same civilian environment, in addition to visual scenes showing the density of displacement reaching the level of forced displacement.

Evidence Three

www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfPUQGdCgyU

19- The facts show multiple attacks within a built-up area in southern Lebanon. They indicate the presence of civilian structures and note that protected objects were within the area of impact, while also documenting search and rescue

operations by medical service personnel. The multiplicity of points of impact indicates either several closely located targets or the extension of the effects of the attack beyond a single target, which may fall within the description of indiscriminate attacks.

Evidence Four

<https://tinyurl.com/yc2mh982>

20- The video shows bridge destruction. These infrastructures are essential for civilian movement and the arrival of humanitarian assistance, as their destruction produces subsequent effects on evacuations, the transport of wounded persons, and the delivery of relief. The harm therefore extends beyond the attack site, which in itself constitutes an attack on protected objects, and affects the civilian population dependent on that infrastructure.

Evidence Five

www.independent.co.uk/tv/news/israeli-army-video-shows-multiple-strikes-on-lebanese-villages-b2953185.html

21- The video shows multiple deliberate explosions within a residential environment. The close timing of the explosions at the same site increases civilians' cumulative exposure to blast effects and indicates a repeated and deliberate pattern rather than an isolated error. The destruction following the attacks is also consistently documented through supporting materials.

Evidence Six

www.youtube.com/watch?v=wEUMkmdFX-4

www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRdmPOU7iTU

www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQ8-RiZS94g

22- The footage shows large structural masses falling from buildings and debris spreading beyond them into surrounding roads, indicating that the effects of the attack did not remain confined to the point of impact. The nature of the collapse

shows that the building structure was directly damaged, with consequences extending to the nearby surroundings, where spaces normally used for daily movement were affected. This scene reflects a level of destruction that exceeded the limits of the targeted site and clearly affected civilian buildings and the adjacent residential space.

Evidence Seven

www.reuters.com/video/watch/idRW304516042026RP1/

www.youtube.com/shorts/HR67SHprBMc

23- Multiple columns of smoke appear across residential areas, together with reports of extensive human losses, indicating attacks at several locations within a connected civilian setting.

Evidence Eight

www.euronews.com/video/2026/03/05/aftermath-following-overnight-israeli-strikes-on-south-beirut

www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZGF0NkL_a2A

24- The materials show rubble from residential neighborhoods, confirming the scale of destruction, in addition to damage to a hospital in southern Lebanon.

Evidence Nine

www.instagram.com/reel/DXMyOWAEe1R/

25- The attack consisted of three successive attacks that sequentially targeted ambulance teams in Nabatieh. This indicates that the targeting was not a single passing moment, but continued as rescue teams arrived at the site. This sequence indicates that the teams were targeted while performing their duties, increasing the danger to paramedics and obstructing their ability to evacuate the wounded and provide assistance.

Evidence Ten

www.reuters.com/video/watch/idRW125309042026RP1

26- The material shows an air attack in which a high-explosive munition struck in the middle of an inhabited civilian area, causing a powerful explosion within a civilian gathering. Civilians are visible at the moment of the attack, followed by collective panic and random flight, with no visible indicators of prior warning or evacuation measures, and no clear military objective visible at the point of impact.

Evidence Eleven

www.facebook.com/watch/?v=984288587363173

27- The filmed material shows a direct air attack that struck a residential building in Shmustar, causing a high-intensity explosion and heavy smoke indicative of the force of an air-delivered blast. No indicators of a distinct military objective are apparent, raising issues of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack under international humanitarian law.

Evidence Twelve

www.youtube.com/watch?v=hAmymEyVBnE

28- The filmed material shows a field scene in the town of Alma al-Shaab, within an open and non-built-up border environment, documenting the phase immediately following an incident of targeting. Several individuals wearing vests marked “Press” are seen running around the location in a state of confusion. A burning vehicle appears in the frame with flames rising, without clear indicators as to the nature of the vehicle. At the same time, a direct emergency response is recorded, with ambulance teams transporting wounded persons and bodies from the scene, reflecting human losses.

29- The clip does not include the moment of the attack. However, the movement of people running, the presence of an active fire, and the medical evacuation operations indicate that the filming took place very close in time to the event. The clip also includes a reporter’s narrative testimony stating that an Israeli strike

occurred at the site and targeted journalists. No visual indicators of direct combat or of a military objective are apparent in the scene at the time of filming.

Testimonies (Human and Professional Evidence)

Evidence Thirteen

www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwlcTLZqtbw

30- A resident recounts how the attack occurred suddenly and was followed by the rapid collapse of a residential building, without any warning or prior indication, in addition to the effects of multiple and large-scale attacks. This description does not stand alone; it is confirmed by filmed scenes of the impact and its immediate effects, with civilians present at the location at the moment of targeting. In this context, the matter is not merely a field incident; it directly places the obligation to take required precautions in attack at the center of the assessment under international humanitarian law.

Evidence Fourteen

www.youtube.com/watch?v=aG4aOHjB2N4&t=90s

31- Displaced civilians recount how they were forced to flee with their children amid continuing attacks, describing an urgent move toward safety under fear and instability. The circumstances of this displacement, which came as a direct response to hostilities and in the absence of safe alternatives, reflect a pattern of forced displacement linked to these attacks.

Evidence Fifteen

www.youtube.com/watch?v=SOvvgDcvnC8

32- In multiple filmed testimonies, local residents describe repeated shelling of their villages and neighborhoods affecting their homes and immediate surroundings, without indicating any distinguishable military objectives within those environments. These accounts, concurrent with field scenes showing a clearly residential character, gain further importance when read with the remaining

materials. They do not merely reflect the subjective perception of residents; they are supported by visual indicators of the pattern of attacks, raising a serious question regarding respect for the duty of distinction in targeting as required by international humanitarian law.

Evidence Sixteen

<https://tinyurl.com/48bykvts>

33- In filmed testimonies from the city of Nabatieh, witnesses from the vicinity of the incident recount the targeting of ambulance teams while they were carrying out field rescue missions. They describe these teams being subjected to repeated attacks during their intervention to assist the wounded, in a context lacking any visible indicators of combat activity in their immediate surroundings. These accounts, concurrent with visual materials showing ambulances and rescue personnel in an open civilian environment, do not remain merely individual testimonies; they acquire evidentiary value and raise a serious question regarding respect for the legal duty to respect and protect medical teams, as well as the principle of distinction, as required by international humanitarian law.

Evidence Seventeen

www.instagram.com/reel/DW6kvZRDBpQ

34- Scenes of destruction are shown as the result of targeting that affected a civilian environment, with excessive damage visible on buildings and their immediate surroundings. At the same time, one resident provides a direct account of what happened, describing the scale of damage and the resulting humanitarian reality. The clip also documents social assistance initiatives, including the distribution of medicines to affected persons at the site. Taken together, these elements mean the clip is not merely an isolated display of destruction, but gains evidentiary value through the association of direct testimony with visual context, showing that the affected place is civilian in character and function. This raises the issue

of compliance with the duties of distinction and precautions in attack, as imposed by international humanitarian law.

Evidence Eighteen

www.youtube.com/watch?v=txVmFLR0D5U

35- This video documents a field report from the site of the targeting in the town of Shmustar (Baalbek District), where a correspondent stands near the building that was attacked. The video shows direct scenes of the effects of an attack in an evidently civilian setting, represented by a building near the town cemetery and surrounding open areas.

36- The account in the report and the witnesses' statements indicate that the attack came suddenly, without visible indicators of prior warning or precautionary measures that could be observed from the filmed material.

Evidence Nineteen

www.youtube.com/watch?v=pUYubkMD3xs

37- This video documents the direct testimony of a wounded Lebanese person speaking from his hospital bed after an Israeli attack on Beirut. He describes the moment of the explosion as he personally experienced it, including the sudden flash and his feeling that he had been killed or was about to die. The material's primary value lies in conveying the account of a civilian survivor from inside the medical facility itself, not merely as a general scene of wounded persons, but as direct human evidence of the immediate effect of the attack on civilians.

38- The video also contains a statement from a physician, Wael Jaroush, who says that the hospital received around 70 wounded persons within 10 minutes of the air attacks, that two people died, and that five remained in the hospital, including three in intensive care. Accordingly, the material does not merely document "large numbers" in a general visual manner; it provides specific numerical information from a medical professional witness regarding the inflow of casualties over a short period.

Evidence Twenty

www.youtube.com/watch?v=aTHbrQd95s0

39- This material shows direct damage to civilian objects consisting of residential homes in an inhabited environment, supported by the testimonies of their owners and within a context that intersects with similar documented incidents. The clearly civilian character of the site, together with the absence of visible indicators of a military objective and the recurrence of this pattern in more than one location, directly raises the issue of respect for the principle of distinction and calls for a comprehensive assessment of the proportionality of the impact on civilian property in the context of military operations.

Evidence Twenty-One

www.youtube.com/watch?v=7wRbwKK77ow

40- This video documents field interviews with paramedics and ambulance teams working in southern Lebanon, where they provide direct accounts of their working conditions while responding to attacks. The speakers appear in their professional clothing and beside ambulances bearing clear markings, establishing their status as medical teams performing a purely humanitarian function.

41- Through their testimonies, the paramedics describe moving to targeting sites to evacuate the wounded and confirm that they work in an environment of continuing danger, where attacks occur on or near rescue teams while they are carrying out their duties. These accounts reflect a direct professional awareness of the nature of the risks and highlight the repeated exposure of ambulance teams to danger during response operations.

Evidence Twenty-Two

www.youtube.com/watch?v=oeNkeI5ixG4&t=82s

42- This video documents the direct professional testimony of journalist Carmen Joukhadar, a survivor of the incident in which a group of journalists was targeted

in southern Lebanon while performing their media duties. The witness confirms that the group was clearly identified as a press team and that the targeting occurred in two successive phases, indicating a repeated attack on the same site over a short period of time.

43- The incident resulted in the killing of journalist Issam Abdallah, a Reuters photographer, in addition to the injury of several other journalists. This element constitutes a direct result of the incident and reinforces its seriousness in terms of its effect on civilians performing a media function.

44- The testimony indicates that the journalists were present at a civilian location for media coverage purposes, with no indicators of military activity in their surroundings, and that the second attack occurred after the first, allowing time for the target to be reassessed.

Applicable International Humanitarian Law

45- The facts set out in this file are assessed under the rules of international humanitarian law governing the conduct of hostilities, whether treaty-based or customary rules binding regardless of formal ratification. This assessment rests on the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law, as well as the system of customary rules reflected in State practice and *opinio juris*. These rules do not only regulate the lawfulness of attacks; they also cover the means and methods used in military operations, especially in environments where civilians and civilian objects may overlap with potential military objectives.

46- As appears from the factual narrative, the operational theatre in Lebanon is marked by densely populated urban environments, including Beirut and its southern suburbs, as well as inhabited villages in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa. This field reality has a direct legal effect. Under international humanitarian law, the presence of a military objective within or near a civilian area does not alter the protection afforded to the civilian population or surrounding civilian objects, nor does it convert an entire neighborhood into a

lawful target. In such circumstances, a continuing obligation of distinction applies: each attack must be directed at a specific military objective, and its effects must be confined within that framework to the extent permitted by the means used.

47- The principle of distinction is the fundamental rule in this framework. It requires parties to the conflict to distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. In the facts presented in this file, where attacks occur within residential neighborhoods and built civilian environments, the presumption of civilian character applies in cases of doubt. This presumption is supported by the available evidence, including visual indicators of residential use and testimonies confirming the presence of civilians, shifting the burden toward establishing that the target was in fact a lawful military objective.

48- The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks is also linked to the principle of distinction and is firmly established in treaty and customary law. An attack is indiscriminate not only when it is not directed at a specific military objective, but also when means or methods of warfare are used that cannot be directed accurately at a particular target or whose effects cannot be limited as required by law. In Lebanon's densely populated urban environments, the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects raises serious legal concerns. Where the blast radius and fragmentation effects exceed the limits of the alleged target and affect neighboring residential buildings, this raises the possibility of classifying the attack as indiscriminate, even in cases where the existence of a military objective within the general area may be alleged.

49- In this context, some available materials show indicators that may be consistent with the possible use of munitions containing phosphorus, based on visible burning characteristics, the persistence of combustion, and the nature of dense smoke. From a legal standpoint, the use of phosphorus munitions are not, as such, prohibited in all circumstances, but it is subject to strict constraints, particularly

regarding use in populated areas. In densely populated civilian environments, the use of such munitions presents elevated risks because of their incendiary effects and the difficulty of controlling their spread, increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects. Accordingly, any possible use of such munitions in civilian areas in Lebanon requires careful assessment in light of the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions, taking into account their effects and their potential extension beyond the alleged target.

- 50- The principle of proportionality adds an essential constraint on the conduct of hostilities. It prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental civilian harm that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. In the Lebanese environments reflected in the evidence, where buildings are close together and civilian presence continues, the foreseeable consequences of aerial bombardment are not limited to direct damage; they extend to secondary collapses, flying debris, and injuries to persons inside surrounding homes. The testimonies of medical teams and rescue personnel, which refer to civilian injuries including children, reinforce this assessment, while taking into account the limits of what those testimonies reflect from the field reality. Proportionality is not applied in the abstract; it requires a concrete assessment of the effects of using high-explosive munitions in populated areas.
- 51- The obligation to take precautions in attack is of particular importance. It is an obligation recognized in treaty and customary law and requires all feasible measures to verify that targets are military, to choose means and methods that reduce harm to civilians, and to give effective advance warnings where circumstances permit. The evidence record, including testimonies describing sudden attacks without warning and the presence of civilians at the moment of targeting, raises serious questions as to whether these obligations were respected. In environments known to have high civilian density, the required standard of care rises in proportion to the expected risks.

52- Medical units, hospitals, and medical personnel enjoy special protection under the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law. This protection extends to the humanitarian function of such facilities and covers all facilities and persons involved in caring for the wounded and sick, unless, and only for such time as, those facilities are used to commit acts harmful to the enemy outside their humanitarian function. Even in such cases, protection does not cease automatically; prior warning and a reasonable time limit are required. In the Lebanese context, where the evidence indicates the presence of medical facilities within areas of targeting and the treatment of wounded civilians, any attack on or near such facilities requires strict scrutiny, especially in light of visual evidence and testimonies indicating direct and deliberate attacks on medical objects.

53- One of the recurring issues in urban conflicts, clearly visible in the Lebanese case, is the “Israeli” claim that the presence of military objectives within a civilian area converts the entire area into a lawful target. This proposition has no clear basis in international humanitarian law. The law does not permit entire areas, or cities to be classified as military objectives merely because of the possible presence of military elements within them. Each target must be assessed individually and attacks must be directed precisely against it. Moreover, even where a lawful military objective is identified within a civilian area, the attacking party remains bound by all other rules, especially proportionality and precautions. The presence of such an objective does not reduce the duty to protect civilians; it imposes heightened scrutiny in the selection of means and methods used.

54- In sum, international humanitarian law imposes an integrated framework governing targeting decisions. It does not merely require that attacks be directed against lawful military objectives; it also requires a prior and careful assessment of the expected effects on civilians and civilian objects. When this framework is applied to the evidence in this file, serious questions arise regarding Israel’s

compliance with these rules. The excessive harm caused by these attacks does not reflect isolated incidents, but a broad pattern of systematic and widespread hostilities that, as the available evidence shows, constitute clear violations of international humanitarian law.

Legal Characterization of the Acts and Attribution of Responsibility

55- Based on the facts contained in the evidence and on the applicable rules of international humanitarian law and international criminal law, there is sufficient information indicating that the acts addressed in this file, attributed to the “Israeli army,” may amount to war crimes, particularly those involving attacks directed against civilians and civilian and medical objects, and journalists, and the carrying out of attacks with knowledge of the likelihood of causing excessive harm.

56- The body of evidence reveals a repeated pattern of “Israeli” attacks within densely populated civilian environments in Lebanon, including residential sectors in Beirut and its southern suburbs, areas in the south of the country, and the Bekaa. Through the recurrence of the incidents, the similarity of their effects, and the presence of civilians at the time of execution, it appears that the harm inflicted on civilians and civilian objects was not, in all cases, an exceptional or incidental result, but was foreseeable in light of the nature of the operations and the means used.

57- In this context, the facts show that those responsible for targeting decisions, whether political or military, acted with knowledge of the likelihood of harm to civilians and civilian objects, or in circumstances in which they should have appreciated that likelihood, given the nature of the environment targeted, population density, and the resulting patterns of harm. This element cannot be ignored when examining the mental element of responsibility for war crimes.

58- The information also supports the possible existence of a pattern of attacks that may fall within the description of indiscriminate attacks, particularly where the effects of the attack appear to have exceeded the alleged target and affected a

broader civilian area, or where means of warfare with wide-area effects were used in environments that did not allow their effects to be confined.

59- At the level of command responsibility, the information supports examining the possible application of the principle of commanders' responsibility. The recurrence and similarity of the incidents show that the acts under review were not isolated. In this framework, there are grounds to examine whether commanders exercising effective control over the "Israeli army" knew, or should have known, that these acts were occurring and failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or limit them or to hold the perpetrators accountable.

60- Responsibility may also be attributed to persons who contributed to the decision-making process, whether through planning operations, selecting targets, providing intelligence, or approving strike plans, where such contribution had a tangible effect on the execution of the attacks under review as derived from the evidence.

61- On the basis of the available elements as a whole, the systematic pattern represented by repeated attacks in civilian environments, similar outcomes, and documented harm to civilians provides a serious basis for initiating an accountability track covering the different possible levels of responsibility, including direct responsibility, command responsibility, and responsibility for contribution.

62- Accordingly, the assessment concludes that there is evidence relevant to individual responsibility and to the chain of command concerned with decision-making mechanisms, the setting of rules of engagement, targeting protocols, and reporting systems within the relevant military structure.

Assessment of the Effects of Weapons and Munitions

63- The available materials provide sufficient information for a preliminary assessment of weapon effects, consistent with the use of high-explosive

munitions, mostly air-delivered, in civilian residential environments. In the attack footage and what followed it, repeated indicators appear, most notably localized collapses in buildings, blast pressure causing damage to neighboring building structures, debris scattered into surrounding streets, columns of smoke or immediate fires after the attack, and scenes of rescuing wounded persons and recovering victims reflecting the effect of the explosion inside residential buildings. Taken together, these features support an assessment that the nature of the effect is closer to high-explosive aerial munitions than to ground munitions of limited effect or purely incendiary effects.

64- From the perspective of open-source forensic analysis, evidentiary value is not limited to the presence of fragments or identifying markings of the weapon, which are not available in these materials, but extends to the pattern of effect itself. In the Beirut clips and subsequent scenes of destruction, the observed pattern indicates the use of a munition capable of causing broad blast damage in an urban environment, including the collapse of building facades, damage to internal structures, and patterns of civilian injuries as reflected in the statements of paramedics and medical teams. These elements are particularly important because the assessment of means and methods of warfare is linked to their expected consequences for civilians, not only to their technical nature. When a munition is used in a residential environment in circumstances where neighboring buildings, residents, and infrastructure are likely to be affected, the characteristics of its effects become an essential element in assessing proportionality and the duty to take precautions.

65- The visual materials support the conclusion that the facts presented are consistent with the use of explosive aerial munitions with medium to high destructive capacity, depending on the scope of structural damage and the spread of debris. The clips focusing on destruction, particularly those showing the destruction of entire residential areas in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Nabatieh,

and Shmustar, the multiple smoke-rise locations, and extensive rubble-removal operations, reinforce this assessment.

Annex A: Consolidated Evidence Register

Evidence Code	Link	Description	Location	Main Indicators	Legal Relevance	Reliability
V-LB-01	www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPM6jZuSQpM	Attack on a residential building	Beirut	Civilian street; collapse	Distinction	High
V-LB-02	www.youtube.com/watch?v=MnfRSy_CAA4	Night attacks and flight of civilians	Southern Suburbs of Beirut	Evacuation; fires	Civilian harm / precautions	High
V-LB-03	www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfPUQGdCgyU	Multiple attacks	South Lebanon	Mixed-use buildings	Proportionality / protected objects	High
V-LB-04	https://tinyurl.com/yc2mh982	Destruction of a bridge	South Lebanon	Vital road	Civilian objects	High
V-LB-05	www.independent.co.uk/tv/news/israeli-army-video-shows-multiple-strikes-on-lebanese-villages-b2953185.html	Successive attacks on villages	Residential areas	Systematic attacks	Systematic intent / foreseeability	High
V-LB-06	www.youtube.com/watch?v=wEUMkmdFX-4	Civilians / no warning	Kayfoun - Aley	Eyewitness	Precautions	Medium-High
V-LB-07	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRdmPOU7iTU	Destruction and displaced persons	South Lebanon	Residential areas and towns	Distinction	Medium-High
V-LB-08	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQ8-RiZS94g	Civilians without visible military objectives	Beirut	Residential areas	Distinction and proportionality	Medium

V-LB-09	www.reuters.com/video/watch/idRW304516042026RP1/	Air attack	Nabatieh - South Lebanon	Civilian areas and natural surroundings	Excessive harm	High
V-LB-10	www.youtube.com/shorts/HR67SHprBMc	Destruction of several buildings	Tyre - South Lebanon	Wide-area attack	Excessive damage to civilian objects	High
V-LB-11	www.euronews.com/video/2026/03/05/aftermath-following-overnight-israeli-strikes-on-south-beirut	Destruction after night attacks	Southern Suburbs of Beirut	Civilian objects	Disproportionality	Medium
V-LB-12	www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZGF0NkL_a2A	Hospital targeted	Tibnin - South Lebanon	Medical objects	Attack on medical objects	Medium
V-LB-13	www.instagram.com/reel/DXMyOWAEe1R/	Paramedics targeted	Nabatieh, South Lebanon	Medical objects	Deliberate / repeated targeting	High
V-LB-14	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i8IvCWKERO4	Residential street targeted	Kayfoun, Aley	Civilian objects	Large-scale destruction / no warning	High
V-LB-15	https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=984288587363173	Air attack on a village	Shmustar	Civilian objects	Disproportionate blast effect	High
V-LB-16	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hAmymEyVBnE	Direct targeting of journalists	Alma al-Shaab - South Lebanon	Protected categories	Distinction	High
W-LB-01	www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwlcTLZqtbw	Civilian casualties	Beirut	Civilian objects	Failure to distinguish / no warning	Medium
W-LB-02	www.youtube.com/watch?v=aG4aOHjB2N4&t=90s	Civilian suffering	Beirut	Systematic pattern	Forced displacement	Medium

W-LB-03	www.youtube.com/watch?v=SOvvgDcvnC8	Civilian casualties	Beirut	Civilian objects	Failure to distinguish / no warning	High
W-LB-04	https://tinyurl.com/22ycjvsm	Ambulance crews targeted	Nabatieh	Statement of the center director	Deliberate / repeated targeting	High
W-LB-05	www.instagram.com/reel/DW6kvZRDBpQ	Civilians targeted	Kayfoun	Systematic pattern	Large-scale	Medium
W-LB-06	www.youtube.com/watch?v=txVmFLR0D5U	Civilians targeted during a funeral	Shmustar - Bekaa	Cemetery during civilian gathering	No warning / excessive harm	High
W-LB-07	www.youtube.com/watch?v=pUYubkMD3xs	Large number of wounded persons	Hospital in Beirut	Doctor and injured person testimony	Protected persons	High
W-LB-08	www.youtube.com/watch?v=aTHbrQd95s0	Damage and civilian suffering	Bekaa	Wide destruction and serious damage to civilian infrastructure	Distinction / proportionality	High
W-LB-09	www.youtube.com/watch?v=7wRbwKK77ow	Paramedics' testimonies	South Lebanon	Medical objects	Deliberate targeting	High
W-LB-10	www.youtube.com/watch?v=oeNkeI5ixG4&t=82s	Journalist testimony	South Lebanon	Journalists targeted	Distinction	High

Annex B: Table Linking Testimonies to Visual Materials

Witness Code	Source / Time	Main Assertion	Supporting Evidence	Legal Relevance	Reliability
W-LB-01-A	W-LB-01 / 01:40	Destruction and civilian casualties in Beirut	V-LB-01/03/06/07/08	Precautions	Medium-High
W-LB-01-B	W-LB-01 / 01:55	Attack on civilians in Beirut	V-LB-01/03/06/07/08	Forced displacement	Medium

W-LB-02-A	W-LB-02 / 01:06	Civilian suffering	V-LB-02	Distinction	Medium
W-LB-02-B	W-LB-02 / 01:50	Civilian suffering	V-LB-02	Harm to the civilian population	High
W-LB-03-A	W-LB-03 / 00:06	Large number of civilian victims	V-LB- 01/03/06/07/08/09/10	Property damage	High
W-LB-03-B	W-LB-03 / 00:50	The victims were civilians; entire families were wiped out - Southern Suburbs - Hayy al- Sullum	V-LB-06/07/08/09	Status of victims	High
W-LB-03-C	W-LB-03 / 01:08	Doctor describes the arrival of large numbers of wounded persons in Beirut	V-LB- 01/03/06/07/08/09/10	Targeting civilians without distinction and without warning	High
W-LB-04-A	W-LB-04	Paramedic describes the targeting of medical teams - Nabatieh, South Lebanon	V-LB-13	Targeting medical objects	High
W-LB-05-A	W-LB-05	Civilians and a social worker targeted in Baysour	V-LB-06	Protected persons / no warning	High
W-LB-06-A	W-LB-06 / 02:33	Civilians and a large number of children targeted in Shmustar, Bekaa	V-LB-15	Protected persons / no warning	High
W-LB-07-A	W-LB-07 / 00:07	Injured person describes the targeting of civilians and residential areas in Beirut	V-LB- 01/03/06/07/08/09/10	Distinction / proportionality / indiscriminate attacks	High

W-LB-07-B	W-LB-07 / 00:24	Doctor describes the large number of victims and wounded persons in Beirut	V-LB-01/03/06/07/08/09/10	Distinction / indiscriminate attacks	High
W-LB-08-A	W-LB-08 / 00:50	Civilian objects and objects indispensable to the survival of civilians	V-LB-04	Distinction	High
W-LB-08-B	W-LB-08 / 02:00	Civilian homes in the Bekaa	V-LB-15	Civilian objects	High
W-LB-09-A	W-LB-09 / 00:18	Paramedic describes casualties among civilians	All evidence	Civilian population	High
W-LB-09-B	W-LB-09 / 03:54	Wounded civil defense member describes the dangers they face as a result of targeting	-	Protected categories / civil defense	High
W-LB-09-C	W-LB-09 / 05:00	Civil defense member describes the dangers they face as a result of targeting and refers to the killing of a child	All evidence	Protected categories / civil defense	High
W-LB-10-C	W-LB-10	Journalist who was injured and whose colleague was killed describes the incident	V-LB-16	Targeting journalists / protected categories	High

Annex C: Table Linking Evidence to Legal Elements

Evidence	Legal Element	Witness Support	Legal Assessment
V-LB-01/ V-LB-07/ V-LB-08/ V-LB-09	Distinction	W-LB-01/ W-LB-03/ W-LB-05/ W-LB-06/ W-LB-08	Strong indicators that the attacks affected a civilian environment
V-LB-03/ V-LB-05/ V-LB-08/ V-LB-09/ V-LB-10/ V-LB-11	Proportionality	W-LB-05/ W-LB-06/ W-LB-08	Large and reasonably foreseeable civilian harm
V-LB-06/ V-LB-03/ V-LB-05/ V-LB-08/ V-LB-09/ V-LB-10	Precautions	W-LB-06	Indicators of absence of warnings
V-LB-14/ V-LB-15	Harm to civilians	W-LB-01/ W-LB-03/ W-LB-05/ W-LB-06/ W-LB-07/ W-LB-08	Deliberate targeting of civilians
V-LB-03/ V-LB-04/ V-LB-10	Civilian objects	W-LB-08	Significant long-term civilian impact
V-LB-16	Protected persons	W-LB-10	Deliberate targeting of journalists
V-LB-12/ V-LB-13	Medical objects / civil defense	W-LB-04/ W-LB-09	Systematic deliberate targeting of medical objects and civil defense
V-LB-02/ V-LB-07	Intentional infliction of suffering on civilians	W-LB-02	Forced displacement
All evidence	Systematic and intentional pattern	All evidence	Repetition of attacks across multiple locations

Annex D: Table Assessing Source Reliability

Category	Indicators	Limitations	Overall Assessment
Field video (YouTube)	Direct footage; environmental indicators	Limited metadata, especially as to geographic scope;	High

		however, the evidence visible in the video can help identify the geographic location	
News video	Editorial controls; context	Possible media framing	High
Civilian testimony	Direct accounts from witnesses	Subjective character	Medium-High
Medical / rescue testimony	Professional perspective	Partial scope	High
Cross-corroboration of evidence	Multiple independent consistencies	-	Very high

Note: News videos include sources such as Reuters, Al Jazeera, Euronews, The Guardian, AP, and others.

Annex E: Table Classifying Munitions Effects

Evidence Code	Link	Observed Effects	Preliminary Munitions Assessment	Reliability	Legal Relevance
V-LB-01	www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPM6jZuSQpM	Direct attack on a residential building; clear blast effect; structural collapse	Consistent with an air-dropped high-explosive munition	High	Distinction; foreseeable civilian harm
V-LB-03	www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfPUQGdCgyU	Residential environment; dense vertical smoke	Consistent with air-to-ground munitions with extended effects in a densely populated residential area	Medium	Proportionality
V-LB-04	https://tinyurl.com/yc2mh982	Destruction of a bridge and interruption of infrastructure	Consistent with an aerial munitions directed at a fixed target	High	Impact on civilian infrastructure
V-LB-05	www.independent.co.uk/tv/news/israeli-army-	Successive attacks within a medium-	Consistent with multiple air	High	Distinction; systematic

	video-shows-multiple-strikes-on-lebanese-villages-b2953185.html	density residential environment	attacks using high-explosive munitions; cumulative risk		pattern; cumulative harm
V-LB-06	www.youtube.com/watch?v=wEUMkmdFX-4	Large explosion in the middle of a residential area with significant destruction	Indirectly consistent with the effects of an air-dropped high-explosive munition	High	Pattern of civilian injury; precautions
V-LB-07	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRdmPOU7iTU	Scenes of destruction in different residential areas	Large-caliber explosive munition	Medium	Destruction of civilian objects
V-LB-08	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQ8-RiZS94g	Families under rubble, destroyed buildings, vertical smoke and fires	Strongly consistent with structural collapse caused by the explosion of a high-explosive munitions	High	Presence of civilians; severity of harm
V-LB-09	www.reuters.com/video/watch/idRW304516042026RP1/	High-explosive munitions and successive attacks	Consistent with an air-dropped high-explosive munitions	High	Residential areas; proportionality; systematic pattern
V-LB-10	https://www.youtube.com/shorts/HR67SHprBM_c	Explosion of a high-explosive munitions, sounds of warplanes, and vertical smoke plume	Consistent with the effects of air-dropped munitions on a built environment	High	Proportionality; distinction
V-LB-11	www.euronews.com/video/2026/03/05/aftermath-following-overnight-israeli-strikes-on-south-beirut	Destruction and structural collapses in residential buildings	Consistent with multiple air attacks	High	Large-scale effects

V-LB-12	www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZGF0NkL_a2A	Extensive losses and neighborhood-level destruction	Consistent with air-dropped high-explosive munitions with medium to high destructive capacity	High	Large-scale effects
V-LB-14	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i8IvCWKE RO4	Extensive losses and neighborhood-level destruction	Consistent with air-dropped high-explosive munitions with medium to high destructive capacity	High	Large-scale effects; systematic pattern
V-LB-15	www.facebook.com/watch/?v=984288587363173	Dense vertical smoke and dust rising from a residential area	Consistent with an air-dropped high-explosive munitions impacting residential buildings	Medium	Excessive harm
W-LB-01	www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwlcTLZqtbw	Traces of destruction and multiple attacks	Consistent with the effects of air attacks using high-capacity explosive munitions	High	Distinction; proportionality; precautions

Annex F: Blast and Fragmentation Analysis

66- The information contained in the evidence register, when analysed, shows a pattern more consistent with blast and fragmentation effects associated with air-delivered high-explosive munitions than with limited-effect penetrator munitions or low-destructive-capacity weapons. This assessment does not rest on a single indicator, but on the convergence of several indicators appearing across attack footage, post-destruction materials, and available testimonies.

67- The clearest indicators include total or partial collapses of residential buildings; debris spreading beyond the immediate point of impact into surrounding streets

and nearby buildings; and multiple civilian injuries, including children. These elements indicate that the blast effect was not confined to a narrow point of impact, but extended through blast pressure and fragmentation affecting the targeted building and its immediate surroundings. In this sense, the observed pattern does not reflect the effect of an attack confined to an isolated target, but a broader effect within a civilian environment.

68- Distinguishing between superficial damage and structural collapse is an important element in this assessment. When the materials show the collapse of building foundations, pancaking of floors, or the fall of parts of a building, this indicates that the structure was subjected either to a direct attack or to sufficient blast pressure to weaken its internal structure. In densely populated urban environments, such as Beirut and its southern suburbs and cities in southern Lebanon, this type of damage entails foreseeable secondary effects, including progressive collapse, transfer of debris to neighboring buildings, and the entrapment of residents under the rubble.

69- With regard to injuries, the testimonies support this assessment. Statements by paramedics, doctors, and civil defense personnel refer to multiple injuries, wounded children, and persons trapped under rubble. These patterns are consistent with exposure to explosions in enclosed spaces and to fragmentation effects, and the testimonies help link the scene of physical destruction to the human consequences.

70- The spatial characteristics of the damage also show the extension of blast effects beyond the alleged target. In several cases, damage affected neighboring civilian buildings and public spaces, indicating that the actual area of effect was not confined to a single target. In densely built environments, as in many Lebanese areas, any munition directed at a specific target may, by its physical nature, produce effects extending to the nearby surroundings. This has direct importance in assessing proportionality and the duty to take precautions.

71- The materials do not consistently show indicators of tightly confined effects, such as specific penetration holes or a very limited damage area. Although the absence of these indicators does not rule out the use of guided munitions, it indicates that their effects in the incidents presented were not actually confined to a single target. This point remains essential to the assessment, as the issue is not limited to the technical characteristics of the weapon but extends to its actual results in the environment in which it was used.

72- In sum, the available evidence supports the conclusion that the documented incidents involved blast and fragmentation effects of sufficient force to cause structural collapses, casualties, and the extension of damage into a wider civilian area. These characteristics have direct legal significance, as the assessment of an attack under international humanitarian law is linked to the foreseeable consequences of the means used, particularly in densely populated civilian environments. In this context, these attacks constitute violations of international law and fall within practices that may amount to war crimes.

Preliminary Classification of Munitions

73- The information supports the consistency of the facts with the use of conventional explosive air-delivered munitions based on a high-explosive charge and producing combined blast and fragmentation effects. In cases involving the destruction of fixed structures or repeated targeting of the same site, the pattern may also be consistent with air-to-ground guided munitions. However, the available materials do not allow attribution to a specific type of bomb or missile.

74- In cases showing large-scale destruction in residential neighborhoods or across several buildings, the observed effects are consistent either with repeated attacks or with the use of munitions with sufficient destructive capacity to produce wide effects in civilian environments.

Annex G: Table Linking Weapon Effects to Legal Consequences

Evidence	Description of Munition Effects	Foreseeable Consequences for Civilians	IHL Relevance	Criminal Implication
Attacks on residential buildings	Explosion, collapse, rubble, casualties	Death, injuries, entrapment under rubble, destruction of homes	Distinction; proportionality	Attacks against civilians / civilian objects
Repeated night and day attacks	Multiple attacks, fires, panic, displacement	Forced displacement, fear, cumulative exposure to danger	Precautions; protection of civilians	Pattern of unlawful attacks
Attacks on infrastructure	Destruction of bridges / roads	Obstruction of evacuation and delivery of aid	Protection of civilian infrastructure; precautions	Damage to civilian objects
Damage to civilian buildings outside the scope of targeting	Wide-area rubble; neighborhood-level destruction	Wide incidental civilian losses	Proportionality	Excessive incidental damage
Hospitals and ambulance units	Influx of civilian casualties; children; overwhelmed response	Confirmation of the civilian character of the victims	Civilian status; protected persons	Deliberate targeting of medical objects
Protected categories	Systematic targeting of journalists	Confirmation of the professional status of the victims	Protected civilian	Deliberate targeting of journalists

Annex H: Geolocation and Attack Distribution Map

75- The information contained in the evidence allows a high level of certainty in identifying geographic locations on Lebanese territory. This assessment is not based on assumption, but on the clarity of locations within the filmed materials themselves, whether through explicit mention or through urban characteristics that leave no serious room for confusion.

- 76- A higher level of confidence is justified when specific elements clearly converge: direct location identification in the video or its description, matching visual indicators including building patterns, street structure, and residential density, and the consistency of these indicators across more than one source.
- 77- In the materials under analysis, locations are not inferred theoretically; they appear directly and are identifiable. Some clips name the place explicitly, while others show a distinctive urban environment allowing reliable identification. This clarity, supported by the recurrence of the same indicators across different clips, practically limits the possibility of error.
- 78- Accordingly, geolocation in this file is classified at a medium to high level of reliability, based on direct visual clarity, explicit or quasi-explicit location identification, and consistent recurrence across multiple sources.
- 79- These locations are clearly and directly distributed between Beirut, the southern suburbs, the villages of the south, and the Bekaa, showing that the attacks were not concentrated in one place, but affected different civilian environments in fact, not only in terms of geographic spread but also in the type and urban character of the places targeted.
- 80- In Beirut and the southern suburbs, the attacks occurred within a dense urban fabric, with adjoining buildings, narrow roads, and continuous civilian movement, meaning that any attack would not remain within the point of impact but would extend directly to surrounding buildings. In the villages of the south, attacks occurred inside residential clusters where homes, roads, and services are interwoven, that is, in places where civilians live daily. In the Bekaa, despite the presence of open spaces, the attacks remained within or near inhabited areas, including main roads and residential gatherings.
- 81- These were not merely separate incidents. A clear recurrence in the method of execution appears across different areas. In all these cases, civilians were present and the location was used for civilian purposes, making harm to civilians foreseeable rather than exceptional.

82- The map of attacks shows this clearly, in terms of repeated attacks inside inhabited areas and their spread across more than one sector. It confirms that what occurred was an operational sequence rather than separate random events, meaning that the impact on civilians was foreseeable.

83- In this context, the high level of certainty here is not only the result of subsequent analysis; it arises from the clarity of the visual evidence itself. It establishes that the planners and executors of the attacks in “Israel,” at their various levels of command, knew or should have known, in light of the circumstances prevailing before or at the time of the attack, of the effects of the targeting on civilians and the population, and that such acts may amount to war crimes.

Annex I: Geolocation and Spatial Linkage Table

Evidence Code	Link	Alleged / Inferred Location	Basis for Geolocation	Reliability	Relevance of Linkage
V-LB-01	www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPM6jZuSQpM	Beirut (urban residential area)	Source description + dense urban pattern + civilian street indicators	High	Attack on a residential area
V-LB-02	www.youtube.com/watch?v=MnfRSy_CAA4	Vicinity of the Southern Suburbs of Beirut	Highway pattern and urban density	Medium	Civilian suffering
V-LB-03	www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfPUQGdCgyU	South Lebanon (built-up area)	Source description + populated area + civilian-type structures	High	Air attacks on civilian areas
V-LB-04	https://tinyurl.com/yc2mh982	Bridge in South Lebanon - Qasmiyeh Bridge	Source description + nature of the target as infrastructure	High	Destruction of vital infrastructure
V-LB-05	www.independent.co.uk/tv/news/israeli-army-video-shows-multiple-strikes-	Southern villages area (Taybeh)	Source description + geographic environment	Medium	Attacks on residential areas

	on-lebanese-villages-b2953185.html				
V-LB-06	www.youtube.com/watch?v=wEUMkmdFX-4	Beirut + Kayfoun	Source description	Medium	Civilian objects without warning
V-LB-07	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRdmPOU7iTU	South Lebanon	Source description + testimonies + geographic environment	High	Systematic and large-scale attacks
V-LB-08	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQ8-RiZS94g	Beirut + Southern Suburbs of Beirut	Source description + street observations + geographic environment	High	Systematic attacks on residential areas
V-LB-09	www.reuters.com/video/watch/idRW304516042026RP1/	Nabatieh, South Lebanon	Source description	Medium	Destruction of civilian property
V-LB-10	www.youtube.com/shorts/HR67SHprBMc	Tyre, South Lebanon	Source description + geographic environment	High	Systematic attacks on residential areas
V-LB-11	www.euronews.com/video/2026/03/05/aftermath-following-overnight-israeli-strikes-on-south-beirut	Beirut area	Source description + urban landmarks	Medium	Large-scale damage
V-LB-12	www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZGF0NkL_a2A	Tibnin Hospital - South Lebanon	Source description	Medium	Medical objects
V-LB-13	www.instagram.com/reel/DXMyOWAEe1R/	Nabatieh - South Lebanon	Source description + urban environment	High	Targeting medical objects

V-LB-14	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i8IvCWKERO4	Kayfoun, Aley	Source description + urban environment	High	Targeting civilian objects
V-LB-15	www.facebook.com/watch/?v=984288587363173	Shmustar - Bekaa	Source description + urban environment	Medium	Residential area
V-LB-16	www.youtube.com/watch?v=hAmyEyVBnE	Alma al-Shaab - South Lebanon	Source description	High	Targeting a journalist on Lebanese territory
W-LB-01	www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwlcTLZqtbw	Beirut + Southern Suburbs	Source description + urban environment + street landmarks	High	Repeated, systematic attacks on an environment with civilian residents
W-LB-02	www.youtube.com/watch?v=aG4aOHjB2N4&t=90s	Beirut	Source description + street landmarks + urban environment	High	Internally displaced persons as a result of forced displacement
W-LB-03	www.youtube.com/watch?v=SOvvgDevnC8	Beirut + Southern Suburbs	Source description + street landmarks + witness statements	High	Attack on civilians in a residential area
W-LB-04	https://tinyurl.com/22ycjvsm	Nabatieh - South Lebanon	Source description + interview context	High	Repeated targeting of ambulances on Lebanese territory
W-LB-05	www.instagram.com/reel/DW6kvZRDBpQ	Kayfoun - Aley	Source description + interview context + urban environment	High	Attack on a residential area
W-LB-06	www.youtube.com/watch?v=txVmFLR0D5U	Shmustar - Bekaa	Source description + urban environment + interview context	High	Attack on a residential area

W-LB-07	www.youtube.com/watch?v=pUYubkMD3xs	Beirut	Source description + interview context	High	Extensive harm in a civilian environment
W-LB-08	www.youtube.com/watch?v=aTHbrQd95s0	Bekaa	Source description + interview context	High	Systematic attacks on civilian objects
W-LB-09	www.youtube.com/watch?v=7wRbwKK77ow	Multiple Lebanese areas	Source description	Medium	Attacks distributed across Lebanese territory
W-LB-10	www.youtube.com/watch?v=oeNkeI5ixG4&t=82s	Alma al-Shaab	Source description	High	Attack on journalists on Lebanese territory

Conclusion on the Context of the Attacks

84- The geographic analysis shows that the evidence is concentrated within three main areas. The first is Greater Beirut and its center, where clips of direct attacks intersect with post-targeting scenes and victims' accounts within a dense residential urban environment. The second is the southern suburbs of Beirut, where repeated clips of attacks, scenes of destruction, and testimonies about continuing bombardment and displacement indicate that a civilian area was subjected to sustained operational pressure. The third is southern Lebanon, where attacks on villages, damage to infrastructure, and civilian testimonies show a parallel pattern of harm inflicted on the population.

85- Alongside these areas, an additional dimension relates to infrastructure, especially bridges and roads, where some materials show the targeting of such locations in a context affecting civilian movement and the arrival of assistance, within the limits of what can be derived from the available information.

86- Analytically, this distribution indicates that the facts are not limited to isolated incidents, but extend across multiple areas. This spread is significant when assessing whether the harm to civilians was foreseeable and when considering the sufficiency of measures taken to limit that harm.

Annex J: Assessment of the Degree of Reliability

87- Assessing the degree of reliability performs a function different from assessing source reliability. Reliability concerns the extent to which a source can be relied upon and its coherence, while the degree of confidence concerns the strength of the conclusion that may be drawn from it within the limits of the available information.

88- A source may be highly reliable in form and content, yet may not provide sufficient detail to identify the location precisely or to characterize the nature of the damage, leaving the confidence level of the conclusion within a medium range. This distinction is used to control the level of conclusions and avoid exceeding what the evidence permits, while preserving the analytical value of the available materials.

Comprehensive Reliability Assessment Table

Evidence Code	Source Reliability	Location Reliability	Munition-Effect Reliability	Civilian Environment Reliability	Notes
V-LB-01	High	High	Medium	High	
V-LB-02	High	High	Medium	High	
V-LB-03	High	Medium	Medium	Medium-High	
V-LB-04	High	Medium	Low-Medium	Medium	
V-LB-05	High	Medium	Medium	High	
V-LB-06	Medium-High	Medium	Low	High	
V-LB-07	Medium-High	Low-Medium	Low	Medium	
V-LB-08	Medium	Medium	Low	High	
V-LB-09	High	Low-Medium	Low-Medium	Medium	
V-LB-10	High	Low-Medium	Low-Medium	High	

V-LB-11	Medium	Low	Low	Medium	
V-LB-12	Medium	Low	Low	Medium	
V-LB-13	Medium	Low	Low	Medium	
V-LB-14	Medium	Low	Low	Low-Medium	
V-LB-15	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium-High	
V-LB-16	High	Low-Medium	Low	Medium	
W-LB-01	High	Low-Medium	Low-Medium	High	
W-LB-02	Medium	Low	Low	Medium	
W-LB-03	Medium	Low-Medium	Low	Medium	
W-LB-04	High	Low-Medium	Low	High	
W-LB-05	High	High	Medium	High	
W-LB-06	High	Medium-High	Medium	High	
W-LB-07	Medium-High	Medium	Low-Medium	Medium-High	
W-LB-08	High	High	Medium	High	
W-LB-09	High	Medium-High	Medium	High	
W-LB-10	High	High	Medium	High	

Forensic Analysis Based on Weighted Confidence Levels

89- The cumulative assessment of the evidence contained in this file, as reflected in the confidence-level table, shows a coherent pattern of facts supported by varying degrees of reliability. When these items of evidence are considered together, they provide sufficient information to reach the level of certainty that war crimes were committed by “Israel.”

90- At the first level, the high-confidence evidence stands out, where source reliability intersects with the clarity of location, the nature of weapon effects, and the presence of a civilian environment. This evidence forms a principal basis for

the file, documenting attacks within urban residential areas in Beirut and its suburbs, accompanied by structural collapses, rubble-removal operations, and direct indicators of civilian presence. This convergence between assessment elements shows that the affected targets were located within a civilian area or a civilian environment, within the limits of what can be drawn from the available materials.

91- At the second level, the medium-to-high confidence evidence expands the geographic and thematic scope of the facts. This includes additional elements such as the targeting of village areas, the documentation of injuries among children, testimonies from medical teams and rescue personnel indicating the civilian character of the victims, and extensive destruction of private property. Although some of these materials do not provide the same level of specificity for every element, their intersection with high-confidence evidence strengthens the overall consistency of the pattern.

92- The third level includes medium-confidence evidence which, despite the limitations of some of its elements, contributes to completing the overall picture. These materials highlight elements such as the absence of prior warning, displacement, fear among the population, and pressure on ambulance services. These indicators support an understanding of the context in which the incidents occurred, within the limits reflected by the available materials.

93- When these levels are assessed cumulatively, the evidence integrates into an interconnected evidentiary path: the most reliable evidence establishes the essential elements, while the other evidence broadens the context and reinforces the general assessment. This convergence of multiple sources, repeated patterns of attacks, and similar effects on civilian environments supports the conclusion that there was a systematic pattern of conduct, indiscriminate in effect and wide in scope.

94- Accordingly, the accumulation of high- and medium-confidence evidence, together with the consistency appearing among it, provides a sufficient basis for

stating that possible violations of international humanitarian law occurred and supports the conclusion that acts were committed that may amount to war crimes.

Conclusion

- 95- Based on the record prepared according to the adopted methodology and on the legal analysis grounded in the rules of international humanitarian law and international criminal law, the information contained in this file shows a legal certainty sufficient to state that the “Israeli army’s” hostile operations in Lebanon were carried out in circumstances incompatible with the obligations imposed by international humanitarian law. This information also indicates criminal responsibility for acts constituting war crimes.
- 96- This assessment is not based on isolated facts, but on the convergence of multiple sources, including attack footage, post-destruction scenes, and testimonies from civilians, medical personnel, and rescue teams. When these elements are considered together, a repeated pattern of attacks affecting civilian environments appears, including densely populated areas in Beirut, its southern suburbs, southern Lebanon, and the Bekaa. The materials also show the presence of civilians in the vicinity of targeting or at the moment it occurred, together with patterns of damage indicating blast and fragmentation effects extending to surrounding residential buildings.
- 97- Under international humanitarian law, at this stage, these elements indicate violations of the fundamental principles governing the conduct of hostilities, as reflected in the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law. In particular, the recurrence of attacks within environments of clear civilian character raises questions regarding respect for the principle of distinction, especially in the absence of consistent indicators of specific military objectives in multiple sites, compared with the presence of indicators showing the civilian character of the affected areas.
- 98- The scale and spread of the damage, including the destruction of residential buildings, civilian injuries, and the presence of children, paramedics, and

journalists among the victims, indicates that incidental harm was not merely a possibility but a result that could be expected from the nature of the means used. In densely populated residential places in Lebanon, the use of explosive munitions with wide-area effects carries elevated risks for civilians. The information supports a preliminary assessment that this harm may, in a number of cases, have been excessive in relation to any expected direct military advantage.

99- With regard to the duty to take precautions, some testimonies show the absence of effective warnings, alongside the presence of civilians at the time of targeting, raising questions as to whether all feasible measures to limit harm were exhausted. In environments known to have a continuous civilian presence, international humanitarian law imposes a higher level of care, which is precisely what the information places under assessment.

100- The recurrence of incidents across multiple sites, together with similar patterns of damage and excessive harm to civilians, confirms that the acts under review do not reflect isolated events but are connected to a broader pattern of operational practice. This supports the conclusion that “Israeli” officials did not take the required measures during targeting to assess proportionality and to implement precautions.

101- When these facts are linked to international criminal law, they may be characterized, on a preliminary basis, as war crimes, including attacks directed against civilians or civilian objects, or the launching of attacks with knowledge of the likelihood of causing excessive incidental harm. The information also raises the possibility of systematic indiscriminate attacks. Accordingly, this file supports the taking of additional steps by the Lebanese Government to identify individual responsibilities on the part of the enemy, assess the role of Israeli political and military command levels, hold them accountable, and prevent impunity.

102- In sum, at its current stage, this analysis provides an evidence-based and interconnected foundation for stating that the “Israeli” hostile operations addressed in this file involve grave violations of international humanitarian law and amount to war crimes.

Section Two

Documentary Report on the Targeting of the Bridges and Crossings of the Litani River in Southern Lebanon

Introduction

- 1- This report addresses the series of Israeli attacks that struck main bridges and crossings over the Litani River and its tributaries, or on access routes leading to them, during March and April 2026. These incidents do not appear as isolated strikes, but rather as one operational objective: the successive targeting of the crossings and bridges of the Litani River, and the reduction of the population's ability to move between the area south of the river and the rest of Lebanon, and vice versa.
- 2- The Litani bridges are treated in this report as civilian objects because they are public crossings used by the population, official institutions, and medical and humanitarian actors. The harm caused by their destruction is not measured only by the physical damage to the structures, but also by the resulting disruption of passage, the restriction of access to medical care and essential supplies, and the weakening of the ability of relief actors and official institutions to reach the population.
- 3- Cross-checked sources show that the targeting of bridges began with the attack on the Zrariyeh Bridge over the Litani on 13 March 2026, and then expanded over the following days to other bridges. Reuters reported that the "Israeli" army said it had targeted the Zrariyeh Bridge on the allegation that Hezbollah used it to move between northern and southern Lebanon, while noting clearly that the army did not publicly provide evidence for that claim. Reuters later reported the Israeli Minister of Defense as saying that Israel had targeted two additional bridges over the Litani, before reporting, on 24 March, that Israel said it had destroyed five bridges over the river since 13 March.

- 4- The assessment does not stop at the number of bridges. In a visual investigation, Reuters reported that Israel's campaign aimed to separate southern Lebanon within a new "buffer zone", and that several bridges over the Litani had been damaged or destroyed. Human Rights Watch concluded that Israeli attacks had destroyed or severely damaged all the main bridges connecting areas south of the Litani with the rest of the country, and that some of them had been targeted more than once.
- 5- The legal issue here is not limited to proving that a specific bridge was targeted. It concerns the successive removal from service of several civilian crossings over the Litani, which isolated wide areas and disrupted the movement of civilians and relief. The available evidence leads to a clear conclusion: the bridges and crossings were targeted in sequence, and the civilian effect was direct, foreseeable, and capable of assessment before the attacks were carried out.

Methodology

- 6- The report relied on preserving the original links and materials, comparing sources, and connecting each item to its location on the map and to the effect left by the attack on civilian movement, in line with the open-source documentation logic reflected in the Berkeley methodology. The analysis is based on the convergence of materials from multiple sources, including Lebanese Army statements, in addition to visual materials and published "Israeli" statements. Each attached item of evidence proves part of the incident, whether in relation to the bridge's location, the moment of targeting, the scale of damage, or the isolation that followed the destruction of the crossing. When these materials are read together, the sequence becomes clear.
- 7- The Israeli narrative is included in this report because it forms part of the evidence. It reveals that the bridges were intended targets in operational planning and execution, not collateral damage. It is not enough to say that the Litani bridges were being used militarily. That must be established for each bridge, and specifically at the time it was targeted, together with the direct military

advantage, an assessment of the expected civilian harm, and proof that feasible precautions were in fact taken.

Evidence and Factual Correlation

Evidence One

www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-strikes-bridge-over-litani-river-lebanon-2026-03-13/

- 8- This evidence establishes the start of the targeting of the Litani bridges through the attack on the Zrariyeh bridge on 13 March 2026. Reuters reported that Israel destroyed a bridge in southern Lebanon over the Litani River, and quoted the Israeli army's claim that the bridge had been used by Hezbollah to move between northern and southern Lebanon, while clearly noting that the army did not publicly provide evidence for that claim. The importance of this evidence lies not only in proving the attack, but also in revealing the weakness of its public justification. As a civilian crossing over the Litani, the bridge remains a protected civilian object unless it is shown, at the moment of attack and on the basis of specific evidence, that it was making an effective and direct contribution to military action.
- 9- The effect of targeting this bridge was not limited to a local disruption. It entered into a broader sequence reducing the available crossing options for civilians, especially when followed by attacks on other bridges over the same river. This makes the harm broader than the bridge structure itself, because disabling it places pressure on other routes and reduces the options available to civilians.

Evidence Two

www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-struck-two-bridges-over-lebanons-litani-river-defence-minister-says-2026-03-18/

- 10- This evidence establishes that the targeting did not remain limited to one bridge. Reuters reported on 18 March 2026 that the Israeli Minister of Defense said Israel had targeted two additional bridges over the Litani, allegedly because they

were used to smuggle weapons southward. At this point, the matter was no longer about a single bridge. Within a few days, the targeting had begun to affect the Litani crossings as an integrated network.

- 11- Legally, all bridges cannot be grouped under one single characterization. Each bridge requires independent proof regarding military use and the timing of that use. This evidence heightens the importance of the principle of individual assessment of targets, because the move from one bridge to several bridges over the same river creates a clear legal risk: treating bridges as a targeted category, rather than as objects whose status must be examined individually.

Evidence Three

www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-instructed-accelerate-demolition-lebanese-homes-frontline-2026-03-22/

- 12- This evidence establishes the targeting of a main bridge on a southern axis connecting southern Lebanon with the rest of the country, in the context of an Israeli order to destroy bridges over the Litani River. Israel targeted a main bridge in southern Lebanon, and the Israeli Minister of Defense said that the army had been ordered to destroy the bridges over the Litani. This material increases the reliability of the incident because it links the targeting to an announced decision directed against bridges, not to collateral damage caused during another attack.
- 13- This evidence is connected to the Qasmiyeh bridge and the coastal road axis. That axis is a public road with an essential civilian function, linking southern areas to urban and service centers to the north. The practical result was the disabling of a crossing used by civilians, ambulances, and supplies, with foreseeable effects on civilian movement, medical evacuation, the transport of essential goods, and the access of official and humanitarian actors to the population.

Evidence Four

www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-military-occupy-swathe-southern-lebanon-defence-chief-says-2026-03-24/

- 14- This evidence establishes that, by 24 March 2026, Israel had announced that it had destroyed five bridges over the Litani since 13 March, and that this was part of a campaign to prevent Hezbollah from reorganizing its presence south of the river. The importance of this material is that it moves the targeting from separate attacks to a policy of preventing passage: five bridges in a short period, within one operational conception, and linked to restricting movement south of the Litani.
- 15- This material is important because it shows that, in the thinking of the military leadership, the bridges were treated as military targets in a systematic and deliberate manner. It follows that the civilian harm caused by cutting crossings was foreseeable, because removing several bridges over the river from service naturally reduces crossing alternatives, lengthens access routes, and disrupts civilian and relief movement. In this area, the bridge forms part of the civilian infrastructure required for access to health care, essential goods, relief operations, and evacuation. Its disruption therefore produces a civilian effect that could be foreseen in advance and had to be included in proportionality and precautions assessments before the attack was carried out.

Evidence Five

www.reuters.com/graphics/IRAN-CRISIS/LEBANON-ISRAEL-INFRASTRUCTURE/gkvlklaxypb/

- 16- This evidence establishes that Israel's campaign aimed to separate southern Lebanon within a "buffer zone", and that several bridges in the south were destroyed or severely damaged, including bridges directly on the Litani. The report presents the bridges on a map, allowing the relationship between the

targeted locations to be seen not as scattered names, but as the systematic targeting of movement and passage.

17- This material proves that the damage did not stop at the moment of the explosion. The road remained cut or limited in use, affecting civilian movement and medical and humanitarian access. The disruption affected civilians' ability to move safely, reach treatment, and obtain essential supplies, and it also affected the ability of official and humanitarian institutions to reach the population. This type of harm lies at the core of the legal proportionality assessment, because it is direct and foreseeable when main crossings are removed from service.

Evidence Six

www.abc.net.au/news/2026-03-28/verify-mapping-israel-s-bombing-of-lebanese-bridges/106504560

18- This evidence establishes the detailed geographic connection between the targeted bridges. The verification team identified the locations of bridges that were damaged or destroyed over the Litani and its tributaries, mapped them, and stated that the targeted bridges formed part of a network connecting central Lebanon with the south. It referred to the Qasmiyeh, Khardali, Qaqaiyeh, Zrariyeh-Tayr Falsay, and Dalafeh bridges.

19- The importance of this evidence is that it connects each bridge to its location and function. Khardali affects the Nabatieh-Marjayoun axis, Zrariyeh strikes a crossing over the Litani, Qasmiyeh targets the coastal road, and Qaqaiyeh and Dalafeh add further layers to the circle of isolation. Accordingly, the legal assessment of each bridge is tied to its role in connecting the population to services, essential goods, evacuation routes, and relief.

Evidence Seven

www.abc.net.au/news/2026-03-24/israel-planning-to-occupy-southern-lebanon-to-the-litani-river/106493608

- 20- This evidence establishes that the statements of the Israeli Minister of Defense were not confined to a particular attack, but formed part of a broader plan relating to control over the area south of the Litani. He said that the army had destroyed five bridges over the Litani and that Israel would seek to control the remaining crossings.
- 21- This evidence matters because it reveals that control over the crossings was part of the declared military thinking, not an incidental result after the targeting. The reference to controlling the crossings does not describe a collateral effect; it reveals that the crossings themselves were part of the operational objective. This strengthens the conclusion that the destruction of the bridges was used as a means of geographic isolation and control of movement. It therefore requires strict legal scrutiny of distinction, proportionality, and precautions, because control over civilian crossings directly affects the movement of the population and their access to essential services and relief.

Evidence Eight

<https://tinyurl.com/yp99d9e6>

- 22- This official evidence, issued by the Lebanese Army Command - Directorate of Orientation, establishes that the targeting of the Qasmiyeh sea bridge - Tyre on 16 April 2026 led to its destruction, and that the practical purpose of that attack, according to the Army statement, was to separate and isolate the area south of the Litani from its north. The statement also establishes that the attack killed one person and injured two others, in addition to injuring one soldier from the unit stationed at the bridge.
- 23- The importance of this evidence is that it does not come only from a press source or a human rights organization, but from an official Lebanese institution directly concerned in the field with assessing and rehabilitating the bridge. It adds three decisive points to the evidentiary record: it establishes the name and location of the bridge, it establishes the result of isolation, and it establishes casualties and the injury of a Lebanese soldier linked to the site. The issue is therefore no longer

a theoretical effect of destroying a bridge, but an announced isolation of the area south of the Litani and direct human losses in the vicinity of the crossing. The attack did not merely destroy a structure; it isolated a wide area and disrupted an essential civilian link.

Evidence Nine

<https://tinyurl.com/yc7fmwr2>

- 24- This second official evidence, issued by the Lebanese Army on 19 April 2026, establishes that the Army fully reopened the Khardali-Nabatieh road, partially reopened the Burj Rahal-Tyre Bridge, and was working to rehabilitate the Tayr Falsay-Tyre bridge, after the damage caused by the Israeli aggression.
- 25- This statement is important because it proves, in practical terms, that the effects of the attacks were not confined to the Qasmiyeh Bridge alone. The Army was not speaking of a theoretical assessment, but of reopening roads and bridges that had been disrupted by the attacks. The mention of Khardali, Burj Rahal, and Tayr Falsay in one official statement shows that the entire crossing network had been damaged and required engineering and field intervention to reconnect the areas.
- 26- The statement also shows that the harm did not end when the attack ended. The Army had to reopen roads and bridges, which means that civilian and institutional movement remained disrupted or limited after the targeting. The need to reopen the Khardali road fully, to open Burj Rahal partially, and to work on opening Tayr Falsay means that civilians and humanitarian institutions were facing a disabled crossing network. This reinforces the applicability of the duty to take precautions and the duty to facilitate relief, because destroying roads needed by people and then leaving them cut or only partially open multiplies civilian harm.

Evidence Ten

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/04/10/lebanon-israeli-strikes-kill-hundreds-damage-vital-bridge>

- 27- This evidence from Human Rights Watch establishes that the attacks struck all the main bridges connecting the areas south of the Litani to the rest of the country, and that some of them were targeted more than once. The report also links the destruction of the bridges to the risk of isolating civilians from food, health care, and humanitarian assistance.
- 28- This material proves that the harm did not stop at the moment of the explosion. The road remained cut or limited in use, affecting civilian movement and medical and humanitarian access. The disruption impaired civilians' ability to move safely, reach treatment, and obtain essential supplies, and it also impaired the ability of official and humanitarian institutions to reach the population. This type of harm lies at the core of the legal proportionality assessment, because it is direct and foreseeable when main crossings are removed from service.

Evidence Eleven

www.hrw.org/news/2026/04/16/lebanon-israeli-bridge-attack-a-potential-war-crime

- 29- This evidence establishes that the destruction of the Qasmiyeh bridge threatened to cut off Lebanese territory south of the Litani from the rest of Lebanon, and that the attack should be investigated as an attack on a civilian object or as a disproportionate attack that may amount to a war crime. The importance of this evidence lies in the fact that, at that stage, Qasmiyeh was the last essential remaining crossing for civilians and aid. Its civilian value was therefore at its highest. The greater the civilian importance of the bridge becomes because alternatives have been destroyed, the more urgent the duty becomes to refrain from targeting it, or to provide safe and effective alternatives.

Evidence Twelve

www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-establish-buffer-zone-south-lebanon-up-litani-river-defence-minister-says-2026-03-31/

- 30- This evidence establishes that bridge destruction was connected to a broader policy of establishing a buffer zone up to the Litani River and preventing the return of a large number of residents to the south of the river before “Israeli” conditions were met. This material does not discuss a specific bridge, but it places the targeting of bridges within its broader geographic and political context.
- 31- When this evidence is read together with the preceding evidence, the link becomes visible between destroying crossings and controlling movement and return. Destroying bridges is not only the disabling of infrastructure; it is a tool for reshaping access to an entire area. This strengthens the legal conclusion that the operation affected civilians by cutting the roads they need for survival, safety, return, access to care, and relief.
- 32- Taken together on the same map, this evidence shows that Qasmiyeh, Zrariyeh, Khardali, Qaqaiyeh, Tayr Falsay, Burj Rahal, and Dalafeh were not scattered points. They were crossings within one network needed by civilians, institutions, and relief actors. The public Israeli narrative did not provide specific evidence that each of these crossings had lost its civilian protection at the time it was targeted. The evidence therefore proves not only that the attacks occurred, but also that their object was a civilian crossing network, and that their effect was to isolate the population and reduce the means available for their protection.

Applicable rules

- 33- This report is based on the Geneva Conventions, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention, and on customary international humanitarian law.
- 34- Rule 7 of customary international humanitarian law requires that parties distinguish at all times between civilian objects and military objectives, and that attacks may be directed only against military objectives and must not be directed against civilian objects. Rule 8 provides that, with respect to objects, a military objective is only that which by its nature, location, purpose, or use makes an

effective contribution to military action and whose destruction or neutralization offers a definite military advantage.

35- On that basis, a bridge is a civilian object by nature and does not become a military objective merely because fighters may possibly cross it, because it is close to an area of operations, or because its destruction pressures the adversary. Actual and specific military use of the bridge at the time of the attack must be established, and the military advantage must be direct and definite.

36- Rule 14 of customary international humanitarian law prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. In applying proportionality, civilian harm is not limited to the persons present on the bridge at the moment of attack. In these incidents, it includes the consequences of removing crossings from service: disruption of medical evacuation, longer routes to hospitals, obstruction of the passage of food, medicine, and fuel, and restrictions on the movement of the population and relief. These are direct and foreseeable effects when main bridges are targeted, and they must be included in the assessment of the lawfulness of the attack before it is carried out.

37- Rule 15 imposes the duty to take constant care to spare the civilian population and civilian objects from the effects of military operations, and to take all feasible precautions to reduce harm. This duty should have increased after each attack, because each destroyed bridge reduced civilian alternatives and made the next bridge more important to the population.

38- The Fourth Geneva Convention also provides an additional basis for the protection of civilians and their property where its provisions apply. Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, in its context, expresses the logic of protecting civilians by ensuring the free passage of medical and food supplies and relief operations for the civilian population. In the context of this report, this article shows that the protection of civilians is not limited to refraining from directly

targeting persons. It also includes refraining from disabling the practical means that allow them to reach food, medicine, care, and relief. The targeting of all crossings over the Litani River constitutes a violation of Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as the destruction of civilian objects was used as a tool to impose collective punishment in the form of geographic isolation and deprivation of essential supplies that must reach the civilian population, namely protected persons, in southern Lebanon.

39- Rule 55 of customary international humanitarian law reinforces this meaning. It requires parties to the conflict to allow and facilitate the passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, subject to the right of control under conditions. If bridge destruction made the passage of relief more difficult or nearly impossible, the issue is no longer confined to the law of targeting; it extends to the duty not to obstruct humanitarian access.

40- International humanitarian law treats bridges as civilian objects. They do not lose that status unless the conditions for a military objective are met with precision, because they perform a public crossing function serving the civilian population, official institutions, and medical and humanitarian actors. These bridges lose their protection only if it is established, for each bridge individually and at the time of the attack specifically, that they made an effective contribution to military action and that their destruction offered a direct and definite military advantage. Even then, the attack remains subject to a strict assessment of proportionality and precautions, given the consequences of destroying a bridge for civilian movement, medical evacuation, relief access, and the transport of essential goods.

41- In the context of this report, the published Israeli narrative did not provide enough to establish that each targeted bridge was a military objective at the time it was attacked. It contained general allegations concerning the movement of fighters or weapons. That level of generality is not legally sufficient. Even if a particular bridge had been used at a particular moment for a military purpose,

that would not transform all Litani bridges into military objectives, nor would it make the same bridge a permanent target.

42- More seriously, the pattern of targeting did not appear to address individual cases, but an entire category of objects. International humanitarian law does not permit a civilian transport network to be turned into a collective target because of the possibility that it might be used by the adversary. Verification must be individual, military necessity must be specific, and proportionality must be calculated for each attack according to its particular and cumulative civilian effect.

The Effect of Destroying Bridges on Civilians

43- The effect of destroying the Litani bridges is measured by what became disrupted after the targeting. Crossings were removed from service or became limited in use; the Lebanese Army had to reopen roads and bridges; and, in the case of Qasmiyeh, the Army confirmed that the targeting led to the isolation of the area south of the Litani. These facts prove that the harm was neither momentary nor confined to the body of the bridge. It extended to civilian movement and to medical and humanitarian access.

44- The medical effect is the most urgent. In armed conflict, time can determine the life of a wounded or sick person. The destruction of a main bridge can turn a rapid medical route into a long journey through secondary roads, or can make access impossible at a critical moment. This harm enters into the proportionality calculation because it is a known consequence of the nature of the target itself. A party targeting a bridge knows, or should know, that ambulances and patients will use it, and that disabling it will affect access to health care.

45- The livelihood effect is no less important. Villages south of the Litani do not live in isolation from the rest of the country. Food, fuel, medicine, and essential supplies need continuous roads. When bridges are targeted one after another, the population does not lose only one road; their alternatives shrink, the cost of movement rises, and the danger increases. Human Rights Watch clearly linked

bridge destruction to the threat to civilians' access to food, health care, and humanitarian assistance.

46- The Lebanese Army statement on Qasmiyeh proves that the effect reached the level of actual isolation of the area south of the Litani, not merely confusion in movement. The Army stated that targeting and destroying the Qasmiyeh sea bridge - Tyre led to the separation and isolation of the area south of the Litani from its north, and referred to one person killed, two injured, and a soldier from the unit stationed at the bridge injured. These facts add an official and field dimension to the civilian analysis. The bridge was not an ordinary road; it was a point of connection for an entire area.

47- The humanitarian effect also appears in displacement and return. Bridges are not only passages for remaining in place; they are also passages for leaving danger and returning when possible. When they are destroyed, civilians may be forced to remain in unsafe areas, or prevented from returning to check on their homes, relatives, and property. The road itself becomes a restriction on the freedom of movement necessary for protection, especially when alternative crossings have been destroyed, damaged, or made unsafe.

48- The capacity of institutions is also disrupted, including municipalities, civil defense, the Red Cross, hospitals, and humanitarian organizations that need bridges to reach the population. The Army statement of 19 April 2026, referring to the full reopening of the Khardali-Nabatieh road, the partial reopening of the Burj Rahal bridge, and work to rehabilitate the Tayr Falsay bridge, proves that the harm was not immediate only; it required intervention to reconnect the roads. This means that the attacks disrupted the practical ability to move, and that civilians and institutions faced a damaged crossing network, not merely one destroyed site.

The Effect of Munitions and the Nature of the Targeting

49- The visual materials and reports indicate that the attacks directly struck the bridges or the crossing points connected to them. They were not merely collateral

damage affecting a bridge near another target. When aerial munitions are used against the body of a bridge, its deck, its supports, or the access road leading to it, the expected result is the disruption of passage. The civilian harm was not a later surprise; it was the natural consequence of choosing the target and the method of attack.

50- Targeting a bridge usually requires enough explosive power to create a defect in the load-bearing structure, the connection point, or the road leading to it. Once such a defect occurs, the bridge becomes unusable, dangerous, or limited to restricted passage. The effect of the attack therefore cannot be treated as secondary: cutting passage is the intended or expected result of this type of targeting.

51- The legal violation appears clearly here. If the natural result of the attack is to cut a vital civilian road, the military justification must be specific, strong, and supported by evidence, not general. The greater the number of bridges targeted, the greater the effect of the munitions on the population, because the targeting does not merely add to a list of damage; it reduces the remaining civilian alternatives.

The Israeli Narrative and Its Assessment

52- The declared Israeli narrative is that the Litani bridges were used, or could be used, by Hezbollah to move fighters or weapons. This narrative does not settle the issue of lawfulness. International humanitarian law does not accept the removal of protection from a civilian object merely because the attacking force declares that it was used militarily. What is required is specific verification, information linked to the time of the attack, an assessment of civilian harm, and consideration of less harmful means.

53- References to bridges, passage, and weapons do not prove that every targeted bridge was making an effective contribution to military action at the time of attack. The legal weakness of the narrative appears in the fact that it offers no explanation of the cumulative civilian harm. Even if some crossings were

assumed to have had a military use, destroying the bridge would still remain disproportionate in relation to the anticipated military advantage where alternatives were absent, such as targeting specific military vehicles as they crossed, monitoring the road, carrying out a temporary partial disabling, or maintaining an effective humanitarian corridor.

54- The Israeli narrative itself confirms the systematic and deliberate pattern. When a senior official announces that five bridges were destroyed and that control over the remaining crossings is required, the matter is no longer a limited field decision. It becomes a policy of isolation. In such a case, the general justification does not weaken the legal suspicion; it increases it, because the civilian harm was known and connected to the declared operational objective.

Legal Analysis

55- The evidence does not point to the targeting of one bridge. The sequence shows successive targeting of the Litani crossings, such that parts of the crossing network were removed from service one after another. Because bridges are civilian objects by nature, the attacking party had to prove, for each bridge and at the time of the attack, that it had become a military objective and that its destruction offered a direct and definite military advantage. The Israeli narrative remained general, while the civilian harm was specific and established: the area south of the Litani was isolated after the targeting of Qasmiyeh.

56- In the Zrariyeh incident, Evidence One establishes that Israel targeted a bridge over the Litani, and that the Israeli army claimed it had been used by Hezbollah to move between northern and southern Lebanon, without publicly providing evidence. The established fact here is not only that the bridge was targeted, but that the published justification remained general. Under the legal rule, it is not enough to say that the bridge is used for movement or may be used militarily. The attacking party must establish that this bridge, at the very time of the attack, was making an effective contribution to military action, and that disabling it offered a direct and definite military advantage. The absence of public evidence

does not by itself prove the absence of internal intelligence. However, on the basis of open sources, it supports the legal conclusion that the bridge remained a civilian object whose loss of protection was not established.

57- Evidence Two and Evidence Three then change the nature of the assessment.

The incident was no longer one attack on one bridge. Reuters reported the announcement that two additional bridges over the Litani had been targeted, and then reported on 22 March that Israel had targeted a main bridge linking southern Lebanon to the rest of the country after a military order to destroy all crossings over the Litani. At this point, the duty of verification becomes compelling, because the targeting was no longer limited to one crossing but affected an entire network of bridges. It is not legally permissible to say that all bridges over the river became targets merely because some of them might be useful to the adversary.

58- The seriousness of Qasmiyeh specifically appears from the convergence of two sources: Reuters described it as a main bridge linking the south to the rest of the country, and the Lebanese Army confirmed that its destruction led to the isolation of southern Litani. This fact proves that the bridge was not a secondary object or a minor road of limited effect, but a civilian crossing node. Under the rule of distinction, the bridge remains a civilian object unless its specific military status is established. Under the rule of proportionality, the harm is not calculated only at the moment of the explosion, but also by the consequences of disabling a main road used by civilians to reach Sidon, Beirut, hospitals, and supplies.

59- The civilian effect here is not a theoretical assumption. The destruction of the main bridges disrupted movement and humanitarian access and obstructed the delivery of essential supplies. The Lebanese Army statement confirmed, with regard to Qasmiyeh, the occurrence of isolation and the injury of civilians and a soldier. These facts establish foreseeability under the proportionality rule. Civilian harm was the natural consequence of targeting the bridges. When the

harm is so clear, any general, unspecified, or unproven military advantage is legally insufficient to justify the destruction of a civilian crossing network.

60- The civilian character of the bridges is established by their actual function. They were public crossings linking inhabited areas and serving the population, institutions, and relief. The evidence shows that the Qasmiyeh, Zrariyeh, Khardali, Qaqaiyeh, Tayr Falsay, Burj Rahal, and Dalafeh bridges formed part of a crossing network connecting inhabited areas to one another and to the rest of Lebanese territory. Their destruction therefore does not merely cause physical damage to objects; it disables an essential civilian function. This disruption enters into the calculation of expected civilian harm, whether under proportionality, the duty of precautions, or the duty to facilitate the passage of humanitarian relief.

61- The Khardali bridge is a clear example of the importance of geographic correlation. ABC Verify notes that Khardali connects the Nabatieh areas north of the Litani with Marjayoun, and the Lebanese Army statement of 19 April 2026 establishes that the Army fully reopened the Khardali-Nabatieh road after it was attacked. This means that its disruption affected an internal civilian axis between inhabited areas, not merely a presumed military passage. If no specific evidence is presented that Khardali was being used, at the time of the attack, to move forces or equipment in a way that made its destruction offer a direct advantage, then its targeting remains directed at a protected civilian object or road. Even if there was dual use, cutting the Nabatieh-Marjayoun axis had to be fully included in the proportionality assessment, because its effect reaches patients, evacuation, relief, and the movement of residents between villages.

62- As for the Dalafeh bridge, it appears in the evidence as an extension of the scope of targeting. Its legal importance lies in showing that the targeting was not limited to a coastal axis or a final bridge, but expanded to crossings forming a connection between the inner south and the axes of the Bekaa and Hasbaya/Jezzine. The applicable rule here is linked to precautions and

proportionality. The wider the circle of destroyed crossings, the fewer the civilian alternatives become, and the more the attacking party must take that cumulative result into account. A subsequent attack is not assessed as though it were the first attack; it is assessed in light of all previous cutting of roads and bridges.

- 63- The seriousness of the Qasmiyeh bridge increases because it was a remaining main crossing. According to the Human Rights Watch report, the destruction of the Qasmiyeh bridge on 16 April 2026 threatened to cut off the land south of the Litani from the rest of the country, and the Lebanese Army statement confirmed the same result in official terms when it said that the targeting and destruction of the bridge led to the separation and isolation of southern Litani from its north. Here the application of proportionality becomes direct. If the bridge was a main crossing for civilians and relief, its civilian value was at its highest. Any alleged military advantage would have to be specific, definite, and direct in order to be weighed against this harm. A general claim of preventing Hezbollah movement is not legally sufficient in the face of the risk of isolating an entire area.
- 64- The defect does not stop at distinction and proportionality. The required precautions raise an additional question in this incident. The entire network had to be considered: the bridges already destroyed, the alternative roads, and the ability of ambulances and relief to pass. The Lebanese Army statement on reopening some roads and bridges after the attack proves that these crossings were necessary to reconnect the areas. This means that the duty to take precautions was not a marginal detail, but lay at the core of the military decision.
- 65- The same problem arises when considering the passage of relief. Destroying bridges does not target a particular relief truck, but it may in practice produce one result: preventing or obstructing the arrival of relief. When the Khardali, Burj Rahal, and Tayr Falsay routes need to be reopened, and when the Army announces that Qasmiyeh was isolated by the targeting, the incident moves from the mere targeting of infrastructure to a legal issue concerning harm to the

civilian population. The rule here does not protect a relief road as a logistical luxury, but as a condition for protecting civilians in conflict.

66- Rules 7 and 8 of customary international humanitarian law add another standard concerning the lawfulness of destroying civilian property, whose destruction is allowed only where required by strict military necessity. They prohibit the destruction of public or private property unless military operations imperatively demand it. Even leaving the question of field control for separate assessment, the standard reflected by this rule is highly important. It is not enough for destruction to be useful or operationally convenient; there must be clear military necessity. In the Litani file, the published evidence does not show an imperative military necessity to destroy an entire network of bridges. What appears is an announced policy of targeting crossings and controlling movement. That departs from the narrow standard of military necessity and enters into the logic of isolating a wide civilian area.

67- The statements of the Israeli Minister of Defense have particular importance because they preceded or accompanied the targeting and linked bridge destruction to control over crossings and the prevention of return. These facts cannot be separated from bridge destruction. When attacks are coupled with a statement about controlling crossings and preventing return, bridge destruction becomes part of a policy to control movement and the population, not merely a response to a specific military use of each bridge. Legally, this strengthens leadership responsibility, because it connects the higher-level decision to the field result and to the foreseeable civilian effect.

68- Accordingly, the violation appears in three clear places. The first concerns distinction, because the bridges remained civilian objects unless it was established that each had become a military objective at the time of the attack. The second concerns proportionality, because the expected harm from disabling the crossing network was extensive when military justification measured against a general. The third concerns the duty of precautions, because the successive

attacks reduced civilian alternatives, and the public sources do not show that safe and effective passages were maintained for civilians and relief.

Legal Responsibility

- 69- Responsibility begins at the level of planning and execution, because a decision to target a civilian bridge requires prior verification of its status, its expected effect on the population, and the existence of less harmful alternatives. Responsibility also extends to the level of leadership that ordered or authorized the policy of targeting bridges, especially in light of public statements referring to the destruction of five bridges and control over the remaining crossings.
- 70- Leadership statements become important because they show that the targeting of bridges was not the result of an isolated field assessment, but part of a broader direction or policy concerning control over crossings. If bridge destruction formed part of an announced policy, and it is then established that this policy isolated civilian areas and obstructed access to food, medicine, and health care, responsibility does not remain confined to the executing military unit. It extends to those who designed the plan, issued the order, knew of the civilian effect, and continued implementation.
- 71- Customary international humanitarian law recognizes state responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law attributable to its organs. It also recognizes individual responsibility for war crimes, and the responsibility of commanders and superiors when they order violations, know or should have known that violations were occurring, and fail to take the necessary measures to prevent them or punish the perpetrators. These principles give public statements and general orders evidentiary importance, because they help connect the higher-level decision to the field result.
- 72- Responsibility does not stop at the first attack. Once more than one crossing had been destroyed, the effect of isolation became known, and each subsequent targeting decision was taken with clearer knowledge of the civilian harm. The statements of the “Israeli” leadership are of particular importance because they

linked bridge destruction to control over crossings and the prevention of return, making the targeting closer to a policy directed against a civilian crossing network than to isolated field decisions.

Legal Conclusion

73- The cross-checked evidence establishes that the targeting of the bridges and crossings of the Litani River was not an isolated incident or limited collateral damage, but a broad and successive operation affecting a civilian crossing network connecting the area south of the Litani to the rest of Lebanon. The evidence and Lebanese Army statements establish that the bridges were directly targeted or severely damaged, and that the operation included several bridges over the Litani and its tributaries. The effect was to isolate the population or threaten their access to food, medicine, health care, and relief. These were direct civilian consequences that had to be included in proportionality and precautions assessments before the attacks were carried out.

74- The available evidence allows a firm conclusion that the targeting of the Litani bridges and crossings was not limited collateral damage, but affected a civilian crossing network performing an essential function for population movement, relief, and access to services. The published Israeli narrative did not provide specific evidence proving that each of these bridges was, at the time it was targeted, a military objective in the strict sense of international humanitarian law. In light of the broad and foreseeable civilian effect, particularly the isolation of southern Litani and the disruption of evacuation routes and humanitarian access, these attacks violate the rules of distinction, proportionality, precautions, and facilitation of relief, and provide a serious basis for characterizing them as unlawful attacks on civilian objects that may amount to war crimes.

75- To a sufficient degree of legal certainty, this pattern constitutes a violation of international humanitarian law. Bridges are civilian objects protected by nature, and the executing party did not, in the public domain, provide sufficient evidence that each bridge had become a specific military objective at the time of the attack.

The civilian harm resulting from the destruction of the crossing network was extensive and foreseeable, affecting the daily life and the medical and humanitarian protection of the civilian population.

76- The decisive legal characterization is that the destruction of the bridges and crossings of the Litani, as revealed by the evidence, constitutes an unlawful attack on protected civilian objects and on a vital crossing infrastructure for the civilian population, and a violation of the rules of distinction, proportionality, precautions, and facilitation of relief. Depending on the circumstances of each attack, the nature of the information available to the leadership, and the degree of knowledge of the civilian effect, this conduct amounts to a war crime, especially since it has been established that the attacks were directed at civilian objects, or were carried out with knowledge that their civilian effects would be excessive in relation to any direct and specific military advantage.

Part Three

The Targeting of a Residential Apartment in Talal Ain Saadeh – Metn on 5 April 2026

Introduction

- 1- On 5 April 2026, at approximately 9:00 p.m., a residential apartment in the Talal Ain Saadeh area, Metn District, east of Beirut, was subjected to a direct Israeli attack that struck a civilian building within an inhabited residential environment. The attack resulted in the killing of three persons and the injury of three others, in addition to material damage to the targeted apartment, the building, and the nearby surroundings.
- 2- The seriousness of this incident appears from the nature of the targeted location and from the human and material consequences that followed. The attack did not occur in a military area or in an open combat zone; rather, it struck a residential unit inside a civilian building in an area of an evident residential character. This description is not a formal detail. It changes the legal reading of the attack, because targeting civilian objects requires a high level of prior verification and calls for a careful examination of the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack.
- 3- Statements issued by the Lebanese Army Command indicate that the attack was carried out by two GBU-39 bombs (Annex No. 1), which penetrated the roof of the building and then the fourth floor before exploding on the third floor, where the main impact occurred (Annex No. 2). The Army Command also reported that a specialized unit attended the scene and conducted a field survey to collect evidence. This statement has particular value because it does not merely confirm that the attack occurred; it also provides technical elements relating to the type of munition, its trajectory, and the place of detonation inside the building.
- 4- This report presents the facts as they appear from the available materials, then proceeds to their legal assessment. The Lebanese Army Command statement constitutes the official technical source, while the open-source visual materials

included in the evidence record provide visual and testimonial elements relating to the nature of the apartment, the scenes of destruction, the moment of the explosion, and the accounts of residents or neighbors. Taken together, these materials provide a sufficient basis to present the incident and examine it legally, particularly with respect to distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack.

Methodology

- 5- The report relies on establishing the facts through more than one source, so that the conclusion is not built on a single video or a single statement. The statements of the Lebanese Army Command were adopted as an official technical source, together with six open-source visual materials. The value of each material appears when it is compared with the others, because each item of evidence confirms a specific aspect of the incident.
- 6- Each element is linked to the materials that support it. A video showing destruction does not, by itself, prove the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the attack, but it establishes a material effect within a specific environment. Likewise, a video containing a local statement does not, by itself, settle the nature of the apartment, but it adds an important testimonial element when compared with the Army statement and the other visual materials. Surveillance-camera footage helps establish the moment of the explosion and the conduct of the location before and during the attack.
- 7- The report first presents what can be established in the field, then explains the value of the available evidence before linking the facts to the applicable legal rules. The first stage concerns the determination of the date, time, place, type of munition, number of killed and injured persons, and nature of the damaged building. The second stage concerns the value of each item of evidence and its relationship with the others. The third stage concerns the examination of the incident in light of the rules of international humanitarian law, particularly distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack.

Factual background

- 8- On 5 April 2026, at approximately 21:00, a direct attack struck a residential apartment in the Talal Ain Saadeh area, Metn. The statements of the Lebanese Army Command indicate that the attack was carried out by two GBU-39 bombs, and that the two bombs penetrated the roof of the building and then the fourth floor before exploding on the third floor. The attack resulted in the killing of three persons and the injury of three others, in addition to material damage to the building and the surrounding area.
- 9- These facts show that the attack did not target a military position or an open combat zone, but rather struck a residential unit inside a multi-storey building. The trajectory of the munition, according to the Army statement, also indicates that the impact was directed into the building, not merely toward its exterior surroundings. This point is important because it places the accuracy of target identification at the center of the assessment, especially since the munition was used inside a residential building.
- 10- The adopted visual materials show that the affected environment has a clear civilian character. Some materials include statements close to the site concerning the nature and use of the apartment; others show scenes of destruction inside the building and the residential surroundings; and others document the moment of the explosion or its immediate effects. When these materials are read together with the Army Command statement, it appears that the current evidence does not provide visible proof of the presence of a military objective inside the apartment at the moment of the attack, while the available facts tend to establish the residential character of the place and the resulting civilian harm.
- 11- The timing of the attack affects the assessment of precautions because it occurred at night, at a time when civilians would normally be expected to be inside apartments or around residential buildings. The nighttime timing alone is not sufficient to conclude that the attack was unlawful, but it makes the duty of verification more stringent, because the presence of residents inside their homes

at that time is foreseeable. In such an environment, the possible presence of civilians cannot be treated as a marginal issue, but as an expected factor that had to be included in the military decision before execution.

Evidence and factual correlation

Evidence One

www.facebook.com/thisislebnews/videos/1858587178155134/

12- This material documents a statement connected to the targeted apartment and the nature of its use. Its value lies in providing information close to the site and to the actual use of the apartment before the attack. Within the limits of its content, the statement indicates that the apartment was locally treated as a residential apartment, not as a location with an apparent military function, which supports its civilian character.

Evidence Two

www.facebook.com/aljadeedtv/videos/2473211669766747/

13- This is a statement by the Mayor of Ain Saadeh concerning the apartment and the targeted site. The importance of this statement comes from the fact that it was made by a local authority familiar with the nature of the area, the buildings, and the residents. The statement confirms that the apartment was not inhabited or did not appear to be a military site, which adds an important element to the evidence file. Legally, this material assists in analyzing the principle of distinction, because the location of the apartment within a residential environment means that the presumption is civilian protection unless it is proven that it had become a lawful military objective at the moment of the attack.

Evidence Three

www.instagram.com/reel/DWx9CUjDJDW/

14- This evidence shows scenes of destruction within the surrounding residential environment. Its importance lies in conveying a direct image of the scale of

damage within a residential setting, allowing an assessment of the effect of the explosion beyond the point of impact alone. The visible damage to the building or its surroundings is not merely a material consequence; it also helps assess the scope of foreseeable civilian harm when an explosive munition is used inside a multi-storey building. Accordingly, this evidence is directly relevant to the proportionality analysis, because civilian harm includes the killed and injured, the damage to civilian objects, and the risks to which residents in nearby apartments and buildings were exposed.

Evidence Four

www.facebook.com/watch/?v=916438441311973

15- This material contains footage from a civilian surveillance camera showing the moment of the attack. It has particular value because it is close to the time of execution itself and shows the explosion occurring suddenly, without visible indications of prior warning or evacuation measures. If the original material shows civilian movement or persons in the vicinity of the place at the moment of the explosion, this strengthens the foreseeability of civilian presence in the area. For this reason, this evidence is important when examining whether sufficient precautions were taken before the attack was carried out, particularly as to whether measures could have been taken to reduce the danger to civilians before execution.

Evidence Five

www.instagram.com/reel/DWy2JNEETio

16- This evidence shows the direct damage caused to civilian infrastructure and the residential surroundings after the attack. Its value lies in complementing the Army statement from the perspective of visual impact. The statement identifies the type of munition and its trajectory, while this material shows the result of the explosion on the building, apartments, or neighboring facilities. This enters into the assessment of proportionality and precautions, because the scale of

damage helps assess what could have been expected before execution if two bombs were used inside a residential building.

Evidence Six

<https://tinyurl.com/5f67prvh>

- 17- This evidence presents statements or scenes connected to the neighbors of the apartment and the residents of the building or its surroundings, indicating that the apartment was not being used for an apparent military purpose. Its importance lies in providing a local account close to the site, which helps understand the nature of the apartment before the attack. The analytical value of this material appears when it is compared with the other evidence, particularly the statement of the apartment owner or persons connected to it, the statement of the mayor, the scenes of destruction (Annex No. 3), and the Lebanese Army Command statement.
- 18- When these materials are compared with one another, essential elements of the incident become clear: an official statement identifying the type and trajectory of the weapon, recordings showing the destruction, and local statements addressing the nature of the apartment and its surroundings. The Army statement defines the technical framework of the attack; Evidence One, Evidence Two, and Evidence Six support a local reading of the nature and use of the apartment; Evidence Three and Evidence Five establish the effects of destruction within a civilian environment; and Evidence Four provides an important temporal element concerning the moment of the explosion and the absence of visible indications of warning or evacuation. Nothing in the adopted materials clearly indicates the presence of a military objective inside the apartment when the attack occurred, while the combined reading tends to establish the residential character of the site and the resulting civilian harm.

Evidence Seven

<https://tinyurl.com/y43wjds8>

<https://tinyurl.com/4a5rb7dp>

- 19- The two statements of the Lebanese Army Command remain the clearest official source for determining the technical facts of the incident. They establish elements that the videos alone do not provide, particularly the type of munition, its path inside the building, the floor where the explosion occurred, the immediate human consequences, and the attendance of a specialized unit at the site to collect evidence. The statements also place the incident within a clear field framework, allowing the material effect to be linked to the type of means used.
- 20- The legal importance of the statements is that they link the type of munition, its trajectory inside the building, and the result that struck a residential apartment rather than an apparent military site. This point is not limited to a technical description; it relates to the assessment of precautions and proportionality, because a party using a guided munition inside a residential building must have precisely verified the target, assessed the expected risk to persons inside or nearby, and clarified the absence of a military objective.

Characterization of the Site and the Civilian Environment

- 21- The evidence included in the report shows that the object struck was a residential unit in a building located in Talal Ain Saadeh. This description is not a formal detail; it changes the legal reading of the attack, because civilian objects are protected from attack unless, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, they become lawful military objectives. A general allegation that a targeted person was inside the apartment is not sufficient to change this characterization unless it is established by specific and reliable evidence.
- 22- The visual materials reinforce this characterization. The scenes of destruction do not show an apparent military structure, but rather effects within a residential environment. The local statements contained in Evidence One, Evidence Two, and Evidence Six also concern the nature and use of the apartment and do not provide indications of apparent military activity inside it. Accordingly, the legal

presumption remains that the damaged object was civilian, and that any attack against it required strict military and legal verification before execution.

- 23- The location of the attack inside a building also raises the level of foreseeable risk to civilians. An attack on a specific apartment inside an inhabited building does not endanger that apartment alone; it exposes adjacent floors, nearby residents, and the building's surroundings to the effects of the explosion, especially where a munition capable of penetrating layers of construction before detonating is used. Therefore, the analysis is not confined to the point of impact, but extends to the entire civilian environment that could foreseeably be affected by the attack.
- 24- The geographical linkage does not rest solely on the mention of Ain Saadeh in the publication pages, but on matching the content of the visual materials with the established elements in the file, particularly the Lebanese Army Command statement, images of the targeted building, scenes of destruction inside the apartment and its surroundings, and materials showing the residential character of the area. This matching establishes that the open-source materials relate to the site of the attack in Talal Ain Saadeh and are connected to the incident addressed in this report, not to another event.
- 25- On this basis, the visual materials establish three essential elements: their direct connection to the incident itself, the occurrence of the attack within a civilian residential environment, and the relationship between the visible damage in the images and videos and the building and apartment that were targeted. These materials also confirm that the damage did not occur in an apparent military site, but within a residential surrounding, and that the nature of the location and the destruction resulting from the attack made the danger to civilians clear and foreseeable at the time of execution.

Nature of the Munition and Its Effect on the Analysis

- 26- The Lebanese Army statements indicate that the munition used consisted of two GBU-39 bombs. According to the statements, the two bombs penetrated the roof

of the building and the fourth floor before exploding on the third floor. This fact establishes that the attack was carried out by guided means capable of penetrating the structure of the building, and that the explosion occurred inside a residential unit or within its immediate area.

- 27- The accuracy of the munition is not, in itself, sufficient to make the attack lawful. The standard does not stop at the accuracy of impact, but extends to the correctness of target selection, the sufficiency of verification, and the scale of the expected risk to civilians. A munition may be precise, yet the attack may still be unlawful if the target was civilian, if the expected civilian harm was excessive, or if all feasible precautions were not taken in practice.
- 28- The munition's trajectory inside the building raises an additional issue relating to the foreseeability of harm. Penetration of the roof and the fourth floor, followed by detonation on the third floor, means that the effects of the attack would occur inside an inhabited or occupiable structure, not in an empty space. This makes the presence of killed and injured persons and damage to apartments or neighboring facilities a foreseeable result, not a remote or unlikely effect.

Applicable Rules

- 29- The rules of international humanitarian law governing the conduct of hostilities apply to this incident, particularly the rules concerning the protection of civilians and civilian objects. Since the incident concerns the use of military force against a residential apartment within Lebanese territory, the rules protecting the civilian population and civilian objects remain applicable, whether the incident is read within the framework of an international armed conflict or within a broader context of cross-border hostilities.
- 30- The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 provides the basic framework for the protection of civilians, particularly where the use of force results in the killing or injury of persons who do not appear to have directly participated in hostilities. Article 27 provides that protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons and family rights, that they shall be humanely treated,

and that they shall be protected in particular against acts of violence or threats thereof. This article confirms the general protection of civilians who do not directly participate in hostilities.

- 31- Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is of particular importance because it includes, among grave breaches, wilful killing, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly. This article becomes relevant if it is established that the attack targeted a civilian object or caused the killing of civilians without the existence of a lawful military objective or military necessity justifying the act.
- 32- Customary international humanitarian law also sets direct rules applicable to the conduct of hostilities. Rule 1 requires distinction at all times between civilians and combatants and prohibits attacks directed against civilians. Rule 7 requires distinction between civilian objects and military objectives and prohibits attacks directed against civilian objects. Under these two rules, the residential apartment remains a civilian object unless it is proven to have become a lawful military objective.
- 33- Rule 14 prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This rule is directly important in the Ain Saadeh incident because the attack caused deaths, injuries, and damage to a residential building, while the evidence file does not provide visible proof of a specific military advantage.
- 34- Rule 15 requires constant care to spare the civilian population and civilian objects from the effects of military operations, and requires all feasible precautions to be taken in order to avoid, and in any event minimize, incidental civilian losses. It is complemented by Rule 16, which requires doing everything feasible to verify that targets to be attacked are military objectives, and Rule 17, which requires feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack. These rules are most closely connected to this incident because they

relate directly to the targeting of an apartment inside a residential building and the use of two bombs within a civilian environment.

- 35- Rule 20 of customary international humanitarian law concerns the obligation to give effective advance warning of attacks that may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. The absence of a warning does not automatically mean that the attack is unlawful in every case, but it requires a careful examination of the reason why no warning was given, particularly when the attack occurs inside an inhabited residential area. In this incident, Evidence Four has particular importance because it shows, according to the materials included in the report, a sudden explosion without visible indications of evacuation or prior warning.

The Israeli Narrative and Its Assessment

- 36- According to what was circulated concerning the incident, the Israeli narrative indicates that the attack targeted a person or an objective with a military or security connection. This narrative is presented here as a claim made by, or attributed to, the executing party, not as a fact established in itself. International humanitarian law does not allow the attacking party to determine the military character of the target merely by its own declaration, nor does it make a subsequent narrative a substitute for the duty of verification that must precede the attack.
- 37- Even if the presence of a wanted person or an alleged target inside the apartment is assumed, that alone is not sufficient to justify the attack. The legal rule does not stop at naming the target; it requires confirmation that the person or object targeted actually fell within the concept of a lawful military objective at the moment of execution. It also requires verification of the target's presence in the place, that attacking it would achieve a concrete and direct military advantage, and that the expected harm to civilians would not be excessive in relation to that advantage.

- 38- In this incident, the location of the attack inside a residential apartment places a higher burden on the Israeli narrative. By its nature, the apartment is a civilian object and does not lose its protection unless it is proven that it was being used to make an effective contribution to military action, or that a lawful military objective was present inside it at the moment of execution. The materials included in the report do not show clear field indications of a military function for the apartment, while the local statements, scenes of destruction, and the Army statement support its characterization as part of a residential environment.
- 39- International humanitarian law does not merely ask whether the alleged target was lawful; it also asks about the means, timing, and expected result. The choice to use two guided bombs inside a residential building at 9:00 p.m. required a strict assessment of the likelihood of civilian presence inside or nearby. If the operation targeted a specific person, that did not remove the duty to choose a means and timing that would reduce the risk to civilians, nor the duty to cancel or suspend the attack if the information was insufficient or if the expected civilian harm was excessive.
- 40- Accordingly, the Israeli narrative, in itself, is not sufficient to remove the legal concern surrounding the incident. It would require proof that the target was military, that its presence in the apartment was confirmed at the moment of execution, which the expected harm to civilians was seriously assessed, and that feasible precautions were taken before force was used. In the absence of these elements from the available materials, the Israeli narrative remains a claim and cannot, by itself, change the civilian character of the place or justify the human and material consequences of the attack.

Legal Analysis

- 41- The legal analysis begins from the original character of the place. A residential apartment is, by its nature, a civilian object. This character is lost only if it is established that, at the moment of the attack, the apartment was making an effective contribution to military action and that its destruction or neutralization

would achieve a concrete and direct military advantage. The adopted materials do not establish that the apartment had lost its civilian protection at the moment of the attack.

- 42- In terms of the principle of distinction, the incident places the lawfulness of the attack under serious question. The attack struck a residential unit inside a civilian building, and the adopted materials do not show the presence of a military position, combat means, or apparent military activity inside the apartment. The local statements also support the civilian character of the place. Accordingly, the targeting of the apartment constitutes a grave breach of international humanitarian law.
- 43- In this context, it is not sufficient to state that an assumed target existed. International humanitarian law does not permit a civilian object to be transformed into a military objective merely by a subsequent allegation or by an unverifiable intelligence assessment. The military objective must be specific, its presence in the place must be confirmed to a sufficient degree, and the attack must be directed at it rather than at a civilian object as such. If that is not established, the attack approaches the characterization of targeting a protected civilian object.
- 44- In terms of proportionality, the civilian harm is established in the current evidence: three persons were killed, three others were injured, and material damage occurred to the building and its surroundings. This harm cannot be legally assessed without identifying the military advantage that the attack was supposed to achieve. If that advantage remains unproven or unspecified, the proportionality balance practically does not exist, because the law does not permit clear civilian harm to be weighed against an ambiguous military advantage.
- 45- Even assuming the presence of a military objective, the use of two bombs inside a residential building at 9:00 p.m. raises a strict question as to whether the expected civilian harm was excessive. The residential character of the site, the multiple floors, and the likelihood of residents or visitors being present in the

apartment or its surroundings are all elements that make knowledge of the risk to civilians foreseeable. Therefore, this risk should have been included in the decision-making assessment before execution, not addressed only after the harm occurred.

- 46- In terms of precautions, the available materials show that the attack occurred suddenly and without visible indications of prior warning or evacuation. This constitutes a serious failure to respect the rules of distinction and precaution. Required precautions include verifying the target, monitoring the presence of civilians, choosing a timing and means that reduce risk, and considering the possibility of postponing or suspending the attack if the information was insufficient.
- 47- In this incident, the Army statements reveal that the two bombs penetrated the building and exploded on the third floor. This means that the executing party, if it used a guided munitions, was targeting an internal point within a residential building. Such a decision cannot be assessed separately from the prior duty to verify that the target was military and from the duty to assess the risk to civilians present on adjacent floors and in nearby apartments.
- 48- As for the claim that a military objective existed, the presence of such an objective inside the apartment at the moment of the attack has not been established. By contrast, the different sources converge on common points: an official statement identifying the type and trajectory of the munitions, visual materials showing the destruction, and local statements addressing the nature of the apartment and its surroundings. Accordingly, it is established that the apartment had not lost its civilian protection at the very moment when the attack occurred.
- 49- The strength of the file rests on the fact that its elements do not come from a single source. There is an official statement issued by the Lebanese Army Command identifying the type and trajectory of the munition and the human consequences; visual materials showing destruction and damage within a residential surrounding; and local statements concerning the nature of the

apartment and the place. No single item of evidence alone supports the conclusion; rather, the result is formed through the combination of these elements and their comparison with one another.

- 50- Within the limits of the current file, these materials are sufficient to establish that the attack struck a civilian object within a residential environment, that it caused the killing of three persons and the injury of three others, and that it caused material damage to the building and its surroundings. The file also contains no visible or independent evidence proving that the apartment was being used for a military purpose or that it had lost its civilian protection at the moment of execution. Accordingly, the assessment is not confined to the mere possibility of a violation; it establishes, to the degree sufficient for legal assessment, the occurrence of a violation of the rules of international humanitarian law relating to the protection of civilians and civilian objects.
- 51- The object struck was a residential apartment protected by its nature. The civilian harm is established in the deaths, injuries, and material damage. The file also contains nothing proving the presence of a lawful military objective inside the apartment at the moment of execution, nor anything proving that effective precautions were taken to avoid or minimize civilian harm before the attack. These elements are sufficient to characterize the incident as a violation of the rules of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack.
- 52- The Israeli narrative does not affect this characterization unless it is accompanied by independent evidence proving that the target was military and present in the apartment at the moment of execution. International humanitarian law does not accept that a residential apartment loses its protection merely by a subsequent declaration issued by the executing party. The attacking party was required to verify in advance the nature of the target, assess the expected harm to civilians, and choose the means and methods that would minimize that harm. In the absence of proof of that in the available materials, the Israeli narrative remains insufficient to justify the attack or to negate its unlawful character.

53- The current materials do not stop at the level of general suspicion; they are sufficient to establish a violation of the rules of international humanitarian law. This violation consists of targeting a civilian object, or at the very least carrying out an attack inside a civilian environment without sufficient verification of the nature of the target and without sufficient precautions to avoid civilian losses. The harm caused to civilians and civilian objects does not appear, in the available materials, to be linked to a concrete and direct military advantage capable of legally justifying it.

Legal Conclusion

54- Based on the Lebanese Army Command statement and the visual materials included in the evidence record, it appears that the attack of 5 April 2026 struck a residential apartment inside a civilian building in Talal Ain Saadeh, and that it was carried out by two GBU-39 bombs that penetrated parts of the building before exploding on the third floor. The attack resulted in the killing of three persons and the injury of three others, in addition to material damage to the building and the residential surroundings.

55- The adopted materials do not show clear indications of the presence of a military objective inside the apartment at the moment of the attack. By contrast, the available evidence tends to establish the residential character of the place, whether through the Army statement, the local statements, or the scenes of destruction showing a damaged civilian environment.

56- The current materials do not allow the incident to be treated as incidental collateral damage, because the attack struck a residential apartment inside a civilian area and caused deaths and injuries. Accordingly, the incident constitutes a serious violation of the rules of international humanitarian law relating to the protection of civilians and civilian objects, and rises to the level of a war crime in the systematic context adopted by Israel in targeting civilian objects.

- 57- On this basis, the incident does not remain at the level of suspicion or possibility. It establishes, to the degree sufficient for legal assessment, the occurrence of a violation of international humanitarian law. This violation consists of targeting a protected civilian object, or at the very least carrying out an attack inside a civilian environment without sufficient verification of the nature of the target and without proof that effective precautions were taken to avoid or minimize civilian losses. The established civilian harm, represented by the deaths, injuries, and material damage, is not matched by any evidence of a concrete and direct military advantage capable of justifying that level of harm.
- 58- The Israeli narrative, in its available form, is not sufficient to change this characterization. International humanitarian law does not allow a residential apartment to be stripped of its civilian protection on the basis of a subsequent claim that an alleged military or security target was present. The attacking party was required, before execution, to establish that the target was lawful, that its presence in the apartment was confirmed, that the expected harm to civilians was not excessive, and that feasible precautions were actually taken. In the absence of these elements from the file, the attack remains unlawful as a matter of law.
- 59- This legal conclusion is reinforced by the nature of the location, the timing, and the means used. Targeting an apartment inside a residential building, at a nighttime hour when residents are expected to be inside their homes, and by means of two guided bombs that penetrated the building before detonating, makes the risk of injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects foreseeable. Accordingly, knowledge of the civilian risk can be inferred from the circumstances of the attack itself, even in the absence of a direct admission by the executing party.
- 60- Therefore, it is legally established that the targeting of the residential apartment in Talal Ain Saadeh on 5 April 2026 constitutes a violation of the rules of international humanitarian law, particularly the rules of distinction, protection of civilian objects, proportionality, and precautions in attack. The circumstances

of execution, the nature of the object struck, the human and material consequences, and the absence of proof of a lawful military objective make this targeting rise to the level of a war crime.

Annex 1

Remnants of the exploded missile



Annex 2

Image of the targeted building identifying the targeted apartment



Annex 3

Images showing the scale of destruction inside the targeted apartment in the targeted building in the Maronite Project in Talal Ain Saadeh and the point where the missile penetrated the apartment ceiling



Section Four

Targeting Medical Services in the Town of Mayfadoun - Nabatieh District

Introduction

- 1- This report addresses the targeting of medical services in the town of Mayfadoun, in the Nabatieh District, on 15 April 2026, while ambulance teams were evacuating the wounded and providing first aid after an initial attack on the town. The incident resulted in the killing of four paramedics and the injury of six others, within a field sequence that included an initial attack, followed by ambulance intervention, and then subsequent attacks that occurred at the same site or in its immediate vicinity while the ambulance teams were present and performing their work.
- 2- The seriousness of the incident is connected to the status of the victims and the nature of the mission for which they came, not only to their number. The paramedics came in response to casualties caused by a previous attack, and they were performing a clear rescue mission, using medical vehicles inside a site that, after the first attack, had become a place of evacuation and rescue. The subsequent attacks therefore cannot be separated from their field sequence, because they occurred after visible ambulance work had begun, and within an area that should have been subject to stricter verification and higher precautions.
- 3- The report examines the incident from the perspective of the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law, particularly the rules protecting the wounded and sick, medical personnel, medical transports, and the rules of distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions in attack, as well as the rules governing loss of protection in cases of misuse and the conditions required for such loss.

Methodology

- 4- The report is based on an interconnected reading of the available materials, particularly the video recording attributed to members of the Nabatieh Ambulance service, the testimonies concerning the targeting of ambulance crews, and the information contained in the evidence. The evidence indicates that

the recording was captured by a camera installed on one of the ambulances, and that it documents the moment of one of the attacks while paramedics and medical vehicles were present at the scene. It also records the names of the paramedics who were killed and the number of wounded among the ambulance teams.

- 5- The report treated the video as field visual material establishing what appears directly in it: the presence of ambulances, the movement of ambulance personnel, an evacuation operation, and an attack occurring in the vicinity of that work. The testimonies, in turn, help explain why the teams arrived and how the incident developed after the first attack. When these elements are read together, the overlapping components establish the beginning of the incident, the nature of the ambulance intervention, and the human and material consequences that followed.
- 6- Accordingly, the incident is not presented as a general narrative, but as an event with specific elements that can be examined in the field and linked to the legal rules protecting medical crews and relief operations. The report therefore does not present the incident as a broad account, but as an event with field elements capable of examination and linkage to the relevant legal rules.

Facts and Chronology of the Attacks

- 7- On 15 April 2026, the town of Mayfadoun was subjected to an initial attack that caused casualties. This attack opened the scene of the incident and required the entry of ambulance teams. The teams were not present at the location incidentally; they moved there because casualties already existed, and for the purpose of reaching the wounded, evacuating them, and providing first aid.
- 8- The first attack differs from the attacks that followed because it created the need for ambulance intervention. After it, the location was no longer the same as it had been before; it became natural for medical vehicles to arrive, for paramedics to move around, and for a search, evacuation, and transfer operation for the wounded to begin. This change in the character of the site should have been taken into account before any subsequent decision to use force.

- 9- After the first attack, ambulance teams moved to Mayfadoun. The information contained in the evidence indicates the participation of personnel from the Islamic Health Organization, the Islamic Risala Association, the Nabatieh Ambulance service, and the Lebanese Civil Defense. The mission was clear: to reach the wounded, treat them, and transport them. This presence was not ambiguous and was not detached from the incident; it was the direct result of the first attack and of the ensuing need for rescue and evacuation.
- 10- After this intervention began, a second attack occurred in the vicinity of the teams' work or at a point close to their route inside the town. At this stage, the scene was different from the moment of the first attack. During the first attack, the ambulance teams had not yet entered the sequence; during the second attack, the response had begun or had become clearly foreseeable. The presence of paramedics had therefore become a foreseeable and direct consequence of the first attack.
- 11- The second attack disrupted the evacuation operation and placed the paramedics themselves within the circle of danger. It also required additional teams to enter in order to assist and search for the wounded or for personnel with whom contact had been lost. At this stage, the scene was no longer limited to victims of a first attack; there were paramedics trying to save the wounded, and then other teams entering to assist those who had been injured or trapped after the subsequent attack.
- 12- A third attack then occurred, which the evidence links to video footage recorded by a camera mounted on one of the ambulances. The video documents the moment of the raid that targeted ambulance teams in Mayfadoun, and shows paramedics alongside medical vehicles during evacuation operations, with the movement of wounded persons from the ground into the vehicles.
- 13- The third attack differs from the two previous attacks because it is documented from within the environment of the rescue operation itself. The first attack caused casualties and required ambulance intervention; the second occurred after the intervention had begun or in its vicinity; the third, according to the video and the

facts, came at a moment when the medical vehicles and paramedics were visible at the location, and the evacuation operation was underway. At this stage, the humanitarian function of the site was visible: paramedics, ambulances, wounded persons, and movement for transfer.

- 14- This sequence ended with the killing of Mahdi Abu Zeid from Nabatieh Ambulance, Fadl Ali Sarhan from the Islamic Risala Association, Saeed Hussein Haribi from the Islamic Health Organization, and Ali al-Hadi Shadi Sabra from the Islamic Health Organization, in addition to the injury of six other paramedics.
- 15- The difference between the attacks is not limited to chronology; it concerns what was known or should have been known before each targeting operation. After the first attack, the presence of the wounded was established. After the arrival of ambulances, the humanitarian function of the site became visible. After the medical vehicles and paramedics appeared during the evacuation, any new targeting at the location required deeper scrutiny in terms of precautions.

Evidence and Factual Correlation

Evidence One

www.instagram.com/reel/DXMyOWAEe1R/

- 16- At the beginning of this video material, personnel wearing ambulance uniforms from different services are seen transferring wounded persons and a martyr from the site where the ambulance teams that had arrived before them had been targeted. In the video, a paramedic from the Nabatieh Ambulance service asks the other paramedics whether there are additional wounded persons, and the answer comes: 'There are two martyrs underneath,' referring to two martyrs from the previous attacks.
- 17- The camera documents the moment of the third raid from inside one of the ambulances, in which a martyr and a wounded person had been placed, and captures the injury of one of the accompanying paramedics from Nabatieh Ambulance. In the later scenes, members of the Lebanese Civil Defense appear removing the driver of the vehicle as a martyr and evacuating the wounded, while shrapnel marks are visible on the Nabatieh Ambulance vehicle.

18- The video shows that the vehicles present at the location are ambulances allocated for evacuating the wounded from the first raid, and it shows their interiors and the medical equipment inside them. It also shows that the persons present at the site, whether wounded, martyred, or alive, are paramedics or rescue personnel wearing ambulance uniforms clearly. The video does not show any trace of military or combat equipment.

Evidence Two

www.youtube.com/shorts/TOWBYRQnBJw

19- The video presents a statement by the head of the Nabatieh Ambulance Center concerning the targeting of paramedics in Mayfadoun. Its value is not limited to the oral testimony; it is strengthened by the scenes showing damaged ambulances and clear material damage. The damaged vehicles visible in the video increase its evidentiary value, because they link the speaker's account to a visible material effect that can be examined and compared with other images, official data, or independent field testimonies.

20- According to the available description, the material shows that the damage affected ambulance means dedicated to humanitarian work, which is an important element in the legal reading of the incident. Targeting or damaging an ambulance during a rescue mission does not have only a material effect; it disrupts the ability of medical teams to reach and evacuate the wounded. The matter becomes more serious when the damage occurs while paramedics are attempting to respond to a previous attack or rescue victims, because this places the incident at the heart of the rules protecting ambulance teams while performing their duty.

Evidence Three

www.instagram.com/reel/DX_dBawt3Md

21- The video documents a narrative issued by an Israeli military spokesperson alleging that the resources of ambulance units affiliated with a non-state armed actor were used to support military activities. This narrative, as it comes from a party to the conflict, is not sufficient to establish loss of protection for personnel,

vehicles, or facilities of a medical or ambulance nature. International humanitarian law does not permit military use to be inferred from institutional affiliation or from a general allegation; it requires specific and verifiable indicators that the means, facility, or person was actually used outside its humanitarian function and in a manner that made a specific military contribution. It also prohibits attack, even if the alleged military use were established, unless a prior warning is given with a reasonable time limit allowing the evacuation of the wounded and the neutralization of humanitarian crews.

- 22- The importance of this video lies in showing a general military discourse directed at ambulance units linked to a non-state armed actor. This discourse does not, by itself, prove the lawfulness of any targeting. It becomes important, however, when compared with the filmed facts in Mayfadoun, where ambulances and paramedics appear to be conducting evacuation work without any visible combat activity or military equipment in the available scene.
- 23- The video attributed to members of Nabatieh Ambulance is important because it does not provide a later description of the incident, but rather shows a moment from inside the site of the ambulance operation. According to the file, the camera mounted on an ambulance captured the moment of the attack while ambulance teams were present at the location. This material gives the documentation a direct link to the moment of the event and shows the nature of the activity taking place at that time. The video is not limited to showing an explosion or an effect; it links the attack to the presence of medical vehicles and paramedics while they were working.
- 24- The testimonies published about the targeting of ambulance crews in Nabatieh help explain why the teams were present and how the incident developed after the first attack. Arab 48 published a video report titled 'Nabatieh: Testimonies on the Targeting of Ambulance Crews' on 18 April 2026, which adds testimony connected to the incident and to the targeting of ambulance teams in Nabatieh. The value of this material remains in supporting the context, while the field video retains its primary value in establishing the visual scene of the third attack.

Applicable Rules

- 25- This incident is governed by the First Geneva Convention of 1949 and customary international humanitarian law, particularly the rules protecting the wounded and sick, medical personnel, and medical transports, in addition to the principles of distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions.
- 26- Article 12 of the First Geneva Convention requires that the wounded and sick be respected and protected in all circumstances, and prohibits violence against them or leaving them without care. In Mayfadoun, the paramedics' intervention began precisely because there were wounded persons after the first attack, making the protection of the wounded and the protection of those who came to assist them a single part of the legal assessment.
- 27- Article 15 of the same Convention requires parties to the conflict to take the possible measures to search for the wounded and sick, collect them, protect them against pillage and ill-treatment, and ensure that they receive the necessary care. The ambulance mission in Mayfadoun was therefore at the core of the function protected by law, not an incidental activity or one external to the scene of the incident.
- 28- Article 19 protects fixed establishments and mobile medical units belonging to the medical services, and provides that they must be respected and protected at all times and may not be attacked. This article has direct importance in the Mayfadoun file because the ambulances and the teams working there formed part of a mobile medical intervention intended to evacuate the wounded.
- 29- Article 21 regulates the issue of loss of protection. It provides that the protection of medical units and establishments ceases only if they are used, outside their humanitarian duties, to commit acts harmful to the enemy. Even in such a case, protection may cease only after a warning has been given, setting, where appropriate, a reasonable time limit, and after that warning has remained unheeded. This article is important in confronting any general allegation that ambulance units were used for military purposes, because it requires a specific

fact, an effective warning, and an opportunity to cease the alleged use, and does not suffice with suspicion or affiliation.

- 30- Article 22 clarifies that certain facts do not deprive medical units of protection, such as the presence of light weapons with their personnel for self-defense or for the defense of the wounded and sick, the presence of guards, or the presence of small arms and ammunition taken from the wounded and not yet handed over to the competent authority. The importance of this article is that it prevents an expansive interpretation of misuse and confirms that loss of protection is a narrow exception that is not presumed.
- 31- Article 24 protects medical personnel assigned exclusively to searching for, collecting, transporting, or treating the wounded and sick, or to preventing disease. This applies directly to the paramedics who were carrying out evacuation and rescue in Mayfadoun, so long as it is not established that they departed from that mission.
- 32- Article 35 protects means of transport for the wounded and sick or for medical equipment, and provides that they must be respected and protected in the same way as mobile medical units. This protection includes ambulances and vehicles used to transport and evacuate the wounded, when they are assigned to that medical mission. An ambulance is therefore protected not merely as a vehicle, but because it is part of an integrated medical function that includes the paramedic, the patient, and the evacuation operation.
- 33- Customary international humanitarian law confirms this framework. Rule 25 requires respect and protection, in all circumstances, for medical personnel assigned exclusively to medical duties. Rule 26 prohibits punishing any person for performing medical duties compatible with medical ethics. Rule 28 requires prior warning before targeting any medical unit alleged to have lost its protection. Rule 29 requires respect and protection, in all circumstances, for medical transports assigned to medical transportation.
- 34- Rule 109 also requires searching for, collecting, and evacuating the wounded and sick, while Rule 110 affirms their right to receive the medical care required

by their condition, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay. In Mayfadoun, the paramedics were performing precisely this function: reaching the wounded, evacuating them, and providing them with initial care.

- 35- The presence of a paramedic in a dangerous area does not remove his protection, and proximity to a site that has been attacked may not be turned into a reason for reducing that protection. Protection remains in force as long as he is performing a medical or humanitarian function, and it is lost only if he is used outside that function in an act harmful to the adversary, under the narrow conditions set by law. The available materials do not show that the paramedics in Mayfadoun departed from their ambulance function.
- 36- The principle of distinction, as embodied in Rule 1 of customary international humanitarian law, obliges parties to the conflict to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and Rule 7 requires distinction between civilian objects and military objectives. The duty of distinction does not end with the first attack; it continues with every new decision to use force, especially when categories enjoying special protection appear at the site.
- 37- The principle of proportionality is affirmed by Rule 14 of customary international humanitarian law, which prohibits an attack when the expected harm to civilians, protected persons, or civilian objects would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. In this incident, any subsequent attack cannot be assessed apart from the presence of paramedics, because the killing of four paramedics and injury of six others is not a marginal effect, but grave harm inflicted on protected persons while performing a protected function.
- 38- Rule 15 requires that all feasible precautions be taken to avoid or minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects, while Rule 16 requires doing everything feasible to verify that the targets to be attacked are military objectives and not protected persons or objects. Rule 19 requires cancelling or suspending an attack if it becomes apparent that the target is not military or that the attack may cause excessive harm. In successive attacks, these rules become more pressing,

because each subsequent attack requires a serious assessment and updated information.

- 39- The protection of the wounded is incomplete if the paramedic is prevented from reaching them. For this reason, killing or injuring paramedics during evacuation does not affect the crews alone; it also affects the wounded persons' right to be collected, cared for, and evacuated.

Legal Analysis

- 40- The facts establish that the medical units went to Mayfadoun because of a clear humanitarian mission: they were responding to casualties caused by a previous attack and were working to evacuate the wounded. This places them within the scope of protection provided by the First Geneva Convention of 1949 and customary international humanitarian law. This protection is further confirmed by the commitment of the targeted medical and ambulance crews to display distinctive emblems on their vehicles and by their personnel wearing the official approved uniform bearing the emblem of the ambulance organization.
- 41- The available materials do not show any legal fact that would remove protection from the paramedics or their vehicles. There is nothing establishing the use of ambulances for combat purposes, nothing establishing that the crews departed from the mission of evacuation and treatment, and nothing establishing that they committed an act harmful to the adversary. The legal starting point therefore remains their protection and the duty to respect their work.
- 42- The Mayfadoun attacks are not to be read as separate events. The first attack caused casualties, and those casualties required the entry of paramedics. The entry of the paramedics changed the nature of the site and introduced persons and means of transport enjoying special protection. Any subsequent attack therefore required fresh verification, an independent assessment, and specific precautions commensurate with the presence of medical crews at the location.
- 43- The second attack reveals the first serious point in the sequence, because it occurred after the response of medical-service personnel had begun or within its direct context. At this stage, the presence of paramedics should have increased

caution, not placed them themselves within the circle of danger. This affects the duty of distinction, because a paramedic is not a military objective; it affects the duty of precautions, because the scene was no longer as it had been before the first attack; and it violates the protection afforded to medical services during armed conflicts.

44- The third attack is the most serious in its significance, because it is documented by the video referred to in the evidence. The presence of the camera on an ambulance, the appearance of the medical vehicles, and the movement of paramedics during evacuation are all elements that make the humanitarian activity at the site visible. The issue was no longer a mere possibility, but a field scene linking the attack to the presence of protected objects and protected persons while performing their work.

45- This difference between the attacks prevents the incident from being treated as one incidental harm. The entire sequence affects the protection accorded to medical crews, because those who came to rescue the wounded themselves became victims of the subsequent attacks. This harm is characterized as deliberate harm to a protected category while performing a visible humanitarian function. In the absence of an operational explanation clarifying the nature of the military advantage sought, and in light of what appears in Evidence One regarding the absence of any harmful activity, this harm becomes a central factor supporting the conclusion that the subsequent attacks were unlawful.

Absence of an Operational Explanation (the Narrative of the 'Israeli Army')

46- Evidence Three refers to an Israeli military discourse that treats ambulance units affiliated with a non-state armed actor as suspect because of an allegation that they were used to transport weapons or fighters or to support military activities. However, this allegation, even if issued by an official military body, is not legally sufficient to remove protection from every ambulance unit or medical vehicle linked to that actor. International humanitarian law does not permit protection to be withdrawn on the basis of general affiliation; it requires each case to be

examined independently and on the basis of specific facts showing actual use outside the medical or humanitarian function.

47- With respect to the Mayfadoun incident, the filmed evidence does not show weapons, combat equipment, or the use of ambulances in an act harmful to the adversary. Nor do the available materials show that an effective warning preceded the targeting, or that a time limit was granted to cease any alleged use. On this basis, the general discourse contained in Evidence Three cannot justify the subsequent attacks. Rather, it reinforces the conclusion that the operational decision treated ambulance units as a collectively suspect category, instead of treating them as protected medical transports requiring independent verification in each case.

48- In the absence of a specific operational explanation identifying the nature of the alleged military objective, the information available before each subsequent attack, and the precautions taken to avoid injuring paramedics, the video materials, testimonies, and sequence of facts remain a sufficient basis for adopting a confirmed legal characterization that the incident falls within a deliberate or systematic pattern of hostile treatment toward protected ambulance units. These indicators establish responsibility at the levels of planning, command, authorization, and execution, particularly among those who allowed the attacks to continue at a site where visible evacuation and rescue operations were taking place.

Legal Conclusion

49- The available materials in the Mayfadoun incident establish that the targeting was not a side effect of a single attack, but occurred within a clear field sequence that ended with the killing of four paramedics and the injury of six others, in addition to damage to ambulance vehicles present at the site.

50- The legal seriousness lies in the fact that the medical crews and vehicles were performing a visible humanitarian function: reaching the wounded, evacuating them, and providing care. This presence imposed on the executing party a direct

duty to re-verify and reassess the situation before any renewed use of force, not to continue the attack as if the scene had not changed.

- 51- The harm was not limited to the paramedics and the vehicles; it also affected an essential humanitarian function protected by international humanitarian law. Disrupting ambulance work during an emergency response deprives the wounded of the chance of rescue, exposes additional teams to danger, and undermines the core protection afforded to medical services in armed conflicts.
- 52- Accordingly, the Mayfadoun incident constitutes a serious file of violation of the rules of international humanitarian law. The available information is sufficient to adopt a confirmed legal characterization that the subsequent attacks, in light of the clear ambulance presence and the absence of any visible evidence of military use, raise potential responsibility at the level of planning, command, or execution, particularly among those who authorized the continuation of the attack at a site where visible and protected ambulance work was underway.

Section Five

Targeting Civil Defense Personnel in Majdal Zoun – South Lebanon

Introduction

- 1- This report addresses the Majdal Zoun incident of 28 April 2026, which led to the death of three members of the Lebanese Civil Defense, on the basis of field information, testimonies, and open sources. The purpose is not limited to narrating the event, but rather to establish the sequence as it occurred: an initial attack, the creation of a humanitarian situation, the intervention of rescue teams, and then a subsequent attack at a site whose nature had changed. This sequence is the basis of the assessment because it requires a legal reading of the incident according to what actually existed at the moment of targeting.

Methodology

- 2- This documentation is based on the Berkeley methodology for open-source materials and is used for a legal reading of the incident. The aim is not to retell news reports, but to verify them and connect them to their essential elements: their source and timing, the context in which they appeared, and the identity of the persons present at the site.
- 3- The Majdal Zoun incident cannot be understood solely through the number of victims. The core issue is the sequence of what occurred: an initial attack that left wounded persons and rubble, the arrival of rescue teams, and then a subsequent attack at a moment when the presence of those teams was inevitable.
- 4- This reading relies on the convergence of several sources. Reuters reported the killing of five persons, including three Civil Defense members who arrived after the first attack, in addition to the injury of Lebanese soldiers. Lebanese Army statements also confirmed that a military patrol was accompanying Civil Defense personnel and two civilian bulldozers during a rescue operation. Al Jazeera described the incident as a subsequent attack that killed Civil Defense personnel, as did the Civil Defense statement. The convergence among these sources does not create competing accounts; it establishes the same sequence of events.

- 5- In addition to media sources, this documentation relies on direct testimonies that carry clear evidentiary weight. The Director General of the Civil Defense stated that the personnel were wearing a unified uniform bearing the special protective emblem of the Civil Defense, and that the words “Civil Defense” were clearly written on the chest. He also confirmed that strict internal instructions categorically prohibit any wounded person from being accompanied inside Civil Defense vehicles, even by family members, reflecting the purely humanitarian nature of the mission.
- 6- The testimony of one wounded soldier also indicates that he was part of a Lebanese Army patrol on a non-combat mission accompanying a Civil Defense team at the start of rescue operations, at approximately 18:00 on 28 April 2026. He added that a projectile launched from an Israeli drone landed at a distance of approximately 100 meters from the site, followed by an attack at around 19:00 in which the soldier and the bulldozer driver were injured, before the site was targeted again at approximately 19:15 by a tank shell, leading to the death of Civil Defense personnel.
- 7- What is established in this incident is the following: an initial attack; the arrival of the Civil Defense; military accompaniment; the presence of civilian vehicles; and then a subsequent three-stage attack during the rescue operation. The coherence of these elements reduces the possibility of relying on a single account and shows that the evidence is consistent.
- 8- The issue concerns what the attacker knew, or should have expected, at the moment of execution. After any attack in an inhabited environment, the arrival of medics and rescue teams becomes foreseeable. Therefore, the assessment is not limited to whether the site had previously been targeted, but extends to what was present there at the time of the second attack, who was present, and whether that presence was observable by the “Israeli Army.”
- 9- Accordingly, the incident is read as the targeting of a site that had become a rescue site, not as an automatic continuation of the initial attack.

10- This documentation relies on the rules of customary international humanitarian law and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The relevant rules are settled and binding, and include distinction, proportionality, precautions, verification of targets, protection of medical personnel and means, including the Civil Defense, and the duty to protect and care for the wounded.

Evidence and Factual Correlation

Evidence One

www.youtube.com/watch?v=N-LhybaesqI

11-This evidence focuses on the stage preceding the targeting, namely what the Civil Defense personnel were doing before the attack that struck them. It includes an interview with Walid Hashash, Head of the Service and Operations Unit at the Civil Defense, regarding what happened to the rescuers in Majdal Zoun before they were targeted. This point is important because it does not present the incident only from the angle of the result, but from the angle of the mission the Civil Defense personnel were performing: reaching a site that had been subjected to an earlier attack, and attempting to rescue or evacuate wounded or trapped persons. If Civil Defense personnel entered the site after a first attack, with a clear status and for a rescue purpose, then their humanitarian status becomes a central part of the analysis. In this situation, it is not enough to say that they were present in a dangerous location; what matters is why they were there, whether their presence was known or knowable, and whether the mission was coordinated, visible, or accompanied by official actors.

Evidence Two

www.instagram.com/p/DXuBHKtjGyc

12-This visual material contains the testimony of an eyewitness describing the moments of targeting from a field perspective. It may clarify how the team arrived, what it was doing at the moment of attack, whether there were wounded persons under the rubble, whether visible vehicles were present, and whether the strike occurred during an actual rescue operation.

Evidence Three

www.reuters.com/ar/world/EPEZPVPFLRKDVPLNBNGZESSGTU-2026-04-28

13-The Reuters report provides the most important external framework for the incident. It states that two consecutive “Israeli” attacks on a building in Majdal Zoun killed five people, including three rescue workers who had gone to assist those injured in the first attack. It also reports, quoting a Civil Defense spokesperson, that the three rescuers were initially trapped under the rubble because of the second strike, and that their deaths were later confirmed. It further states that the Lebanese Army announced the injury of two soldiers in the second strike.

14-The importance of this material lies in its confirmation of the pattern of a consecutive strike. This pattern is highly significant in legal analysis because it raises the question of the duty of precautions, the verification of persons present at the site after the first strike, and the protection of ambulance and Civil Defense personnel while performing their mission.

Evidence Four

<https://tinyurl.com/y6dhsxwz>

15-The Al Jazeera English report presents the incident in a broader context and indicates that the Lebanese Prime Minister described the targeting of Civil Defense personnel in Majdal Zoun as a crime, and that the victims were performing their humanitarian duty. It also states that two consecutive strikes on a building in Majdal Zoun killed five people, including three rescue workers who had come to assist the wounded from the first attack. It reports that the Lebanese Army said two soldiers were wounded in the second strike, which hit troops, rescue workers, and civilian bulldozers.

Factual Background

16- On 28 April 2026, a building in the town of Majdal Zoun, Tyre District, was subjected to a first air attack that caused casualties and trapped persons under the

rubble. Regardless of the nature of the target that was said to have been attacked, the attack created an immediate humanitarian reality: wounded persons, trapped persons, and rubble that required opening the road and the immediate intervention of the Civil Defense. From this moment, the legal assessment begins, because the nature of the site changed after the first attack and it became a rescue site.

17-Civil Defense teams then arrived, accompanied by a Lebanese Army patrol and two civilian bulldozers. These elements were not in a combat posture. The Civil Defense was working to rescue the wounded, the bulldozers were there to remove rubble, and the Army was accompanying the operation. The field reality therefore indicates that the site was a rescue site.

18-A second attack occurred in three stages at the same site or in its immediate surroundings, killing five persons, including three Civil Defense personnel, and injuring soldiers. According to Reuters, the rescuers arrived after the first attack before being killed in the subsequent attack, while Lebanese sources confirmed that the soldiers were injured while accompanying the rescue operation. Official statements by the General Directorate of the Civil Defense also confirmed the death of three of its personnel while carrying out an ambulance and rescue mission in Majdal Zoun. These facts show that the victims were present because of a humanitarian mission created by the first attack.

19-This is further supported by the testimony of one Civil Defense member, who stated that they arrived after the first attack and began extracting the wounded. They were targeted by an Israeli drone in two stages, during which a soldier and a bulldozer driver were injured in the second attack. When one of the wounded persons was being brought out, the site was targeted a third time by a tank shell after the road had been cut.

20-The statement of a participating soldier also confirms that he set out at around 18:00 on a non-combat mission to accompany the Civil Defense. As rescue operations began, a projectile from a drone landed approximately 100 meters away. This was followed by a similar attack at 19:00, as a result of which he, another soldier, and the bulldozer driver were injured. Then, at approximately

19:15, the Civil Defense team was targeted by direct fire, likely a Merkava tank shell fired by units of the “Israeli Army,” which led to the death of Civil Defense personnel while they were performing their work.

Context and Surrounding Environment

21- At the time of the second attack, the site was no longer merely a general area of operations. Legally, the description of the site was not the same as it had been before the first attack. It had become a site that had been attacked and then transformed into a rescue site, meaning that it combined the effects of the first attack with the presence of persons working to address those effects. In this situation, several levels of protection overlapped at once: protection of the wounded, protection of rescuers, protection of rescue means, and protection of civilians who might have been present at or around the site.

22- After the first attack, the site became a place that contained, or was likely to contain, wounded persons and persons trapped under the rubble. This immediately gave rise to the duty to collect and care for the wounded. The First Geneva Convention provides that the wounded and sick must be respected and protected, and that all possible measures must be taken to search for and collect them after engagements or after hostilities. The Fourth Geneva Convention further confirms that wounded and sick civilians are entitled to special protection and respect. Customary rules independently confirm the same principle, particularly Rules 109 and 110 concerning the search for, collection of, and care for the wounded.

23- In this context, the presence of the Civil Defense and the bulldozers was not incidental. The Civil Defense is the practical instrument for implementing the duty to rescue the injured, and the civilian bulldozer in this context was not an ordinary vehicle, but a necessary means to open the road, remove rubble, and reach those trapped underneath. Therefore, targeting the site while these means were present did not affect only persons; it struck the rescue operation itself. The importance of this lies in the fact that protecting the wounded practically requires

protecting the route to the wounded, the rescuer, and the means necessary to reach them.

24- As for the presence of the Lebanese Army at the site, its actual role on the ground must be examined, not merely its formal status. It is true that Army personnel belong to an armed force; however, according to the available facts, their presence was to accompany a rescue operation with the Civil Defense and the civilian bulldozers. In such a case, it is not enough to say that the presence of the Army made the site a military objective. International humanitarian law does not rely on the mere presence of military personnel; it links lawfulness to the actual military function and to the military necessity of targeting. If the Army was present to secure a rescue site, assist in evacuating the injured, or organize access to the site of the attack, then that presence, in itself, did not create a military necessity justifying an attack.

25- The participating soldier's statement specifically confirms this description. He described his mission as non-combat and limited to accompanying a Civil Defense team and securing the conditions for conducting rescue operations. In this sense, the Army's presence at the location did not add a military character to the site; rather, it fell within the organization of a rescue operation in a dangerous area. His timing also shows that the site remained for a sufficient period in a state of visible humanitarian activity that could be observed and assessed: approximately 18:00 at the start of the mission, approximately 19:00 at the second attack, and approximately 19:15 at the third attack.

26- The conclusion that imposes itself is that, at the moment of the second attack, the site had acquired a clear and unmistakable humanitarian character. This conclusion is reinforced by the direct testimony of the Director General of the Civil Defense, who confirmed that the personnel were wearing a unified uniform bearing the Civil Defense protective emblem, and that the words "Civil Defense" were clearly written on the chest. He also explained that strict internal instructions categorically prohibit the accompaniment of any wounded person inside Civil

Defense vehicles, even by family members, confirming the purely humanitarian nature of the mission and making the protected status directly visible.

27- According to the adopted methodology, the strength of evidence is not measured only by the number of sources, but by the quality of their convergence, their independence, and the consistency of their essential elements. In this incident, there is direct convergence between an international source, Reuters; Lebanese sources that transmitted statements of the Civil Defense and the Army; and an independent media source that described the incident as a double attack. The common elements among these sources are what give the essential facts their strength: an initial attack, the presence of the Civil Defense, the presence of the

30- The direct testimonies collected in this documentation also provide an additional evidentiary dimension. The testimony of the Civil Defense member offers a precise internal timeline from within the event itself, linking a specific rescue act, namely extracting a wounded person, to the moment of targeting. The testimony of the Director General of the Civil Defense provides institutional proof of the clarity of the protected status through the uniform, the emblem, and the visible writing, in addition to the nature of work rules that prevent any non-humanitarian use of the vehicles.

31- The statement of the participating soldier provides a third evidentiary

Legal Analysis

- 33- The soldier's field statement, read together with the factual analysis according to the adopted methodology, forms a clear basis for assessing the incident within the framework of war crimes, as serious violations of fundamental rules governing the conduct of hostilities.
- 34- The first matter established by the testimony is the nature of the mission: a non-combat mission to accompany a Civil Defense team during rescue operations. This characterization is not secondary; it is a decisive legal element because it removes the site from the framework of direct military engagement and places it within the framework of protected humanitarian activity. When a site in this condition is targeted, the question is no longer merely whether a military objective existed, but whether the special protection of persons not taking part in hostilities was respected.
- 35- The testimony indicates that the targeting occurred in successive stages, with intervals allowing observation and reassessment. When placed alongside the remaining information, this sequence excludes the purely instantaneous or incidental character of the attack and indicates a continuing operational conduct. In such a case, the act is not assessed as an isolated incident, but as a series of connected acts. This is significant in characterizing serious violations, because repetition with available time for reassessment reinforces the attribution of the conduct to a conscious decision, not to a passing error.
- 36- The testimony establishes that the targeting occurred during the performance of a specific rescue act, at a moment when humanitarian activity was directly under way. This element is particularly important because it shows that the nature of the site was not ambiguous or mixed; it was capable of being identified. In international humanitarian law, the clearer the protected status of the persons, the higher the level of protection and the heavier the burden of verification before any attack.
- 37- When this testimony is linked to the testimony of the Director General of the Civil Defense, which confirms the visibility of the uniform, emblem, and

writing, it is established that the targeted persons were identifiable in the field and were not merely persons of unknown status. This means that the targeting did not occur in an environment of confusion, but in an environment in which protected persons could be distinguished.

- 38- Targeting the site despite these elements raises the issue of a violation of the rule of distinction. In the absence of indicators of combat activity at the moment of execution, the attack struck protected persons. It also directly raises the issue of breach of the duty of precautions, since, according to the time intervals and the apparent observation, it would have been possible to reassess the situation before carrying out the subsequent attacks.
- 39- The act also raises the issue of proportionality. The foreseeable harm from targeting a site where rescuers are working includes killing them, disrupting rescue operations, and delaying access to the wounded. In the absence of a clear and direct military advantage, such harm becomes excessive in relation to any possible objective.
- 40- The legal effect does not stop with the rescuers themselves; it extends to the wounded. Targeting those who are rescuing them practically means disrupting the obligation to collect and care for the wounded, which is a fundamental obligation under international humanitarian law. Accordingly, the act does not only strike persons directly; it also strikes the protective system connected to them.
- 41- The presence of Lebanese Army personnel at the site, according to the testimony, does not alter this description, so long as their role was connected to accompanying a rescue operation and not to participation in combat activities. In such a case, a military objective does not automatically arise from mere presence; the assessment remains linked to the nature of the actual activity.
- 42- When these elements are taken together, strong indicators exist of serious violations of fundamental rules of international humanitarian law, including:
- 43- the targeting and killing of protected persons while performing a humanitarian mission and without committing any harmful act;

- 44- the execution of attacks without sufficient distinction between a military objective and protected persons;
- 45- breach of the duty of verification and precautions before carrying out the attack;
- 46- causing disproportionate harm in the absence of a clear military advantage;
- 47- Disrupting operations to rescue the wounded and the protection associated with them.
- 48- In the context of an existing armed conflict, and with the element of knowledge or possible knowledge of the nature of the site and the persons present therein, these acts, taken together, do not remain within the framework of a violation or operational error. They fall within the scope of war crimes, as acts that seriously violate the fundamental rules protecting persons not taking part in hostilities and guaranteeing the minimum of humanity in armed conflict.
- 49- The Majdal Zoun incident raises a set of interrelated legal issues. It cannot be confined to the possible existence of a military objective in the targeted area, important as that may be, because the incident concerns a second attack that occurred after the site had turned into a rescue environment. It must therefore be addressed from the standpoint of the status of the persons present, the nature of the activity they were performing, the duty of verification before attack, the principle of distinction, proportionality, precautions, protection of the wounded, and the effect of the Lebanese Army's presence at the location.
- 50- With respect to the protected status of Civil Defense personnel, the facts show that they were carrying out a rescue and ambulance mission. This status gives them clear legal protection. Customary Rule 31 requires respect and protection for humanitarian relief personnel, and Rule 32 requires protection of the means used in relief operations. This is reinforced by the text of the First Geneva Convention, particularly Article 12, which provides that the wounded and sick must be respected and protected in all circumstances, and Article 15, which requires that all possible measures be taken to search for and collect the wounded. The Fourth Geneva Convention also confirms, in Article 16, the duty to protect and respect wounded and sick civilians.

- 51- These rules stand on their own and are binding as customary rules. Targeting Civil Defense personnel while they are carrying out rescue work cannot be treated as ordinary incidental harm when their status and function were clear or perceptible. This description becomes even clearer in light of the testimony of the Director General of the Civil Defense, who confirmed that the personnel were wearing a unified uniform bearing the special protective emblem and that the words “Civil Defense” were visible on the chest, making their status directly perceptible.
- 52- The second attack constitutes the central point of the legal assessment. After the first attack, the arrival of rescue teams was natural and foreseeable. This is not a theoretical assumption, but a direct consequence of the nature of hostilities. Here, a clear legal obligation arises from Article 15 of the First Geneva Convention, which does not merely protect the wounded but also requires enabling their rescue.
- 53- Therefore, any party carrying out a subsequent attack on the same site or its surroundings cannot ignore the possibility that rescuers are present. Customary Rule 16 requires verification that the target is military before any targeting. In the case of the second attack, reliance on the earlier assessment connected to the first attack is not enough, because the circumstances had changed completely.
- 54- The standard of knowledge or possible knowledge is not theoretical here; it is a practical standard directly connected to the duties of parties to the conflict. Article 12 of the First Geneva Convention does not merely impose protection, but presupposes positive conduct in respecting that protection. Ignoring clear circumstances on the ground may therefore constitute a breach of this obligation.
- 55- If the attacker knew of the presence of the Civil Defense, the targeting would be directed at protected persons. If actual knowledge is not established, the field facts make such knowledge inferable: an initial attack, rubble, sufficient time, and the arrival of rescue teams.

- 56- With respect to the principle of distinction, although this principle is traditionally attributed to broader rules, its practical roots appear in the obligations of the Geneva Conventions to protect specific categories. The special protection of the wounded and rescuers means, in practice, that they must not be treated as targets. Accordingly, targeting a site containing rescuers without evidence of actual combat activity amounts to a breach of the duty of distinction.
- 57- With respect to precautions, the obligations of the Geneva Conventions, particularly Article 15 of the First Convention, presuppose not only refraining from harm but also taking positive measures to facilitate rescue. Therefore, failure to reassess the situation after the first attack, despite clear indicators of humanitarian activity, constitutes a breach of the duty of precautions.
- 58- The importance of this aspect increases in light of the soldier's statement, which shows the existence of time intervals sufficient for reassessment.
- 59- With respect to proportionality, targeting a site where rescuers are working conflicts with the spirit and text of the Geneva Conventions, which are founded on the minimum humanitarian protection in conflict. The foreseeable harm here does not affect only persons; it affects the rescue operation itself, contrary to the obligations contained in Articles 12, 15, and 16 referred to above.
- 60- With respect to the protection of the wounded, the First Geneva Convention does not merely protect the wounded person; it also requires protection by enabling access to him. Therefore, targeting the Civil Defense while performing this mission is not only an attack on rescuers, but a direct violation of the obligation to collect and care for the wounded.
- 61- With respect to the presence of the Lebanese Army, this does not change the description. The conventions look not to formal status, but to the practical reality. If the soldiers were accompanying a rescue operation, their presence did not remove protection from the site or turn it into a lawful military objective.

- 62- With respect to military necessity, the Geneva Conventions do not recognize it as an absolute concept, but as one restricted by duties of protection. It therefore cannot be used to justify targeting a clear humanitarian site.
- 63- With respect to the legal characterization, the combination of these elements — protected persons, visible humanitarian activity, ability to observe, and repeated attacks — shows that the act does not fall within the scope of field error, but within grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
- 64- Pursuant to Articles 19 and 24 of the First Geneva Convention, and Article 16 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and with the existence of knowledge or possible knowledge, targeting a rescue site in this manner rises to the level of a grave breach and is classified within war crimes in the general sense, as a serious breach of fundamental obligations to protect the wounded and relief personnel.

Absence of an Operational Explanation (“Israeli Narrative”)

- 65- The “Israeli Army” may claim that the first attack targeted a building believed to be connected to military activity or to Hezbollah. Even assuming this claim is correct, it does not settle the legality of the second attack. International humanitarian law is not based on a static assessment, but on an assessment renewed as facts change. What may have been a military objective at one moment may lose that status later, especially when the Civil Defense and bulldozers arrive at the site and rescue work begins. Therefore, the characterization of a military objective cannot legally be carried over from the first attack to everything that occurs later at the site, because the field reality had changed.
- 66- This understanding is grounded in the obligations of parties to the conflict under the First Geneva Convention, which requires that all possible measures be taken to search for and collect the wounded. This means, in practical terms, that the environment in which rescue operations arise must be respected and not treated as an automatic continuation of the previous target.
- 67- It may also be claimed that the presence of the Lebanese Army at the site made it a military objective. This assertion requires scrutiny. The mere presence of

military personnel in a place is not sufficient in itself. The relevant consideration is not status, but actual function at the moment of targeting. It must be established that those soldiers were performing a combat role or directly contributing to military action. If they were accompanying the Civil Defense during a rescue operation, as the facts indicate, then at that moment they were part of a humanitarian activity, not an engagement.

- 68- In this context, the requirements of the Fourth Geneva Convention, particularly Article 16, cannot be ignored. That article confirms the protection of wounded and sick civilians, which practically extends to everyone working to rescue them or facilitate access to them. Accordingly, this targeting cannot be justified by relying on a formal military presence unrelated to a combat function.
- 69- The legal argument is strengthened by the statement of the participating soldier himself, who explained that his departure at approximately 18:00 was part of a non-combat mission to accompany a Civil Defense team. The importance of this statement is that it comes from within the event and defines the nature of the mission as experienced by those participating in it, not as understood later from the outside. Thus, the claim that the Army's presence turned the site into a military objective becomes insufficient, and there is no evidence of actual combat activity at the moment of execution.
- 70- This claim is further weakened by the testimony of the Director General of the Civil Defense, who confirmed that the personnel were wearing a unified uniform bearing the special protective emblem and that the words "Civil Defense" were clear on the front of the personnel's clothing (Annex 1). He also stated that internal instructions categorically prohibit any person other than Civil Defense personnel from accompanying any wounded person inside the vehicles, even if that person is a family member. These elements leave little room for confusion and instead point to a clear rescue environment that could be identified in the field.
- 71- It may be claimed that the second attack resulted from error or miscalculation. Even if that possibility is considered, it does not relieve responsibility if the error

resulted from failure to verify or from disregard of the duty of precautions. International humanitarian law is not limited to punishing direct intent; it imposes an objective standard of required conduct. When circumstances on the ground clearly indicate the presence of rescuers, through uniforms, emblems, and the nature of the activity, failure to verify is not an excuse in itself; it may be evidence of breach of a legal duty.

72-The hypothesis of error becomes even weaker when the sequence of events is examined as described by the wounded soldier. The attacks did not occur all at once; they took place in stages: a first projectile in the vicinity of the site, then a second attack, then a third attack by tank shell after approximately fifteen minutes. This sequence does not by itself prove intent, but it weakens the hypothesis of instantaneous error and indicates continuation of the act despite the availability of time for reassessment. In such cases, the legal question concerns the extent to which the duty of verification was respected before each subsequent attack, not only before the first attack.

73-Finally, it may be claimed that the operations took place in the context of a conflict with Hezbollah and that the area was, by its nature, dangerous or operational. This proposition does not change the legal assessment. The rules contained in the Geneva Conventions were created precisely to regulate conduct in conflict, not outside it. The existence of armed conflict does not remove protection from the Civil Defense, does not cancel the duty to collect the wounded, and does not allow rescue operations to be targeted. On the contrary, the more intense the conflict, the more important these rules become, because they represent the minimum humanitarian protection that may not be exceeded.

Legal Conclusion

74-When read together with the adopted methodology and the rules of international humanitarian law, the Majdal Zoun incident shows a clear sequence of facts leaving little room for ambiguity: an initial attack created a humanitarian situation, followed by the arrival of the Civil Defense, bulldozers, and a Lebanese Army patrol to carry out a rescue mission, and then a subsequent attack struck the

rescuers and those accompanying them. This sequence is not merely a chronological detail; it is the element that gives the incident its legal weight, because it shows that the second attack did not occur in a vacuum, but at a moment when the site had effectively become a protected rescue environment.

75-On the basis of this sequence, targeting Civil Defense personnel while they were carrying out rescue work constitutes a clear breach of the protection owed to relief personnel and means. It also constitutes a direct breach of the duty to protect, collect, and care for the wounded and trapped persons, a duty provided for in the First Geneva Convention. The Fourth Geneva Convention also confirms the protection of wounded and sick civilians, which practically extends to those working to rescue them.

76-The second attack also raises a clear issue concerning the rule of distinction, because sufficient distinction was not shown between an alleged military objective and protected persons performing a humanitarian mission. It also raises the issue of breach of the duty of precautions, because the presence of rescuers at a site that had already been attacked was foreseeable and required a higher level of verification before any subsequent targeting. The duty of precautions also entails compliance with Rule 20 of customary international humanitarian law, which requires effective advance warning before any attack that may affect civilians, a requirement also reflected in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. In view of the time interval between the attacks in Majdal Zoun and the visible nature of the rescue mission under observation, the field circumstances technically and practically allowed such a warning to be given and an opportunity to evacuate the site to be provided. Its absence therefore constitutes a breach of the preventive standards intended to avoid harm to protected persons and relief teams. In addition, the issue of proportionality arises, because the foreseeable harm from targeting a rescue site — killing rescuers, disrupting rescue operations, and delaying access to the wounded — is direct and clear harm that cannot be balanced against an unspecified or unproven military advantage.

- 77-The presence of the Lebanese Army at the site does not alter this assessment. The available information indicates that its presence was in the context of accompanying a rescue operation, not in the context of combat activity. Therefore, such presence does not, in itself, create a lawful military objective and cannot be used to justify targeting the Civil Defense or civilian bulldozers. Rather, when placed in its practical context, it reinforces the characterization of the site as an organized space for humanitarian response, not a place of engagement.
- 78-The statement of the wounded soldier adds an important practical dimension to this conclusion. It establishes that the Army's mission was non-combat and limited to accompanying a Civil Defense team. It also shows that the attacks did not occur all at once, but followed one another in clear temporal stages, opening the way to conclude that there was sufficient time for observation and reassessment. In addition, the testimony of the Civil Defense member linking the targeting to the moment of extracting a wounded person, and the testimony of the Director General of the Civil Defense confirming the clarity of the uniform and emblem, make the question of knowledge or possible knowledge of the nature of the site and the persons present there rest on concrete facts, not theoretical assumptions.
- 79-In this context, it is difficult to keep the act within the frame of suspicion or operational error. The incident occurred within an armed conflict, and clear elements were present: protected persons, visible humanitarian mission, possibility of observation, and repeated attacks. These elements, taken together, indicate a serious breach of fundamental rules of international humanitarian law, particularly those relating to the protection of the wounded and medical services.
- 80-This characterization is further strengthened if the incident is viewed within a broader context, should a repeated pattern of targeting rescue teams or obstructing ambulance operations be established. Repetition would transform the incident from an isolated event into operational conduct affecting the core of the protection recognized by the Geneva Conventions in armed conflicts.

81-Accordingly, the final legal formulation may be stated as follows: targeting the Majdal Zoun site after it had become a rescue site, with the presence of Civil Defense personnel, civilian bulldozers, and a Lebanese Army patrol on a non-combat mission, constitutes a clear breach of international humanitarian law, particularly the rules of distinction, proportionality, and precautions, and the obligations under the Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of the wounded and relief personnel and means. In the context of an existing armed conflict, and with knowledge or possible knowledge of the humanitarian character of the site and the protected status of the persons present, this act rises to the level of a war crime, whether as a direct and deliberate targeting of protected persons or as an attack carried out without sufficient distinction and with disregard for the duty of verification and precautions.

Unmodified screenshot No. (1), published on the official page of the General Directorate of the Civil Defense on Facebook, captured on 1 May 2026.



Unmodified screenshot No. (2), of a statement issued by the Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Lebanese Ministry of Public Health), published on 28 April 2026 and captured on 1 May 2026.



Annex (1)

Photograph of the unified uniform of the Lebanese Civil Defense – Tyre Center, showing the visibility of the protective emblems, as well as a photograph of an ambulance belonging to the center, clearly showing that it is a Civil Defense ambulance.



Section Six

The Killing of Journalist Amal Khalil and the Injury of Journalist Zeinab Faraj in the Town of Tayri – South Lebanon

Introduction

- 1- This report addresses the incident involving the killing of journalist Amal Khalil, a correspondent for Al-Akhbar newspaper, and the injury of photojournalist Zeinab Faraj, in the town of Tayri, Bint Jbeil District, South Lebanon, on 22 April 2026. The report does not proceed from a predetermined characterization. Rather, it reconstructs the incident evidentially in accordance with the Berkeley Protocol on open-source investigations, which requires identifying the source, examining its internal content, cross-checking it against independent sources, and then linking the facts to the relevant legal rules in order to reach a legal conclusion.

Methodology

- 2- The report relies on multiple open sources, most notably the chronological reconstruction published by Reporters Without Borders, the Reuters report, the Associated Press report containing a direct interview with Zeinab Faraj from the hospital, the Al Jazeera report on Zeinab Faraj's testimony, and LBCI's coverage, which described her as the "sole witness" to the Tayri crime. It also relies on field work and information available to the Lebanese Army concerning the request submitted to the "mechanism" to allow rescue and ambulance teams to enter. The report also analyzes the "Israeli" narrative as reported by Reuters and Reporters Without Borders, and examines its consistency with the sequence of events and the established facts.

Evidence and Factual Correlation

Evidence One

<https://tinyurl.com/278dpxam>

- 1- The Al Jazeera report provides a human and professional portrait of journalist Amal Khalil. It does not merely refer to her killing, but presents part of her career, testimonies from members of her family and colleagues, and what was said about the final hours before her death. The report is significant because it places Amal Khalil in her professional context, as a journalist working in the field and covering developments in the South, rather than as an unidentified person or an incidental presence at the scene.
- 2- From a documentation perspective, this report is useful in three essential respects. First, it strengthens the victim's journalistic status through testimonies and professional context. Second, it adds elements concerning the last communications and information circulating before the attack occurred. Third, it contributes to forming an initial picture of the difficulty of reaching the location after the targeting.

Evidence Two

<https://tinyurl.com/bdexmnvd>

- 3- The Associated Press report contains the account of journalist Zeinab Faraj, a survivor of the incident who had been accompanying Amal Khalil. This makes the report highly significant from an evidentiary standpoint, because the testimony does not come from a distant observer, but from a person who was inside the incident and lived through its stages.
- 4- According to the report, Zeinab Faraj described a sequence of attacks: a vehicle in front of them was hit, then they exited their vehicle, a drone remained in the air, Amal's vehicle was then struck, and the two journalists subsequently took shelter in a nearby building, which was later targeted. This sequence is highly significant because it does not depict the incident as a single isolated attack, but as a successive course of conduct that extended over time and allowed for reassessment.

Evidence Three

<https://tinyurl.com/5eebprhu>

- 5- LBCI focuses on the post-attack phase, particularly the search-and-rescue operation. The most important element in this material concerns the Lebanese Red Cross's attempt to reach the location, the evacuation of the injured Zeinab Faraj, the recovery of two bodies, and the team's subsequent need to withdraw after being exposed to additional danger, before the search for Amal Khalil was later resumed.
- 6- This phase is no less important than the moment of the attack itself. Under international humanitarian law, the assessment does not end when injury or death occurs. The manner in which the wounded are treated, whether rescue teams can reach them, and whether their work is respected are all elements that form part of the legal reading of the incident. If it is established that rescue teams were prevented, delayed, or exposed to unjustified danger while attempting evacuation, this opens an independent avenue for legal analysis.

Evidence Four

<https://tinyurl.com/3nnm7w5r>

- 7- The Reporters Without Borders report provides organized material in terms of chronology. It presents the incident through successive times, communications, distress attempts, and delayed access by rescue teams. It therefore constitutes important material for building an initial timeline of the incident.
- 8- The significance of this report lies in the fact that it does not merely state that a journalist was killed. Rather, it attempts to link several elements: the presence of the two journalists on a field assignment, their exposure to escalating danger, communications made to alert others or seek assistance, the difficulty faced by rescue teams in reaching them, and the later recovery of the body. This type of sequencing helps determine whether there was a practical opportunity to verify, halt escalation, or facilitate rescue.

Evidence Five

<https://tinyurl.com/kkj5htyn>

9- The Reuters report presents a news account while also setting out some of the competing elements of the incident. It refers to the killing of journalist Amal Khalil and the injury of the photographer who was accompanying her, and to the fact that the two journalists were near the town of Tayri while covering events, before they took shelter in a nearby building that was subsequently targeted. The additional significance of the Reuters report is that it also sets out the Israeli narrative.

Factual Background

10- On 22 April 2026, Amal Khalil and Zeinab Faraj were in the town of Tayri in South Lebanon on a field journalistic assignment. They had planned to cover the situation after the ceasefire and were travelling behind a vehicle carrying the mukhtar of Bint Jbeil, Ali Bazzi, and a person named Mohammad Ali Hourani, when an Israeli attack struck the vehicle in front. The attacks then continued, culminating in the targeting of the house, which led to the killing of journalist Amal Khalil and the injury of Zeinab Faraj.

Reconstruction of the Timeline

11- Chronological reconstruction is one of the most important levels of proof because it brings together the timing of the strikes, communications, rescue requests, and the role of the “mechanism.”

12- The first attack, at approximately 14:30, struck a vehicle in front of the vehicle carrying Amal Khalil and Zeinab Faraj. The two journalists survived and managed to exit the vehicle. At 14:52, journalist Carmen Joukhadar, Al Jazeera’s correspondent in South Lebanon, called Amal Khalil. Joukhadar reported that she heard Amal running and panting, but that Amal said she was fine.

- 13- Between 15:00 and 16:00, rescue teams waited for authorization from the committee known as the “mechanism” (the ceasefire monitoring mechanism), after it had been contacted at 15:41. This body plays, among its roles, a coordinating and mediating function in relation to the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, and was established in November 2024 under the auspices of France and the United States, with representatives of the parties to the conflict and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. This establishes that a request was addressed to an existing official coordination committee for safe access to the targeted site.
- 14- At approximately 15:15, a second attack targeted the vehicle of the two journalists. After that, Amal Khalil called her colleagues to inform them of the attack, then took shelter with Zeinab Faraj in a nearby three-storey house. At 16:22, the last known contact with Amal Khalil took place, according to her sister, who was on the phone with her. After this call, communication with her was cut off. At 16:27, the house in which the two journalists had taken shelter was targeted in a third attack by a fighter jet, not by a drone, and the smoke resulting from that attack was photographed by Carmen Joukhadar from the nearby town of Khiam. (See Annex 1)
- 15- At approximately 16:40, the Lebanese Army and nearby rescue teams were unable to reach the location of the two journalists because the attacks were continuing. At approximately 18:00, the Lebanese Red Cross was able to evacuate Zeinab Faraj, who was injured. During that operation, the “Israeli forces” fired a sound bomb and live ammunition, causing damage to the ambulance (images in Annex 2) and forcing it to withdraw without rescuing Amal Khalil. At approximately 19:20, the Lebanese Army decided to accompany the Lebanese Red Cross to the site because of the dangerous situation. After the technical matters relating to the equipment needed for rescue were addressed, the Lebanese Red Cross returned to the location with the Army and bulldozers at approximately 20:20, before it was announced at 23:10 that Amal Khalil’s body had been found on the ground floor of the building.

Zeinab Faraj's Testimony and Its Evidentiary Value

- 16- Zeinab Faraj's testimony is an independent evidentiary statement because it comes from a direct survivor who was present during all stages of the incident and described hours of pain while waiting for help to arrive. Zeinab stated that the first attack hit the vehicle that was in front of them while Amal was filming with her phone from the car window. They then stopped, exited the vehicle, and took shelter on the side of the road while a drone remained in the sky above them. Less than an hour later, a second attack hit Amal's vehicle beside them.
- 17- Zeinab adds that she was able to open a metal door to a shop or garage behind them and that they took shelter inside. She described Amal's condition as crawling and injured, and stated that Amal also sustained burns after the nearby targeted vehicle caught fire. This detail does not merely add a human description to the incident; it changes Amal's legal position within the analysis. She was no longer only a civilian journalist in a dangerous location; she had also become a wounded person in need of rescue and care, requiring enhanced protection under the rules protecting the wounded and sick.
- 18- Zeinab further states that, while she was exhausted, she heard the sound of a missile falling before a third attack struck the building in which Amal had taken shelter. The force of the explosion threw Zeinab outside, while Amal remained trapped inside.
- 19- A report published on 26 April 2026 intersects with this testimony. It states that Zeinab Faraj said that a vehicle travelling in front of them was suddenly struck by a missile "without sound," after which they stopped and took shelter in a nearby location, before Amal's vehicle was directly struck while it was about three metres away from them, causing Amal to suffer burns after the vehicle caught fire. The report also states that Zeinab tried to help Amal and move her to one of the nearby buildings, and that the shelling resumed later, with the force of the explosion throwing her outside while Amal remained inside. Another report was also published on Zeinab Faraj's testimony and described her as the

“sole witness to the Tayri crime.” The multiplicity of sources gives this testimony legal evidentiary weight.

- 20- The witness stated that throughout the attack there was a drone personally monitoring them and flying over them at low altitude. When shown images of several drones, she identified one of them (Annex 3), This type is used by the “Israeli Army”. This testimony establishes that, before the targeting, there was a direct feed from the targeted area focused on the two journalists. This indicates knowledge of their identity before the targeting, or at least knowledge of their civilian character, and therefore knowledge of their protected status under international humanitarian law.

Israeli Narrative and its Assessment

- 21- The “Israeli Army” claimed that it had identified two vehicles leaving a military facility used by Hezbollah, crossing what it calls the “forward defense line,” and approaching the forces in a manner that constituted an immediate threat. It therefore targeted one of the vehicles and then a nearby building. The Israeli Army also stated that it does not target journalists. The official account of the “Israeli Army” on X confirmed that the air force had targeted one of the vehicles and then a building into which those it described as “infiltrators” had taken shelter, after considering them to be in violation of the ceasefire agreement.
- 22- However, legal and evidentiary examination of this narrative leads to its rejection. If the initial suspicion related to a particular vehicle, that does not automatically justify targeting the journalists’ vehicle or the building in which they later took shelter. If the “Israeli Army” describes the persons as “infiltrators,” the identity of the two journalists was known and had been communicated to it, at least when authorization was requested through the mechanism at approximately 15:41 and before the building was targeted. Their images were also being transmitted directly by the surveillance drone flying above them at very low altitude, according to the witness’s statement. The decisive legal question here is not only whether there was an initial suspicion,

but what the attacking party knew, or should have known, about the status of the targeted persons at 16:27 when the house was targeted. According to the established facts, the answer is yes.

Applicable Rules

Protection of Journalists

- 23- Customary international humanitarian law Rule 34, according to the ICRC database, affirms that civilian journalists engaged in professional missions in areas of armed conflict must be respected and protected unless they take a direct part in hostilities. In the same context, journalists are considered civilians so long as they do not participate directly in hostilities. Security Council Resolution 1738 (2006) also affirms the obligation to respect and protect journalists and media personnel during armed conflicts, prohibits targeting them, and calls for ensuring their safety and not obstructing their work.
- 24- When this rule is connected to the facts, the conclusion is not based on the result alone, namely the killing of one journalist and the injury of another, but on a series of interrelated elements: two journalists on a professional mission, a first attack on a vehicle in front of them, the two journalists exiting and attempting to take shelter, a drone remaining above the location, a second attack on Amal's vehicle, injuries and burns, sheltering in a building, and then a third attack on that building.
- 25- The link between the rule and the facts is clear here. The available facts establish that Amal Khalil and Zeinab Faraj were on a journalistic mission, that Amal was filming the effects of the field situation, and that Zeinab was accompanying her as a photojournalist. None of the open sources, nor the "Israeli Army," presents evidence that either of them took a direct part in hostilities. Their original legal status therefore remains that of protected civilians. This is not altered by the media outlet for which Amal worked or by the editorial line of that institution, because the legal protection of a journalist is not lost because of professional

affiliation or editorial opinion, but only in the event of direct participation in hostilities, which is not conclusively established as a matter of law.

- 26- Accordingly, the targeting of the journalists' vehicle, followed by the targeting of the building in which they took shelter, after indicators and communications existed regarding their identity and location, raises a strong suspicion of a violation of the principle of distinction. The conclusion here is not based only on the killing of one journalist and the injury of another, but on the connection between the facts and the rule: two civilians on a journalistic mission, no evidence of direct participation, successive targeting, and possible information concerning their identity before the third attack.

Duty of Verification and Precautions

- 27- International humanitarian law imposes a duty of constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects from the effects of hostilities, and requires those who plan or decide upon an attack to verify by all feasible means that the target is a military objective, and to cancel or suspend the attack immediately if it becomes apparent otherwise or if the expected civilian harm would be excessive.
- 28- Applying this rule to the facts reveals the clarity of the violation. Between the first attack at approximately 14:30 and the third attack at 16:27, nearly two hours elapsed. During that period, the two journalists exited the vehicle, communications took place with colleagues and relatives, attempts began to coordinate rescue through the Lebanese Red Cross, the Lebanese Army, the mechanism, and the "Israeli Army," and rescue teams waited for authorization from the mechanism between 15:00 and 16:00. According to Zeinab's testimony, a drone also remained in the sky above the location. These facts make the duty of verification a continuing duty, not a momentary one.
- 29- The legal conclusion here is that the initial military assessment under the "Israeli" narrative, assuming it existed, should have been revised after the facts changed from a targeted vehicle in front, to two journalists who had exited and taken shelter, and then to two injured women inside a shop or house. If the attack

continued after these changes, while coordination channels were seeking safe access to the targeted site and while there was continuous monitoring by the drone belonging to the party that carried out the attack, with knowledge of the journalistic status of those targeted, the link is clear: the rule requires continuous verification before targeting, and the facts reveal time, information, communications, and monitoring that allowed such verification. This conclusively establishes the existence of a serious violation of the rule of verification and precautions.

Protection of the Wounded and Medical Units

- 30- The provisions of the First Geneva Convention and customary international humanitarian law, particularly Rules 109 and 110 of the ICRC study, provide that whenever circumstances permit, and particularly after an engagement, each party must take without delay all feasible measures to search for, collect, and evacuate the wounded and sick without discrimination, and that they must receive the medical care required by their condition to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay. The protection also includes the duty to take measures to protect the wounded and sick from ill-treatment, and to collect and evacuate the dead whenever circumstances permit.
- 31- According to the facts, Amal Khalil was wounded after the second attack. According to Zeinab Faraj's testimony, Amal was crawling, injured, and suffering burns after the nearby vehicle caught fire. Zeinab herself was injured and in need of evacuation. After the second attack, Amal became trapped inside the building, while Zeinab was pulled from the rubble. These facts bring both victims within the scope of protection of the wounded, especially Amal, who remained for hours without evacuation.
- 32- The rescue team was able to remove and evacuate Zeinab, as well as the bodies of the two persons killed in the attack on the first vehicle. The Lebanese Ministry of Health stated that the "Israeli Army" opened fire on the Lebanese Red Cross ambulance that had arrived to rescue Amal, forcing it to retreat. The

humanitarian mission was prevented by a sound bomb and live ammunition directed at the ambulance, while continuing shelling prevented access, and the Lebanese Army later decided to accompany the Lebanese Red Cross despite the absence of clear authorization from the “mechanism.”

- 33- The legal link is that if an ambulance is prevented or forced to retreat by live fire or a sound bomb while attempting to evacuate a trapped wounded person, this is not merely an incidental effect of the attack. It constitutes an independent violation of the duty to protect medical objects and of the obligation to search for, collect, and evacuate the wounded without delay. The delay in recovering the body until 23:10 also raises the question of the duty to collect and evacuate the dead, while distinguishing between delay resulting from actual military danger and delay resulting from unjustified and deliberate obstruction.

The Two Persons Killed in the First Vehicle and Their Connection to the Chain of Events

- 34- The two persons killed in the first vehicle must not be omitted from the report, because their presence is not a marginal detail. It is noted that two persons were killed in the first attack on the vehicle, that their identities were not immediately confirmed, and that the rescue team removed Zeinab as well as the bodies of the two persons killed in the attack on the first vehicle.
- 35- This fact establishes that, from its beginning, the scene was one of victims and body recovery, not merely a continuing military movement. It also shows that rescue teams were dealing with more than one victim at the location, making the request for a safe corridor through the “mechanism” more urgent. Although the identities of the two persons were not immediately determined, Zeinab Faraj stated in her testimony that they were the local mukhtar and a person who usually helped them and guided them on the road.

Legal Analysis

- 36- The established context does not reflect a single attack that can be isolated and analyzed on the basis of one moment. Rather, it reveals an operational sequence

composed of three interrelated stages in time and place, each with its own facts that should have affected the subsequent targeting decision. The first stage begins with an attack on a vehicle in front of the two journalists, which led to the killing of two persons and immediately turned the location into a casualty scene, opening the likelihood of the presence of civilians and possible rescue teams. At that moment, the initial assessment, whatever its basis, may have been linked to a specific vehicle and a specific circumstance. The subsequent facts, however, show that this circumstance did not remain unchanged.

- 37- In the second stage, after the two journalists exited their vehicle, moved to the side of the road, and attempted to take shelter, a subsequent attack struck their vehicle. Here, two essential elements changed. First, the matter was no longer about an unidentified vehicle moving along the road, but about persons who had exited it and were exposed. Second, direct injuries had appeared, as Zeinab Faraj's testimony indicates that Amal Khalil sustained multiple injuries and that the vehicle caught fire. After this attack, the matter was no longer about a suspected vehicle, but about injured persons outside it, at least one of whom was unable to move.
- 38- The third stage occurred after the two journalists moved to a nearby building seeking protection, at a time when coordination efforts for evacuation had already begun through known channels, including the Lebanese Red Cross and the Lebanese Army through the "mechanism." At this stage, the issue was no longer movement or transit, but a fixed location containing two persons, at least one of whom was injured, with declared requests to secure safe access. The third attack did not strike a vehicle; it struck a building into which two persons had fled after being injured.
- 39- The legal effect of this pattern is not linked to the number of attacks in itself, but to the relationship between them. Each subsequent stage was not an automatic continuation of the previous stage, but came after a clear change in the field situation: from a vehicle in front, to persons outside a vehicle, then to injured persons, and then to persons inside a building. This change directly

raises the issue of re-verification before the subsequent attack. Accordingly, the analysis of the third attack cannot be separated from the information that preceded it, because the targeting decision at that moment should have taken those changes into account.

- 40- In this context, other facts provide additional proof of what has been stated. If a drone was hovering over the location, as Zeinab Faraj's testimony indicates, that suggests continuous surveillance. If communications had begun with the Lebanese Red Cross, the Lebanese Army, the "mechanism," and the "Israeli" side to secure a safe corridor, this means that the location was no longer unknown in terms of the presence of persons requiring evacuation. If rescue teams waited for authorization from the "mechanism" between 15:00 and 16:00, this establishes that access to the location was the subject of official coordination known to the mechanism and the "Israeli Army."
- 41- When these elements are combined, the third attack cannot be separated from this context. It occurred in the presence of confirmed surveillance, ongoing communications, a request for access, existing injuries, and a defined location. In these circumstances, the legal question shifts from assessing the lawfulness of the first attack to whether the attack was suspended or re-verified after the facts changed. If information concerning civilian identity, location, and medical condition had become available or knowable, then continuing with the targeting decision without reassessment raises the issue of breach of the duty to verify the legality of the target, and therefore establishes the element of intent in the context of an armed conflict in targeting civilians not directly participating in hostilities, with the "Israeli Army" knowing the protection enjoyed by the two targeted women.
- 42- Thus, the conclusion is not drawn from a general characterization, but from the connection between specific elements: the multiplicity of stages, the changing nature of the target, the availability of time and additional information, including knowledge of the nature of the target, and the continued use of force despite that. This connection confirms that the conduct of the "Israeli Army"

constitutes a serious violation of international humanitarian law, consisting of the targeting of civilians who had entered a situation requiring protection, including their status as wounded persons inside a defined shelter location, in addition to the targeting of the medical services that intervened to rescue them. This cannot be separated from the broader context of the armed conflict in Lebanon, where other facts indicate a systematic targeting of journalists and medical objects, making the targeting addressed in this report one episode in that systematic policy adopted by the “Israeli Army,” and establishing the commission of war crimes on a broad scale.

Legal Conclusion

- 43- In light of the foregoing cross-checking of open sources, and the conclusions that can be drawn from them when read alongside the Lebanese Army’s information and Zeinab Faraj’s testimony, the characterization of the Tayri incident is no longer a matter of general assessment or initial impression. It is based on factual elements repeated and consistent across more than one source. These elements are not limited to the final result, namely the killing of Amal Khalil and the injury of Zeinab Faraj. They extend to the way the event developed step by step: the presence of two journalists on a clearly professional field mission; the absence of any indication that they participated in a hostile act; their movement from a vehicle to an exposed location and then to a building seeking protection; their exposure to successive attacks over a period that was not short; the initiation of actual communications to secure evacuation through known channels; and the fact that this coincided with their injuries and their additional protection as wounded persons. When placed in one context, these facts cannot be read as separate incidents, but as one course of events in which the facts changed at each stage, necessarily requiring reconsideration of any previous assessment of the nature of the target.
- 44- In this framework, the conclusion is not based on generalization or evaluative language, but on a direct connection between what actually occurred and what

the legal rules require in such cases. The presence of two journalists with an established civilian status, and the absence of evidence that this status was lost, is matched by successive targeting of the places where they were located, from the road to the vehicle and then to the building. With each movement, the facts changed: from presence in a vehicle, to exposed presence, then to injury, and then to sheltering inside a building, in parallel with ongoing communications requesting assistance. This sequence, by its nature, places verification at the core of the assessment, because each stage provided additional information concerning the persons' identity, location, and condition.

- 45- The available facts indicate that what occurred may not be consistent with the requirements of distinction, verification, and precautions, and that the treatment of the target was not adjusted in line with the changing circumstances on the ground. The fact that one of the victims remained under the rubble for hours, amid documented attempts to request evacuation, also confirms the extent to which the rules protecting the wounded and rescue operations were not respected, regardless of the legality of the attacks themselves.

Accordingly, it may be stated that the facts conclusively indicate that the attack, in its successive stages, involved the targeting of two journalists protected as civilians, and may have been carried out without sufficient reassessment of the nature of the target after they were injured and moved to a place of shelter. The facts also indicate that evacuation procedures were deliberately delayed or obstructed by the "Israeli" side at a time when the need for them was clear. Since the evidence establishes that the "Israeli" party knew the identity of the two journalists, or was able to verify it, and that it knew of the existence of injuries and evacuation requests before the final attack or during the rescue attempts, the matter is no longer merely an error of assessment. It falls within acts viewed as serious violations of international humanitarian law and, according to legal certainty, rises to the level of a war crime.

Annex (1)

Photograph taken by an eyewitness (journalist Carmen Joukhadar) documenting the moment the house was targeted



Add a Caption

Wednesday • 22 Apr 2026 • 4:27 PM

[Adjust](#)

 IMG_1755


Apple iPhone 13 Pro Max

HEIF



Wide Camera — 26 mm $f1.5$
12 MP • 3024 × 4032 • 719 KB

ISO 50 | 129 mm | 0 ev | $f1.5$ | 1/6993 s



South Governorate >

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Annex (2)

Photographs showing the Lebanese Red Cross ambulance that intervened and evacuated journalist Zeinab Faraj at 18:00, while it had been struck by bullets as a result of the targeting it was subjected to, forcing it to withdraw



Annex 3

Image of the type of drone identified by witness Zeinab Faraj, which, according to her statement, was flying above them throughout the incident



Autel EVO Max 4T

This drone can display simultaneous live feeds from several sensors, including wide-angle cameras, thermal cameras, and zoom cameras.

Flight duration: provides a flight time of up to 42 minutes.

Range: features a transmission range of up to 15 kilometers.

Camera system: includes a 48-megapixel zoom camera, capable of up to 10x optical zoom and up to 160x hybrid zoom.

Section Seven

The Attacks of 8 April 2026: Large-Scale Indiscriminate Attacks against Civilian Properties

Introduction

- 1- This report addresses the Israeli attacks that struck Lebanon on 8 April 2026, only hours after the announcement of a ceasefire connected to the confrontation between the United States and Iran. The timing of these attacks cannot be separated from their legal and factual assessment. At a moment when regional escalation was expected to recede, Lebanon witnessed one of the broadest waves of attacks in the ongoing conflict. Reuters described the attacks as the largest carried out by Israel against Hezbollah since the beginning of the war, noting that the Israeli military announced that it had targeted Hezbollah infrastructure inside "civilian areas" across the country. Reuters also reported that the attacks killed more than 250 people and injured more than 1,100 in a single day, after the ceasefire relating to Iran and the United States.
- 2- The open-source material does not point to a single attack or a limited incident, but to a series of attacks conducted within a short period of time, striking Beirut, the southern suburbs, parts of Mount Lebanon, the Bekaa, and the South. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 8 April witnessed more than 100 Israeli attacks covering Beirut and multiple locations in Mount Lebanon, the Bekaa, and the South. In a later update, UNHCR described that day as a violent peak in the conflict, with more than 100 attacks within ten minutes, resulting in more than 300 killed and 1,200 injured in a single day. Human Rights Watch also stated that more than 100 Israeli attacks that day, including inside densely populated neighborhoods in Beirut, killed more than 300 people and damaged the vital Qasmiyeh Bridge.
- 3- Geographically, the attacks do not appear to have been confined to a conventional area of operations. They struck densely populated civilian, commercial, and residential neighborhoods in Beirut and its surroundings, with

locations such as Corniche al-Mazraa, Talet al-Khayat, Ain al-Mreisseh, Hayy al-Sullum, and locations in Mount Lebanon such as Kayfoun falling within the scope of the attacks. This breadth requires verification of each location separately, but it also requires consideration of the general pattern: the choice of targets, the pace of execution, and the assessment of collateral damage. Several documented reports indicate that the attacks struck densely populated residential neighborhoods that, until then, had been relatively spared from attacks in Beirut and other areas, and that the Ministry of Health death toll later rose to 357 killed and 1,223 injured, with confirmation that the toll was not final because search operations under the rubble and the identification of victims were still ongoing.

- 4- The gradual rise in casualty figures also shows that the effects of the attacks did not end at the moment of explosion. Differences in the figures do not necessarily reflect contradictions between accounts; rather, they reflect the continuation of search, rescue, and victim-identification operations after the attacks. The figure therefore cannot be read merely as a final toll. It must also be understood as evidence of the continuing humanitarian impact beyond the moment of attack.
- 5- This report does not treat news items as separate headlines, but as primary material to be legally and methodologically verified. Photographs, videos, official statements, and statements by the executing party are read together and not in isolation from one another. These materials include visual content documenting scenes of chaos and destruction in Beirut and describing the broad Israeli attacks. They also show emergency teams operating in locations from which smoke was rising after the simultaneous attacks in Beirut, in addition to other visual sources from international and local platforms. These materials assist in assessing the scale of the humanitarian impact and in identifying the legal questions raised by the attacks.
- 6- The Israeli narrative is part of the verification material, not a final conclusion. Israel announced that it targeted more than 100 Hezbollah sites or structures, and Israeli sources, or sources quoting the Israeli military, stated that the targets included infrastructure and centers associated with Hezbollah. It also stated that

at least 180 Hezbollah members were killed that day. However, announcing that Hezbollah sites were targeted is not sufficient in itself. The nature of each location at the moment of attack must be verified, including its character, its location, and the collateral damage that targeting it could cause during peak hours. Under international humanitarian law, an object does not become a military objective merely because of its general association with a party to the conflict. It must be a specific military objective at the moment of attack, its destruction must offer a direct and concrete military advantage, and the expected civilian harm must not be excessive in relation to that advantage. The Israeli narrative must therefore be tested against what the images show, what the testimonies say, and what the records of hospitals and rescue teams reveal.

- 7- International positions do not, in themselves, establish responsibility, but they confirm that the incident raised serious international concern because of its scale, timing, and civilian impact. The United Nations condemned the wave of attacks and described reports of hundreds of deaths and injuries, including among civilians, as horrific, only hours after the ceasefire linked to Iran. United Nations experts also condemned what they described as unprecedented Israeli bombardment in Lebanon following the announcement of the ceasefire and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities. International agencies and statements reported that UNHCR described the attacks as the largest and most destructive in the current conflict, referring to the striking of approximately 100 sites without warning, including densely populated areas in Beirut that were already hosting displaced persons. These positions are used here as indicators of the seriousness of the incident and the breadth of its effects, not as independent legal proof.
- 8- Despite the high number of casualties, the event cannot be measured only by the number of dead and wounded. The harm here does not appear at a single point, but in an interconnected series of effects: multiple attacks in a short time, densely populated civilian areas, reports of an absence of warning at some locations, the use of means of warfare with wide effects in an urban fabric, the subsequent

intervention of rescue teams, direct pressure on hospitals and ambulance teams, and an impact on movement and humanitarian access, particularly in relation to infrastructure such as the Qasmiyeh Bridge. The legal assessment begins from this connection between the act and the result, particularly with respect to the rules of distinction, proportionality, precautions, and the protection of the wounded and rescue operations.

- 9- Accordingly, this report begins with the rules of international humanitarian law before any political characterization. Its first aim is to establish what can be established: where the attack occurred, when it occurred, the nature of the location, who was present, the type of harm caused, and whether there was an effective warning or clear precautions. The facts are then tested against the rules of distinction, proportionality, precautions, and the protection of the wounded and rescue operations. The outcome is a file based on verifiable facts and specific legal answers.

Methodology

- 10- This report relies on open-source documentation methodology and on handling such material with care, while linking it to its temporal, spatial, and legal context. The purpose is not merely to prove that the attacks occurred, but to determine what can be established about them: the location, the approximate time, the nature of the visible damage, the content of testimonies, the extent to which the material intersects with independent sources, and what each element adds to the legal reading of the incident.
- 11- The materials do not have equal evidentiary value within this file. A video showing smoke or an explosion is not sufficient, by itself, to establish responsibility, but it may prove a visual effect that needs to be linked to a place, a time, and an independent source. A testimony referring to the absence of warning is not read as a ready-made legal conclusion, but as an indicator to be compared with what international agencies or UN sources report about the nature of the attacks. As for the statement of the executing party, it is not treated

as a final truth, nor is it dismissed without comparison. It is placed alongside the visual evidence, medical tolls, and descriptions of the civilian environment in order to assess whether the declared military characterization is consistent with the visible facts.

- 12- For the purposes of this documentation, the material may be arranged into three categories. The first category consists of primary visual materials, including links relating to titles such as the fiercest wave of attacks on Lebanon, deadly attacks on Beirut, intensive bombardment, and scenes of direct explosions. The importance of this material lies in the possibility that it contains direct footage or footage close in time to the attacks. In accordance with the adopted methodology, before relying on these materials, the original versions were preserved, the time of publication was identified, key frames were extracted, visible geographic markers were reviewed, and the material was compared with other sources. For this reason, such material is currently treated as supporting material, not as conclusive evidence of a specific location or final chronology.
- 13- The second category includes visual materials that can be strengthened through textual and visual verification, including material documenting scenes of chaos and destruction in Beirut and linking those scenes to the Israeli attacks that occurred after the temporary ceasefire between the United States and Iran. The importance of this material is that it does not merely provide a general description, but links the scenes to a clear temporal context and shows the direct effects of the attacks in a residential environment.
- 14- This category also includes visual material relating to emergency response after the attacks, in addition to links showing a direct explosion or scenes from social media. Additional checks were carried out by identifying the original publisher, the time of first publication, whether the video was reposted from another source, and whether the visible markers match the locations mentioned, such as Corniche al-Mazraa, Talet al-Khayat, Ain al-Mreisseh, or Kayfoun. These materials are therefore used as visual indicators and compared with more reliable material. They are not used alone as a basis for final conclusions.

- 15- The third category consists of more established journalistic, human rights, and UN sources. These are the sources on which the report relies to establish the general framework of the attacks, the toll of human losses, and the legal and humanitarian characterization.
- 16- When these materials are brought together, the value of cross-corroboration becomes clear. Journalistic, human rights, and UN sources intersect on the broad scope of the attacks, the narrow time frame, and the high casualty toll. The visual materials intersect around the presence of urban destruction, fires, chaos, and the intervention of emergency teams. Human rights and UN sources help link that damage to the subsequent humanitarian impact, particularly pressure on hospitals, search operations under the rubble, and difficulty accessing assistance. This is precisely where the adopted methodology is useful: the material is not treated as a separate piece of evidence, but as one link in a chain of evidence whose credibility is strengthened by its intersection with other material.
- 17- The evidence does not stop at documentation. It also assists the transition toward determining responsibility. Statements by the executing party about the nature of the targets are compared with the nature of the sites actually struck, with testimonies about the absence of warning, with images of destruction in civilian neighborhoods, and with the human losses. If the executing party acknowledges a broad and rapid operation, if independent sources confirm that densely populated civilian areas were struck, and if the toll is large and rising because victims remained under the rubble, then the legal question is no longer limited to whether the attack occurred or whether it was justified in the abstract. It becomes whether the rules of distinction, proportionality, and precautions were actually respected in each act of targeting. At this point, the role of each item of evidence becomes clear: video proves the effect; testimony helps assess the nature of the environment or the issue of warning; the medical toll shows the scale of harm; the statement of the executing party establishes the scope and the

declared objective; and the human rights or UN source places the matter within the framework of violations of international humanitarian law.

- 18- The methodology here is not an isolated introductory paragraph, but the working method that governs the entire report. The factual narrative relies on what has been corroborated across sources; the analysis of munitions relies on visual materials that can be documented; the analysis of responsibility relies on combining what the executing party announced with the nature of the environment, the issue of warning, and the scale of harm; and the legal conclusion remains tied to degrees of confidence, not to assumptions. This is what gives the documentation legal usability: it does not rely on the number of links, but on connecting each item of material to a specific evidentiary function and a clear legal rule.

Evidence and Factual Correlation

Evidence One

<https://tinyurl.com/59dw3c34>

- 19- The Reuters material published on 8 April 2026 provides the general framework of the attacks, identifying the executing party, the scope of the operation, and the preliminary toll. It reported that Israel launched its widest attacks on Lebanon since the beginning of the current conflict with Hezbollah, and that the attacks killed more than 250 people and injured more than 1,100 in a single day. It also conveyed the Israeli narrative, which referred to the targeting of more than 100 Hezbollah centers or sites in Beirut, the Bekaa, and the South, including inside populated areas.
- 20- This material can be relied upon with a high degree of confidence because it comes from a well-known international agency and because its essential elements intersect with other sources. Its importance in this record is not limited to the toll or the identification of the perpetrator. It also extends to the pattern of the operation itself. When attacks are carried out on this scale, across more than one area, and cause this level of losses, verification of the independent

assessment of each target becomes essential, as does assessment of whether the expected military advantage justified the expected or resulting civilian harm.

Evidence Two

<https://tinyurl.com/y7ahwnss>

- 21- The Associated Press material indicates that the attacks struck Beirut and civilian, commercial, and residential areas, and that 8 April 2026 was one of the bloodiest days of the conflict, with more than 300 people killed, including more than one hundred women, children, and elderly persons. It also conveys residents' sense that safety had been lost even in areas that were previously perceived as less exposed to attack.
- 22- This material is among the stronger sources in the record, given the nature of the agency's work and its field coverage supported by images and testimonies. Its direct value lies in the issue of precautions and effective warning. The absence of warning does not, by itself, prove unlawfulness, but it becomes a central element when an attack occurs in a densely populated area. This raises the question why no warning was issued and what alternative precautions were taken to reduce civilian losses.

Evidence Three

<https://tinyurl.com/328fmrkm>

- 23- The Al Jazeera video, published on 8 April 2026, shows scenes of chaos and destruction in Beirut after the broad Israeli attacks. This material supports the description of the civilian environment affected and shows the impact of the attacks on streets, buildings, civilian movement, and rescue operations. From a legal perspective, it assists in assessing the foreseeability of civilian harm in an urban environment, particularly when the scenes are linked to the nature of the means used and the location of the attack.

Evidence Four

<https://tinyurl.com/4cevmpxa>

- 24- The Euronews material reports that Israeli attacks struck dense commercial and residential areas in Beirut without warning, in the context of Israel's announcement that the ceasefire linked to Iran did not extend to Lebanon. This material combines three important elements: the political context, the absence of warning, and the civilian character of the affected areas.
- 25- Its reliability is generally high because it is issued by an international platform and its content intersects with other published materials. It is particularly useful for testing the duty of precautions. The reference to the absence of warning in dense areas makes the question of whether warning was possible, or whether alternative means were used to reduce civilian harm, unavoidable.

Evidence Five

<https://tinyurl.com/3e7te73c>

- 26- The Public Broadcasting Service material, according to the title and content available in open sources, indicates that Israel said the ceasefire with Iran did not apply to Lebanon and that it bombed central Beirut without warning. Although full access to the material was not available, its intersection with other evidence gives it evidentiary value in establishing the same framework: attacks on central Beirut and other areas without warning after a regional ceasefire that was not extended to Lebanon.
- 27- This material helps highlight the element of awareness of the context and the operational choice. The executing party was not acting in a vacuum, but within a declared regional context, and nevertheless treated Lebanon as outside the scope of de-escalation.

Evidence Six

<https://tinyurl.com/47ubwph5>

- 28- The statement of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, issued by OHCHR, is an important UN human rights item of evidence. It

described the level of killing and destruction in Lebanon as terrifying and called for independent investigations and accountability.

- 29- This statement shows that the facts reached a level of seriousness requiring a public position by OHCHR. Its value lies in supporting the need for an independent investigation into possible serious violations of international humanitarian law, particularly in relation to distinction, proportionality, and precautions.

Evidence Seven

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/04/1167280>

- 30- The United Nations briefing, including UNHCR material, is one of the central items in this record. It stated that approximately 100 locations were struck within ten minutes, without warnings, including densely populated neighborhoods in Beirut that were already hosting thousands of displaced persons.
- 31- The strength of this evidence is that it combines the narrow time frame, the multiplicity of locations, the absence of warning, and civilian density. It comes from a UN body concerned with the humanitarian situation and displaced persons. It therefore places the duties of precautions and verification in question, particularly as to whether each targeted site was subjected to an independent assessment and whether warning was absent in relation to all locations.

Evidence Eight

<https://tinyurl.com/ye28fnd5>

- 32- The Human Rights Watch material addresses the 8 April attacks and the damage to the Qasmiyeh Bridge. It indicates that more than 100 Israeli attacks across Lebanon, including in densely populated neighborhoods in Beirut, killed more than 300 people and damaged the last major bridge linking southern

Lebanon to the rest of the country, threatening tens of thousands of people's access to food, health care, and assistance.

- 33- The importance of this material is that it does not stop at direct killing. It also addresses the subsequent effect on movement and humanitarian access. This expands the scope of civilian harm in the analysis of proportionality and precautions. The expected harm is not limited to those killed or injured at the moment of attack, but also includes those whose treatment or access to assistance becomes impossible afterward.

Evidence Nine

<https://tinyurl.com/mx4yvdyt>

- 34- The Wall Street Journal material describes the pattern of attacks in terms indicating that missiles fell heavily on around 100 targets within a short period. It reports that Israel said it targeted Hezbollah elements or structures, while the result was hundreds of deaths in civilian areas.
- 35- This material assists in understanding the method of execution of the operation in terms of attack density, speed, and the multiplicity of targets. These elements are important because responsibility is not always read from the result of a single strike, but from the manner in which the operation as a whole was carried out. If the executing party launches a large number of strikes within a short period and in civilian environments, independent verification of each target, separate proportionality assessment, and practical precautions for each attack all become central issues.

Evidence Ten

<https://www.bbc.com/news/videos/c0rx4ve0klyo>

- 36- The visual material from the British Broadcasting Corporation conveys its correspondent's description of the attacks that struck Beirut. It shows rescuers removing rubble from a destroyed building in central Beirut after an Israeli

attack, in addition to testimonies from residents describing the moments of terror they experienced during the attack.

Evidence Eleven

<https://www.instagram.com/reel/DW9YyoukqMg>

<https://www.facebook.com/reel/1310610430964128>

https://www.instagram.com/reel/DW4leDPDb_7

- 37- The Instagram and Facebook links contain scenes that appear to show a direct explosion or visual material connected to the multiplicity of attacks in Lebanon. These materials are not disregarded and may, if verified, help show the moment of attack, the sequence of explosions, or the absence of any visible warning or evacuation before the strike. They remain supporting indicators that must be linked to sources of higher reliability.
- 38- When these items of evidence are brought together, the features of Israel's violation of international humanitarian law appear. This conclusion does not rest on a single source or on the casualty toll alone. It is formed from intersecting elements: an Israeli announcement of the targeting of a large number of objectives in Lebanon; independent reports that densely populated civilian areas were struck; visual material showing destruction, fires, and rescue operations; testimonies and UN sources referring to the absence of warning; and a rising civilian casualty toll because victims remained under the rubble.
- 39- From this connection, the legal question becomes more precise. It is not enough to establish that the attacks occurred. It is necessary to verify the executing party's knowledge of the nature of the sites, the foreseeability of civilian harm, whether each target was subject to independent assessment, the suitability of the means used to the character of the place, and whether actual precautions were taken to reduce harm or enable rescue operations.
- 40- This evidence is not merely a list of sources. It shows the function of each item within the file. Some evidence establishes scope, toll, and perpetrator. Other

material shows the civilian environment, destruction, and the issue of warning. UN statements add humanitarian and human rights assessment. Other evidence documents the development of the toll and search operations. The pattern of speed and density is also shown. As for videos and social media material, after verification, they strengthen the understanding of the rescue environment and the effects of munitions. Together, they link the attacks to the Israeli military.

Approximate Chronology of the Attacks

- 41- The chronology begins in the hours preceding the attacks. After the announcement of a ceasefire connected to the confrontation between the United States and Iran, Israel declared that this arrangement did not include Lebanon or Hezbollah, then proceeded to implement a broad wave of attacks on Lebanese territory. The importance of this starting point is not limited to its political background. It also reveals the nature of the operational decision that preceded execution: a decision taken in the context of a partial regional de-escalation and then rapidly translated into a broad operation in Lebanon. The evidence places the attacks within this direct temporal framework, supporting their reading as an operation based on a prior decision, not as a limited or gradual reaction.
- 42- Once execution began, a strikingly broad temporal concentration appeared. UN evidence indicated that around 100 locations were struck within ten minutes, while other evidence established very high density and broad attacks over a simultaneous period. Although the figures differ from one source to another, they converge on one indication: the attacks were not carried out gradually over hours, but within a clear compressed time frame. This pattern is legally important because it makes independent verification of each target more urgent. It also raises the question of the ability to reassess the situation between one attack and another, particularly when attacks occur inside or near civilian environments.

- 43- In Beirut, the effects of the attacks appeared from the first minutes of the wave. Journalistic and visual materials indicate that areas such as Corniche al-Mazraa and Ain al-Mreisseh were exposed to explosions close in time, with reports of the absence of prior warning. Here, visual material is particularly important, especially clips showing successive explosions or columns of smoke within a close time frame, because they provide an initial picture of the sequence of attacks inside one residential space. There is no indication that the effects of the first attack, including panic, flight, or civilian gathering, were verified and taken into account before any subsequent attack in the same area or nearby.
- 44- After the first minutes, the effects of the attacks became clearer in more than one location inside Beirut. In Talet Ain al-Mreisseh, Hayy al-Sullum, Ain al-Tineh, and Corniche al-Mazraa, the evidence points to the complete collapse of buildings, the outbreak of fires, and the presence of victims under the rubble. At this stage, the matter was no longer merely a site that had been attacked; some locations had become actual rescue environments. The evidence indicates a gradual rise in the casualty toll, while other material documents the arrival of emergency teams and the start of evacuation operations. This transformation is legally important because it shifts the focus from the moment of attack alone to its immediate consequences: the protection of the wounded, the work of rescue teams, and the possibility of reaching the injured.
- 45- With the cessation of direct attacks, another phase of harm began. Casualty figures rose as rubble was removed, pressure on hospitals increased, and rescue teams worked in difficult conditions. At this point, time becomes part of the assessment of harm itself, not merely a sequence of events. Delay in reaching the wounded, difficulty transporting the injured, or the obstruction of some roads are effects that appear after the attack, but they may have been foreseeable when the decision to attack was taken, especially in a dense residential environment or in an area dependent on limited infrastructure. This phase should therefore not be separated from the attack, but read as an extension of its humanitarian and legal effect.

- 46- Outside Beirut, particularly in the South, a parallel chronology linked to infrastructure appears. The evidence indicates damage to the Qasmiyeh Bridge, a vital bridge linking southern Lebanon to other areas. This incident is not read as isolated material damage, but as a point that affects what follows: civilian movement, access to assistance, and transport of the wounded. After the bridge was damaged, a subsequent chain of effects began, including delays in evacuation, difficulty reaching hospitals, and the possibility of aggravating injuries. This expands the reading of time from the moment of explosion to the following hours and days, when the real effect of disabling infrastructure on the civilian population becomes visible.
- 47- Some testimonies and journalistic materials indicate that the attacks were not only distributed geographically, but may also have occurred in waves or within a close temporal sequence in certain areas. If this pattern is confirmed through visual analysis, it would add an important element to the duty of reassessment. Even a short time interval may impose a duty to verify the nature of the site after the first attack, especially if the location has become a rescue environment or if dense civilian movement has appeared.
- 48- Accordingly, the chronology can be read as an interconnected path: beginning with an operational decision in a clear political context; moving to intensive execution within a short time; expanding geographically inside civilian environments; rapidly transforming some locations into rescue environments; and then extending its effect through the rising casualty toll and the disruption of infrastructure. The importance of this path is that it links the moment of decision, the method of execution, the nature of the place, the direct result, and the subsequent result.
- 49- For this reason, time in this documentation is not limited to arranging the facts. The temporal pressure between attacks, their simultaneity across multiple areas, and the continuation of their effects after they stopped are all elements affecting the assessment of compliance with the rules of verification, distinction, proportionality, and precautions. They also help assess whether the

pattern of execution itself made respect for these rules more difficult or placed it under serious legal doubt.

Description of the Environment and Context

- 50- The available evidence does not suggest that areas such as Corniche al-Mazraa, Ain al-Mreisseh, Talet al-Khayat, Hayy al-Sullum, Shmustar, Kayfoun, and others were open battlefields or isolated military objectives. They appear as clear civilian, multi-use environments: adjacent residential buildings, main and side roads, shops, daily civilian movement, vehicles, and areas that in some cases hosted displaced persons. When the evidence record is assembled, it appears that the affected environment was civilian and dense, not an operational area separated from the population.
- 51- This description is not merely a spatial background. The presence of a possible military objective inside a civilian neighborhood does not turn the entire neighborhood into a lawful target. The greater the civilian density, the greater the duty of verification before attack, the stricter the proportionality test, and the broader the required precautions. The analysis therefore does not begin simply with the existence of a military objective, but with whether that objective was clearly identified within this environment, whether it could be isolated from its civilian surroundings, whether the means chosen for targeting were compatible with the nature of the place, and whether the expected civilian harm was proportionate to the direct and specific military advantage.
- 52- This characterization becomes more important when following what happened after the attacks. Visual evidence and intersecting testimonies show that some sites did not remain merely places that had been struck. They quickly became rescue sites. Scenes of fires, rubble, and emergency teams documented by visual evidence indicate a continuing humanitarian effect: wounded persons trapped or requiring extraction, collapsed buildings, damaged roads, and direct pressure on ambulance and health-care services.

- 53- At this point, the situation is not only that of a damaged civilian neighborhood. It is a situation to which the protection of the wounded and relief operations is directly connected. The presence of wounded persons or persons under rubble triggers additional rules, including Article 12 of the First Geneva Convention on respect and protection for the wounded and sick, Article 15 concerning the search for and collection of the wounded, and Article 16 of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civilian wounded and sick. Customary rules also support this framework, particularly Rules 31 and 32 on the protection of humanitarian relief personnel and objects, and Rules 109 and 110 on the collection and care of the wounded. Some sites therefore acquired a clearer humanitarian character after the attack because of the presence of wounded persons and rescue teams, not merely because they were damaged locations.

Effect of Munitions and Destruction

- 54- The available visual evidence shows that the destruction was not confined to the direct point of impact. Dense columns of smoke, fires, burned vehicles, damaged building facades, rubble extending into streets, and civilian victims can be seen. These indicators are not sufficient to determine the exact type of munitions, but they assist in assessing the scope of the effect, particularly when the damage appears in or beyond the surroundings of the presumed target.
- 55- Some evidence suggests the possible use of a combination of large munitions and precision-guided munitions. Even if this characterization remains in need of technical verification, it is at least visibly consistent with the variation in the scale of destruction from one location to another. The size of the crater, the pattern of fragmentation, the direction of the blast, the extent of shattered glass, and the nature of collapse in neighboring buildings all confirm the use of high-explosive munitions delivered from the air.
- 56- In a dense residential environment, the effect of an explosion does not stop at the point of impact. The blast wave may extend to nearby buildings, shops, and vehicles; fragments may strike persons and property outside the target; flying

glass may widen the circle of injuries; and fires or partial collapses may cause subsequent damage. Therefore, when evidence shows vehicles burning at some distance from the explosion point, damage to adjacent buildings, or streets covered with rubble, it appears that the effect went beyond the presumed target into a wider civilian area.

- 57- The issue is not the type of munitions alone, but its suitability for the location. The principle of distinction is not limited to choosing the target; it also includes choosing a method of attack that can be directed at the target without producing a wide effect in a civilian environment. In populated neighborhoods, the use of means with a wide explosive effect becomes more legally sensitive because the likelihood of civilian casualties, damage to neighboring buildings, and disruption of roads is more foreseeable.
- 58- In assessing proportionality, the effect of munitions must be included within the expected civilian harm before the attack, not treated only as a subsequent result. If the site is inside a densely populated neighborhood, the potential harm is not limited to the point of impact. It may include indirect injuries, disruption of movement, fires, partial collapse of buildings, and delayed ambulance access. The evidence points to heavy pressure on hospitals and extensive destruction in affected neighborhoods. This does not by itself prove that the harm was excessive in the legal sense, but it confirms that the harm was not limited or marginal, and makes comparison between it and the expected military advantage necessary in each attack separately.
- 59- The effect of munitions therefore cannot be separated from the nature of the place where they were used. A means that may appear less problematic in an isolated area may become highly dangerous in a dense neighborhood. The more the visual material indicates that the effect exceeded the presumed target and extended to a wider civilian surrounding, the greater the burden of justification on the executing party, and the stricter the assessment of distinction, proportionality, and precautions becomes.

The Israeli Narrative and its Assessment

- 60- Reliable evidence indicates that the executing party was Israel, through the Israeli military and air force. This attribution is not based on one source, but on a clear intersection between international agencies, international media platforms, and official Israeli statements reported in that coverage. The level of confidence in attribution is therefore high, while the legal discussion shifts to the method of execution and the extent to which the rules governing the use of force in armed conflict were respected.
- 61- In statements attributed to the Israeli military, it was said that the attacks targeted more than 100 sites linked to Hezbollah, including, according to the Israeli narrative, command centers, intelligence infrastructure, rocket-launch sites, air and naval units, and elements linked to the Radwan Force. Claims were also reported that a large number of fighters were killed, with figures in some accounts reaching around 250. These statements reflect the usual operational discourse used to justify attacks by describing targets as military or as linked to a fighting party.
- 62- However, this description does not determine lawfulness under international humanitarian law. The law is not satisfied by general organizational affiliation or by an abstract description of a site. It requires a specific assessment of each target at the moment of attack. It is not enough to say that a site is linked to Hezbollah. It must be verified whether that site, at that precise time, made an effective contribution to military action, whether its destruction offered a direct and concrete military advantage, and whether the expected civilian harm was not excessive in relation to that advantage. The analysis thus moves from the language of military justification to the actual test of lawfulness.
- 63- The importance of this test becomes clear when the Israeli narrative is compared with the results documented by independent sources. While Israel speaks of military infrastructure or sites linked to Hezbollah, the reliable evidence attached to this file points to the striking of densely populated civilian areas in Beirut and elsewhere, and to a large toll that included civilians,

including women and children. This discrepancy does not by itself prove unlawfulness, but it requires verification of the accuracy of the information relied upon by the executing party, the suitability of the means used, and respect for the principle of distinction.

- 64- Some statements or Israeli justifications indicate that issuing prior warnings in certain areas, particularly in Beirut, might have undermined the achievement of the military objective. Even if this justification is taken seriously, it does not end the duty of precautions. International humanitarian law does not make warning an absolute duty in every case, but it does require all feasible precautions to reduce civilian harm. If warning is not possible, the question remains as to alternatives: choosing a time that reduces civilian presence, using less harmful means, modifying the method of attack, or suspending the attack if expected civilian harm is high. The claim that warning was not possible therefore does not close the legal discussion; it shifts it to how precautions were actually implemented.
- 65- In addition to the statements of the executing party, international positions provide important context for assessing the gravity of the facts. The United Nations clearly condemned the attacks, while the High Commissioner for Human Rights described the level of killing and destruction as terrifying. These positions do not, in themselves, establish legal responsibility, but they confirm that the facts were not understood internationally as a limited incident or as ordinary collateral damage, but as a broad attack raising serious questions about respect for international humanitarian law.
- 66- Positions were also issued by international and European actors calling for Lebanon to be included in the ceasefire. Kaja Kallas considered that the de-escalation should extend to Lebanon, while European political figures described the attacks as unacceptable or indiscriminate. Again, these positions are not sufficient to prove responsibility, but they help show that the scale, timing, and civilian effect of the operation raised political and legal concern beyond the immediate Lebanese context.

- 67- When the statements of the executing party are read alongside the independent evidence, the analysis is no longer confined to the declared target of the attacks. Responsibility is read from the intersection of three elements: what the executing party said about the nature of the targets; what the independent evidence shows about the nature of the affected sites; and what the civilian casualty toll and subsequent effects reveal about the scale of civilian harm. If the targets were inside densely populated civilian environments, the attacks were conducted with high temporal density, and the civilian toll was large, then describing the targets as military is not sufficient. What is required is verification of whether proportionality and precautions were actually applied in each case.
- 68- In this framework, the statements of the executing party are not treated as proof of lawfulness or unlawfulness by themselves, but as part of a body of evidence to be compared with the field reality. They help establish the element of knowledge, define the scope of the operation as the executing party chose to describe it, and identify the justifications that must be tested against the facts. When these statements are read together with the visual evidence, testimonies, medical tolls, and UN positions, they cease to be merely justificatory discourse and become essential material in attributing responsibility, because they show what was said about intent and objective and allow comparison with what actually occurred on the ground.

Legal Analysis

- 69- The facts established through the intersecting evidence indicate that the assessment of these attacks cannot stop at the general description of the targets announced by the executing party. Under international humanitarian law, what matters is not what is said about the target in general terms, but what each location was at the moment of attack, what civilian harm could have been expected, and what precautions were taken before and during execution. The analysis therefore requires returning to the basic rules of the four Geneva

Conventions of 1949 and customary international humanitarian law, particularly the rules of distinction, proportionality, precautions, and the protection of civilians and civilian objects.

- 70- The issue begins with the rule of distinction. Under customary Rule 1, parties must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants, and under customary Rule 7, they must distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. These rules are consistent with the protection established by the Fourth Geneva Convention for civilians, which is based on the presumption of protection for civilian persons and civilian objects unless the contrary is established in a specific case. Therefore, targeting dense urban areas such as central Beirut cannot be justified merely by saying that Hezbollah elements or structures were present there. What is required is verification of whether each targeted site constituted, at that precise moment, a military objective in the legal sense, and whether it lost its civilian protection according to a precise standard, not according to a general or collective characterization.
- 71- The rule of proportionality is directly connected to this assessment. Customary Rule 14 prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Proportionality is not assessed at the level of the operation as a whole, but at the level of each attack separately. The high casualty toll and the accompanying damage in residential neighborhoods and infrastructure lead to a specific and clear conclusion: the military advantage was not sufficiently clear and specific to justify the expected civilian harm. In the same context, the civilian harm exceeded the concrete and direct military advantage. In the absence of a separate assessment of each target, the violation of proportionality becomes established.
- 72- Precautions in attack form the third axis of this analysis. Customary Rules 15 and 16 require all feasible precautions to avoid or reduce civilian harm and to verify that the objectives to be attacked are military objectives. In light of the

data indicating the targeting of a large number of sites within a very short time frame, the narrow temporal scope did not allow reassessment of the situation between one attack and another. If it is claimed that warning was impossible, this does not end the duty of precautions. It shifts the inquiry to possible alternatives, such as changing the timing, choosing less harmful means, changing the method of execution, or refraining from the attack if expected civilian harm was high.

- 73- Advance warning has particular importance in populated areas. Customary Rule 20 requires effective advance warning of attacks that may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. If the absence of warning at certain sites is established, the executing party must explain why warning was not possible and what alternative precautions it took to reduce civilian losses. This was not done. If warning was absent and practical alternatives were also absent, as in the attacks examined in this report, the matter is not merely a field exception; it becomes an indicator of a violation of the duty of precautions.
- 74- The protection of the wounded and sick and of relief operations is central to this assessment. These protections are among the most firmly established obligations in the Geneva Conventions. The First Geneva Convention, particularly Articles 12 and 15, requires respect and protection for the wounded and sick, and requires that they be searched for, collected, and cared for. Article 16 of the Fourth Geneva Convention also protects civilian wounded and sick. Customary rules support this framework, especially Rules 31 and 32 on the protection of relief personnel and objects, and Rules 109 and 110 on the collection and care of the wounded. In view of the evidence indicating wounded persons under rubble, heavy pressure on hospitals, and active rescue environments, the effect of the attacks on access to the wounded or on the capacity of rescue teams is not treated as a secondary side effect, but as part of the legal harm that must be included in the assessment.

- 75- The protection of civilian objects and civilian infrastructure is also present. Civilian objects, particularly those linked to the life, movement, and access to assistance of the population, are protected under international humanitarian law. In this context, damage to vital facilities, such as bridges or main roads, is not read merely as direct material harm, but as harm extending to civilians' ability to access food, health care, assistance, and evacuation. In a fragile environment such as Lebanon, it is foreseeable that disabling key infrastructure would produce broad humanitarian consequences. This should have entered into the proportionality and precautions analysis before the attack, which, according to more than one reliable item of evidence, did not occur.
- 76- The four Geneva Conventions remain the general legal framework for these facts, especially the First Convention, which protects the wounded and sick in the field, and the Fourth Convention, which provides the basic protection of civilians. The importance of this framework is that it places the facts within a single protective system encompassing civilians, the wounded, relief teams, and civilian objects. It does not permit each element to be read in isolation from the others.
- 77- Accordingly, this analysis sets out the legal framework through which the facts were tested and reaches a conclusion on responsibility. When the evidence is read together with the rules of distinction, proportionality, precautions, warning, and protection of the wounded and civilian objects, the existence of violations of these rules becomes apparent.

Israeli Narrative and its Assessment

- 78- According to the official narrative of the party that announced the execution of the attacks, more than 100 military sites linked to Hezbollah were targeted in Beirut, the South, and the Bekaa. According to what was announced, these sites included command centers, intelligence infrastructure, rocket-launch sites, combat units, and sites linked to the Radwan Force. The Israeli narrative also included claims that a number of fighters were killed, with figures in some

sources ranging between approximately 180 and 250, in addition to the announcement of the killing of Ali Yusuf Harshi, whom the Israeli military described as the personal secretary and nephew of Naim Qassem.

- 79- This narrative must be included in the report because it comes from the party that announced the operation or from open sources reporting that party's statements. At the same time, it is not sufficient in itself to establish the lawfulness of each attack. It remains the narrative of an attacking party, and it must be tested against the body of images, videos, testimonies, civilian casualties, the nature of the affected places, and the scale of damage to infrastructure.
- 80- Under international humanitarian law, describing targets as linked to Hezbollah is not sufficient to justify the entire operation. Each target must be examined separately in terms of its nature at the moment of attack, the extent of its effective contribution to military action, and the direct and concrete military advantage expected from striking it. The expected civilian harm, its proportionality to that advantage, and the precautions that could have been taken to reduce it must then be assessed.
- 81- This issue becomes more sensitive when a large number of targets are struck within a very short time. Speed of execution does not reduce the duty of verification; rather, it requires greater precision in establishing that verification occurred. The broader and more simultaneous the attacks, the more necessary it becomes to show that each location was independently assessed and that proportionality was not estimated generally at the level of the entire operation, but separately for each attack.
- 82- The claim that Hezbollah members were killed, even if established, is not sufficient by itself to justify the method of execution or its results. The presence of a person who may be considered a military objective does not mean that striking that person is lawful by any means and in any location. If that person is inside a residential neighborhood or a dense area, the attacking party must still prove that the means used were suitable, that the expected civilian harm

was not excessive, and that feasible precautions were taken. The presence of a military objective inside a civilian neighborhood does not transform the entire neighborhood into a target.

- 83- The same applies to the claim that some locations were command centers or military sites. Such a description requires specific proof for each location, not a general label. The function of the place at the time of attack must be identified, as must whether it was actually performing a military role at that moment. If the site was inside a residential building, a commercial street, or a populated neighborhood, the duty of verification becomes stricter because the nature of the place requires additional caution.
- 84- As for the absence of prior warning, Israel may argue that warning would have allowed the target to escape or would have lost the element of surprise. This justification may be understandable in specific circumstances, but it does not eliminate the duty of precautions. Even where warning is not possible, the attacking party must look for other means to reduce harm, such as choosing a different time, using less harmful means, modifying the method of execution, or refraining from attack if the expected civilian harm is high. If there are no indications that these alternatives were studied, the absence of warning becomes an important element in assessing the legal suspicion.
- 85- It has also been alleged that Hezbollah operates from within civilian areas. Even if this is established in some locations, it does not transfer the entire burden of protection to the other party, nor does it exempt the attacking party from its obligations. International humanitarian law keeps the duties of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in force. Indeed, it makes them more sensitive when a military objective exists inside a civilian environment. The presence of a target in a civilian setting requires greater caution, not broader authorization to use force.
- 86- The narrative presented by Israel therefore does not, by itself, answer the decisive questions. The file requires more than a general description of targets or an announcement of fighter casualties. It remains a justificatory narrative

that does not show, for each targeted site, the nature of the objective, the basis for choosing it, the information available before the attack, the expected civilian harm, and the precautions actually taken. Without these elements, the declared Israeli narrative remains legally insufficient to justify the scale of the harm and the results that appeared on the ground.

Responsibility

- 87- Responsibility in this report is not built on one piece of evidence, nor on the casualty toll alone, but on the convergence of different evidence showing that civilian harm was foreseeable and that the necessary precautions were not taken to avoid or reduce it.
- 88- The chain of attribution begins with the statements of the executing party, as reflected in the evidence. These statements show that the operation was not limited, but included a large number of targets within a narrow time frame. This fact does not, in itself, determine lawfulness or unlawfulness, but it reveals the nature of the operational decision: a broad, dense, and rapid operation. This makes individual verification of each target essential in reading the operational conduct.
- 89- The importance of this fact increases when it is compared with independent evidence. That evidence does not present the broad scope merely as a claim made by the executing party, but documents it as a field reality covering dozens of locations within a short period, including densely populated areas. The breadth of the operation is therefore no longer merely a description of the operation; it becomes part of the manner in which it was executed.
- 90- The nature of the environment is derived from the intersection of more than one item of evidence, which indicates that some attacks occurred in the heart of Beirut or in civilian areas without prior warning, alongside visual evidence showing wide destruction and an immediate emergency situation. This intersection is important because it does not only prove that the locations were generally civilian; it also shows that the actual effect of the attacks struck a

civilian environment in all its elements: buildings, streets, civilian movement, rescue teams, and service facilities.

- 91- Additional evidence concerning the rising toll and evidence from humanitarian organizations about damage to infrastructure add another dimension relating to the extension of harm beyond the moment of explosion. The harm did not stop at the deaths and injuries in the first moment. It appeared in persons under rubble, pressure on hospitals, disruption of vital roads, and difficulty reaching some areas. These are not marginal effects in a dense residential environment, but results that should have been included in the risk assessment before execution.
- 92- The legal connection is therefore not based on the result alone, but on what could have been expected from that result. If the indicators available before the attack or during planning showed that targets were located within dense civilian environments, as appears established, that execution would be rapid and broad, that the means used might produce effects beyond the point of impact, and that warning was not used, then the occurrence of major civilian harm does not appear remote or exceptional. It becomes an element placing responsibility for the violation of international humanitarian law on the executing party, namely Israel.
- 93- Accordingly, foreseeability occupies a central place in the construction of potential responsibility. Responsibility is not read only from the scale of harm after it occurred, but from the relationship between what was known before the attack, what was expected to occur, and what precautions were or were not taken to reduce civilian harm.

Legal Conclusion

- 94- When compared with one another, the available materials show that the events of 8 April 2026 do not appear, in their present form, as an isolated incident or as limited collateral damage. They appear as a series of broad attacks carried out within a short time and striking multiple areas in Lebanon, including Beirut

and densely populated residential neighborhoods, as well as locations in the South, the Bekaa, and Mount Lebanon. This assessment is not based on one narrative, but on the convergence of what appears in the visual evidence with field testimonies, international media reports, UN and human rights assessments, and available video material.

- 95- From these materials, clear preliminary facts can be drawn. The attacks covered a large number of locations and were carried out within a narrow time frame and on a broad scale, with UN and journalistic indications that dozens of locations were targeted within minutes. This fact suggests that what occurred was not a set of scattered incidents, but a systematic operational pattern. A number of the attacks occurred in visibly civilian areas, including residential neighborhoods in Beirut, with evidence in the majority of sites indicating the absence of an effective warning or prior evacuation allowing civilians to avoid the danger.
- 96- The intersecting evidence shows that human losses were high, with hundreds killed and more than one thousand injured, and search operations continuing under the rubble. This means that the humanitarian effect did not stop at the moment of explosion, but extended to the stages of rescue, recovery, transfer of the wounded, and medical care. Visual evidence and testimonies also show widespread destruction in buildings and property, fires, rubble, and the presence of victims in civilian locations, indicating that the effect of some attacks exceeded the direct point of impact and extended to the nearby residential or commercial surroundings.
- 97- The same materials indicate that a number of affected sites quickly became rescue and recovery sites, with the intervention of emergency teams and civil defense and direct pressure on hospitals and ambulance teams. Damage to certain vital infrastructure, particularly infrastructure connected to civilian movement and access to basic services, expanded the effect of the attacks beyond the moment of explosion and gave the harm a continuing humanitarian character that was not limited to direct material loss.

- 98- Israel, as the party that announced the execution of the attacks, acknowledged that it targeted a large number of sites and provided an operational justification, namely that those sites were military or linked to Hezbollah and that the attacks caused losses among its ranks. However, although this narrative is an essential part of the file, it does not justify the lawfulness of the attack in light of the nature of the affected places, the scale of civilian harm, the issue of warning, the means used, and the extent to which the duties of verification, proportionality, and precautions were respected.
- 99- When these facts are applied to the rules of international humanitarian law, these acts involve serious violations of international humanitarian law, particularly customary rules and the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention relating to the protection of civilians. The geographic breadth of the attacks, their temporal density, the occurrence of a number of them in densely populated civilian areas, and the resulting large human losses, widespread destruction, disruption of infrastructure, and destruction of civilian objects are all elements establishing that these violations were systematic and deliberate and rise to the level of war crimes.

Section Eight

Documentary Report on the Forcible Displacement of Civilians in Lebanon as a Result of Evacuation Orders, Broad Warnings, and Military Operations that Made Staying or Returning Unsafe

Introduction

- 1- This report addresses the facts that pushed civilians in Lebanon to leave their areas or remain outside them in the context of broad evacuation warnings, repeated attacks, destruction of homes, roads and crossings, and field conditions that made staying or returning unsafe. The report does not treat displacement as an ordinary movement of population resulting from general fear in wartime, but as the outcome of an actual course of pressure on the civilian population, beginning with broad warnings and later including military operations, material destruction, and the absence of conditions for safe return.
- 2- The report focuses on the facts after 28 February 2026, without separating them from the wider context of military operations in Lebanon since 8 October 2023. The analysis here, however, does not rely on the law of occupation or on provisions specific to occupied territories, but on customary international humanitarian law and the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions, particularly the rules of distinction, the prohibition of terror, the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, proportionality, precautions, effective warning, protection of civilian objects, protection of medical services, and the prohibition of creating conditions that make the continued presence or return of civilians practically impossible.
- 3- The report does not treat evacuation orders as neutral administrative notifications. A warning acquires legal significance when, by its breadth, the manner in which it is issued, and the context surrounding it, it leads to the removal of civilians from their areas or keeps them outside those areas. It is not sufficient to describe a warning as preventive for it to become lawful. It must be specific, understandable, linked to a clear military danger, and capable of

implementation by civilians without becoming a means of collectively pushing them into displacement. A civilian who receives a broad order to leave, amid repeated attacks, destruction of homes and roads, and no clear prospect of return, is not facing a free choice in either the factual or legal sense.

- 4- The central issue here is not merely to prove that civilians left their areas, but to determine whether their departure resulted from free choice or from warnings and field conditions that made staying unrealistic and return unsafe. The available material indicates that displacement did not result from the warnings alone, but from their interaction with repeated military operations, destruction of civilian objects, pressure on shelters, disruption of health services, and statements and practices that made return conditional or impossible.

Methodology

- 5- The report follows the methodology of the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations, particularly by preserving original materials or their links, establishing the context and date of publication, linking each item to its source, location and time, and distinguishing between what the material directly proves and what may be inferred from it when read together with other evidence. On this basis, the report relied on preserving the original materials and linking them to their field and legal context. It did not treat each warning, report, or visual item as a standalone piece of evidence, but as part of a broader sequence. The published text of a warning shows the scope of the message addressed to civilians; the map, title, or visual material helps identify the location; the human rights or UN report helps measure the impact; while photographs and videos show what occurred after or during the warning in terms of displacement, destruction, or field pressure.
- 6- Each incident addressed in this report has a distinct evidentiary value. Some evidence establishes the scope of the warnings, some establishes their effect on population movement, and some establishes the field environment that made staying or returning dangerous. The report does not claim that any single item is

sufficient to prove the entire course of events. Rather, it relies on the convergence of evidence, in accordance with the verification and corroboration logic used in the Berkeley methodology. When a broad warning coincides with a report of mass displacement, scenes of smoke, destruction, or shelters, and continuing operations, displacement can be read as a foreseeable and direct effect of the pattern of operations and warnings, not as an incidental or disconnected result.

- 7- The materials were linked to the geographical location whenever possible, through the name of the town or area, the map accompanying the warning, the title of the visual material, or the convergence of more than one independent source. A distinction was also made between evidence proving that a warning was issued, evidence proving its impact, and evidence helping to assess the coercive environment that pushed civilians to leave or prevented their return. Accordingly, open sources are not used in this report as a separate media narrative, but as materials capable of examination, review, and legal connection, within an evidentiary chain that shows the relationship between the warning, the field environment, and the subsequent impact on civilians.

Evidence and Factual Correlation

Evidence One

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/05/israeli-military-calls-for-evacuating-southern-lebanon>

- 8- This report, published on 5 March 2026, establishes that the “Israeli army” called, on 4 March 2026, on residents of southern Lebanon to evacuate their homes immediately and head north of the Litani River. The organization stated that the call covered the entire population south of the Litani, an area representing approximately eight percent of Lebanon’s territory and including hundreds of thousands of people. The report also noted that, on 2 March, the Israeli army had called for the evacuation of more than fifty towns and villages in the south, and that the number had risen, according to the United Nations, to more than one hundred towns and villages in the south and the Bekaa by 3 March.

- 9- The value of this evidence lies in proving the beginning of broad evacuation orders that did not address a specific danger in a particular building, street, or military point, but rather an extensive residential area containing a large number of civilians. In field terms, such an order is not read as a localized warning, but as a message pushing the population to leave a wide area all at once. Legally, this raises a direct question about the effectiveness and limits of the warning. A lawful warning must help civilians avoid a specific danger; it must not place them before a vague collective choice between immediate departure and remaining under an undefined threat.

Evidence Two

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/23/israeli-officials-signal-stepped-up-atrocities-lebanon>

- 10- This report, published on 23 March 2026, establishes a link between the expansion of “Israeli” ground operations in southern Lebanon and statements indicating an intention to forcibly displace the population, destroy civilian homes, and carry out attacks that may affect civilians. It stated that forcible displacement, unjustified destruction, and attacks deliberately targeting civilians may constitute war crimes.
- 11- This evidence does not stop at a single warning incident. It places the warnings within a broader course of statements, field operations, and destruction of homes. Its legal importance emerges here: when evacuation is accompanied by destruction of homes and statements linking the return of residents to security conditions set by the attacking party, the matter is no longer merely a preventive measure to protect civilians from an imminent danger. It becomes part of field and political pressure that removes people from their areas or keeps them outside them.

Evidence Three

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-evacuation-orders-affect-14-lebanon-ngo-says-2026-03-13/>

- 12- The Reuters report establishes that Israeli evacuation orders covered, according to the Norwegian Refugee Council, approximately 1,470 square kilometers, or about fourteen percent of Lebanon's territory, including southern Lebanon and parts of Beirut. Reuters also reported that around 800,000 people had been displaced in Lebanon by that date, and that the broad evacuation orders created fear and panic of imminent attacks, even in places where an attack was not necessarily imminent.
- 13- This evidence shows that the scale of the warnings was itself a pressure factor on civilians. When evacuation orders cover a large proportion of the country's territory, civilians can no longer distinguish between an immediate danger and a presumed danger. In practical effect, the warning becomes a generator of collective fear and a driver of displacement. This is important in assessing knowledge of the consequence, because an entity issuing warnings on such a scale, in the context of ongoing operations, must expect the result to be a wide departure of the population, not a limited and temporary movement around a specific military objective.

Evidence Four

<https://www.reutersconnect.com/item/recent-israeli-military-orders-more-than-a-dozen-towns-in-southern-lebanon-to-evacuate/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjY6bmV3c21sX1ZBMDc0NDA0MDMyMDI2UIAx/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjY6bmV3c21sX0xWQTAwVD A3NDQwND AzMjAyNIJQM Q>

- 14- This evidence presents visual material linked to a broad evacuation warning. The title of the material indicates that the Israeli army ordered more than a dozen towns in southern Lebanon to evacuate on 4 March 2026. The value of the video does not lie merely in repeating the content of the warning, but in proving how it spread and reached the public as a visual message capable of wide circulation.
- 15- In field terms, civilians receive this type of material as an urgent danger signal, not as a calm legal notification. When the message is directed to several towns

at once, its psychological and practical effect exceeds the limits of an individual warning. This evidence therefore helps explain how evacuation orders moved from a military statement to direct pressure on the residents of entire villages and areas.

Evidence Five

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-orders-residents-leave-southern-beirut-2026-03-05/>

- 16- This evidence establishes that the warnings reached the southern suburbs of Beirut, a densely populated urban environment and not an isolated military area. Its importance lies in showing that the pattern of evacuations moved from southern villages and towns to densely populated civilian neighborhoods in the capital, where residential buildings, narrow streets, civilian institutions, shops, and service facilities are interwoven.
- 17- In such an environment, a broad warning does not remove a few individuals from a specific danger. It creates a collective movement out of an entire civilian area, accompanied by fear, traffic chaos, disruption of daily life, and pressure on receiving areas. Legally, the warning must be examined from the standpoint of its effectiveness and practicability. In a crowded area, a warning must be as specific as the danger, clear in its scope, and accompanied by time and routes that allow civilians to leave without turning into a collective order to empty a wide area.

Evidence Six

<https://www.reuters.com/graphics/IRAN-CRISIS/MAPS/znpmelervl/2026-03-06/israel-orders-mass-evacuations-in-lebanon-bombards-beirut/>

- 18- This evidence establishes that the evacuation orders in the southern suburbs did not remain isolated messages, but were accompanied by subsequent strikes on a populated area. This is where its legal and field value lies. Civilians did not

receive only a theoretical warning; they received a message followed by actual strikes in a dense urban environment.

- 19- This link between the warning and the strikes reinforces the conclusion that departure was not a calm or voluntary choice, but a response to a direct and visible danger. It also shows that, in practical effect, the warning became part of a field environment that pushed residents to leave a wide civilian area. The danger is heightened because the southern suburbs are an interconnected urban area, where a building cannot easily be separated from its civilian surroundings. The mass departure from crowded neighborhoods before airstrikes has a direct impact on families, the elderly, the sick, children, and the ability of residents to return after the strike has ended.

Evidence Seven

<https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/statement-dr-tedros-adhanom-ghebreyesus-who-director-general-lebanon-9-apr-2026>

- 20- This evidence establishes that the evacuation warning reached the Janah area in Beirut, an area that includes two major referral hospitals, Rafic Hariri University Hospital and Al-Zahraa Hospital. It also shows that evacuating around 450 patients, including forty in intensive care, was not practically feasible, and that the World Health Organization called for the evacuation order to be withdrawn.
- 21- This evidence is central to the report because it adds a direct medical impact. When a warning includes an area containing referral hospitals, the issue is no longer limited to the ability of residents to leave their homes. It extends to patients who cannot move, intensive care units, medical staff, ambulances, equipment, and the actual ability of the health system to transfer patients to safe alternatives. If the World Health Organization considered the evacuation practically unfeasible, that substantially weakens any claim that the warning was an effective precaution to protect civilians.
- 22- Legally, this evidence links the rules on effective warning, precautions, and protection of medical services. A warning is not effective when it requires

intensive care patients or a referral hospital to leave without the existence of medical alternatives capable of receiving them. In such a case, the warning may become an additional source of danger, because it pushes toward dismantling a vital medical service or places patients before two dangerous options: remaining in a threatened area or being moved under medically unsafe conditions.

Evidence Eight

<https://english.news.cn/20260410/359be6ba156b4c29b3a9cdc065f544a5/c.html>

- 23- This evidence reports the call by the Director-General of the World Health Organization for Israel to reverse the evacuation order for the Janah area, explaining that the area includes Rafic Hariri University Hospital and Al-Zahraa Hospital, and that there are no alternative medical facilities capable of accommodating around 450 patients, including forty in intensive care.
- 24- This evidence confirms that the effect of the Janah warning was not hypothetical. The presence of this number of patients inside two key hospitals makes evacuation a highly dangerous medical matter, and a hospital cannot be treated like any other civilian building. Evacuating patients requires ambulances, alternative beds, ventilators, doctors, nurses, safe routes, and sufficient time. When these elements are unavailable, the warning becomes impossible to implement in a manner that protects civilians, and its effect becomes closer to disabling a vital health service in the midst of conflict.
- 25- The danger here is not limited to the possibility of an attack near a medical facility. It also includes harm resulting from fear, medically impossible evacuation, and the possibility of death or deterioration of patients because of forced transfer or interruption of care. This makes the Janah incident a central example showing that some warnings did not push only healthy residents into displacement, but also affected categories of persons who cannot survive simply by leaving.

Evidence Nine

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-issues-evacuation-warning-seven-lebanese-towns-north-litani-2026-04-26/>

- 26- This evidence establishes that “Israel” issued, on 26 April 2026, warnings to residents of seven towns located north of the Litani River and outside what was called the buffer zone. The report stated that Israeli attacks that day killed fourteen people and injured thirty-seven, including two women and two children according to the Lebanese Ministry of Health, and that the Israeli army instructed residents to head north and west away from the towns.
- 27- This evidence adds an important element to the file because it shows that the warnings did not remain confined to the area south of the Litani or to areas near a clear line of contact, but extended to towns north of the river. This expansion weakens the argument that the evacuations remained linked to a narrow and specific field necessity. The issuance of the warning on a day that saw deaths and injuries, including children and women, also makes fear and displacement foreseeable. Civilians do not read a warning in isolation from the surrounding destruction; they read it as part of an existing danger threatening their lives, families, and homes.

Evidence Ten

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-urges-southern-lebanon-residents-evacuate-amid-operations-2026-05-03/>

- 28- This evidence establishes that the “Israeli army” issued, on 3 May 2026, an urgent warning to residents of several towns in southern Lebanon, asking them to evacuate their homes and stay away from areas of operations in Lebanon.
- 29- This evidence shows that the warnings were not a passing event at the beginning of the escalation, but continued at a later stage, making their effect on displacement and return clearer. A civilian who had previously left has no realistic reason to return if warnings are renewed and operations continue. A civilian who remained receives a repeated message that the area is unsafe. In

this sense, successive warnings do not operate as separate alerts, but as links in a course that makes staying difficult and return dangerous.

Evidence Eleven

<https://www.reutersconnect.com/item/smoke-rises-in-southern-lebanon-after-israel-issues-evacuation-order/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjY6bmV3c21sX1ZBODYxODA3MDUyMDI2UIAx>

- 30- The video in this visual item shows smoke rising in southern Lebanon after an Israeli evacuation order was issued, as seen from Marjayoun on 7 May 2026, with UNIFIL vehicles visible in the scene. The value of this evidence lies in its connection between the warning and the subsequent field environment.
- 31- Civilians do not deal with the warning alone, but with smoke, the movement of forces, fear of a nearby attack, and the difficulty of assessing whether staying is safe. The video therefore proves not merely a visual fact, but helps explain the climate in which decisions to flee are made. In this environment, departure is not a calm choice, but a response to clear field pressure.

Evidence Twelve

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/beirut-school-converted-wartime-shelter-becomes-flashpoint-societal-tensions-2026-05-05/>

- 32- This evidence establishes the effect of displacement after it occurred. Rafic Hariri School in Beirut was converted into a shelter for more than 1,500 displaced persons; the war displaced more than one million people in Lebanon; and at least 124,000 persons were living in collective shelters run by the government. The report also stated that return was not an option for some displaced persons because homes were damaged and the war was continuing.
- 33- This evidence moves displacement from the level of figures to the level of daily life. A school turned into a shelter, and a displaced person unable to return because his home was damaged or because the war continues, prove that the

issue is not reduced to the geographical movement of people. Here the practical effect of the warnings and operations appears on housing, dignity, and family stability. It also shows that a warning, if it leads to large-scale departure without any prospect of return, becomes part of the legal problem and not merely a precaution preceding an attack.

Evidence Thirteen

<https://www.reutersconnect.com/item/beirut-school-converted-to-wartime-shelter-becomes-flashpoint-for-societal-tensions/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjY6bmV3c21sX1ZBNzM4NzAyMDUyMDI2UlAx/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjY6bmV3c21sX0xWQTAwMzczODcwMjA1MjAyNIJQMQ>

- 34- This visual material, published on 5 May 2026, shows a school in Beirut converted into a shelter for displaced persons, a displaced child looking out of a window, the schoolyard, and scenes associated with the transformation of an educational institution into a temporary place of residence. The video proves displacement not as a number, but as a material reality inside a place originally intended for education and then transformed into shelter.
- 35- The value of this material increases because it preserves the direct human impact of the warnings and attacks. It shows what happens after civilians leave their homes, and helps assess whether the movement of displacement was temporary and protected, or whether it placed residents in collective and open-ended living conditions. From the standpoint of customary international humanitarian law, this impact becomes part of the assessment of the effectiveness of the warning and the precautions taken to protect civilians, not a humanitarian matter separate from military operations.

Evidence Fourteen

<https://www.reuters.com/video/watch/idRW833306052026RP1/>

- 36- This evidence establishes that displacement included vulnerable civilian groups requiring special shelter arrangements in Beirut, while noting that shelter capacity remained limited in comparison with the number of persons in need. Its importance lies in showing that displacement did not end at the moment of departure, but created protection and shelter needs that shelters could not fully absorb.
- 37- When shelter capacity is limited, issuing broad warnings becomes more problematic. An effective warning is not measured only by whether the message reaches civilians, but by its practical ability to reduce the danger to them. If the warning leads to a mass movement toward centers that are insufficient to receive the displaced, its real effect becomes part of the assessment of legality and precautions.

Evidence Fifteen

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/09/lebanon-israel-unlawfully-using-white-phosphorus>

- 38- This report, published on 9 March 2026, establishes that the organization documented Israel's use of white phosphorus over a residential area in the town of Yohmor, southern Lebanon, on 3 March 2026. The organization stated that it verified and geolocated eight photographs showing white phosphorus munitions airbursting over a residential part of the town, with civil defense responding to fires in homes and cars.
- 39- This evidence does not concern a written evacuation warning, but it is important because it proves that the conditions driving displacement did not arise from texts alone. The use of incendiary munitions over a residential area creates immediate danger and fear that cannot be separated from residents' decision to leave. Civilians do not wait for a legal characterization of the weapon before deciding to leave their homes when they see fires around them or hear of its use over populated areas. When such an environment is coupled with broad

evacuation orders, displacement becomes a foreseeable result more than an incidental effect.

Evidence Eighteen

<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/lebanon/update-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-lebanon-23-04-2026.pdf>

- 40- The update of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, issued on 23 April 2026, establishes that Israeli operations after 2 March 2026 included widespread and continuing attacks, caused a large number of civilian casualties and displaced persons, and placed these facts within the context of the escalation of military operations after 28 February 2026.
- 41- This evidence links the evacuations to the general environment surrounding them. Civilians do not leave only because of a leaflet or statement, but because of the accumulation of danger around them. When a warning is combined with repeated attacks, casualties, destruction of homes, disruption of roads, and uncertainty about return, displacement becomes the inevitable result of that course. Accordingly, the warning may not be assessed separately from the operations that preceded, followed, or accompanied it.

Applicable Rules

- 42- This report is based on the context of military operations and broad warnings affecting civilians in Lebanon, in light of customary international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions provisions relating to the protection of civilians, the wounded and sick, hospitals, and medical services during armed conflict. Accordingly, the legal basis of the report rests on the rules protecting civilians, distinction, proportionality, precautions, effective warning, the prohibition of terror, protection of medical services, and the prohibition of disabling objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.
- 43- Rule 1 of customary international humanitarian law requires distinction at all times between civilians and combatants, and Rule 7 requires distinction between civilian objects and military objectives. Villages, neighborhoods, or wide areas

may therefore not be treated as a single military mass merely because of suspicion that fighters or military facilities exist within them. The presence of a possible military objective in a civilian environment does not remove protection from the civilian population or from surrounding civilian objects.

- 44- Rule 2 prohibits acts or threats of violence whose primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population. This prohibition is not limited to direct bombardment. It also includes a pattern of threats and warnings when combined with repeated attacks, casualties, rising smoke, destruction of homes and roads, and impossible return, so that the practical result becomes the spread of broad fear pushing residents to leave their areas. In such a case, the warning is no longer merely a preventive measure, but part of an environment of fear and pressure that removes civilians from their places.
- 45- Rule 11 prohibits indiscriminate attacks, including attacks not directed at a specific military objective or using a means or method of combat whose effects cannot be limited as required by law. Rule 12 is also particularly important here because it prohibits attacks that treat a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village, or area containing civilians and civilian objects as a single military objective. This prohibition is directly connected to warnings that include entire villages, neighborhoods, or areas without precise identification of the source or scope of the danger.
- 46- Rule 14 prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. In this assessment, civilian harm may not be limited to deaths and injuries at the moment of attack. Foreseeable harm may also include large-scale displacement, loss of housing, disruption of access to treatment and food, pressure on shelters, and inability to return, where such consequences are natural and known in light of the scope of the warnings and operations.
- 47- Rule 15 imposes a duty of constant care in the conduct of military operations to spare civilians and civilian objects from the effects of attacks. Rules 16, 17 and

18 require verification of targets, selection of means and methods that reduce civilian harm, and cancellation or suspension of an attack if it becomes apparent that the target is not military or that the expected harm is excessive. These rules become more urgent when operations are accompanied by general warnings covering the residents of entire villages and areas, because issuing a warning does not relieve the attacking party of its duties of verification, distinction and proportionality.

- 48- Rule 20 requires advance and effective warning of attacks that may affect the civilian population, when circumstances permit. A warning, however, is not effective merely because it is published or circulated. Effectiveness means that the warning is clear in content, specific in scope, understandable to the concerned population, and capable of being implemented in the time available. It also means that civilians know what the danger is, which area must be avoided, which route can be taken, where a safer place can be reached, and when return becomes possible. A warning that asks residents of entire areas to leave immediately, without sufficient identification of the danger, without realistic time to leave, or without regard for patients, the elderly, persons with disabilities and children, fails to perform the protective function required by law.
- 49- The mere issuance of a warning before an attack is not enough to make it lawful. If the warning is so broad that civilians do not know whether their home, street, or neighborhood is within the real danger; if it requires mass departure in a short time; or if it is issued in an area containing hospitals and patients who cannot be moved, it may turn from a means of reducing harm into an independent cause of harm. An effective warning must reduce the danger to civilians, not transfer them from the danger of bombardment to the danger of displacement, chaos, interruption of treatment, and loss of shelter.
- 50- Rule 50 prohibits destruction of the property of an adversary unless required by imperative military necessity. This rule is important in this file where destruction of homes, roads, bridges, or civilian facilities fixes displacement or prevents return. Destruction here is not examined only as material damage, but

as a factor that changes civilians' lives and makes return to villages or neighborhoods unsafe or impossible.

- 51- Rule 54 prohibits attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. Depending on each incident, this includes water installations, food sources, infrastructure allowing access to medical treatment, and vital roads allowing the arrival of ambulances and basic supplies. If attacks, evacuation orders, or destruction of crossings isolate residents from food, water, medicine, or health care, the issue is no longer merely a movement of displacement; it becomes the creation of living conditions civilians cannot endure.
- 52- Rule 22 requires all feasible precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects under the control of a party to the conflict against the effects of attacks, while Rule 24 provides that each party must, to the extent feasible, remove civilians and civilian objects under its control from the vicinity of military objectives. These two rules show that protection of civilians is not achieved by placing the burden of danger on them alone or merely by asking them to leave. It requires parties to the conflict to take practical measures preventing residential areas from being turned into environments of collective expulsion or impossible survival.
- 53- The Fourth Geneva Convention also provides important provisions that are not tied to the law of occupation and may be incorporated into this report from the perspective of protecting civilians, patients, and hospitals. Article 16 provides that the wounded and sick, as well as the infirm and expectant mothers, shall be the object of particular protection and respect. This article is important in analyzing the Janah warning, because an evacuation affecting an area containing intensive care patients cannot be measured in the same way as a warning addressed to civilians capable of movement.
- 54- Article 17 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that parties to the conflict shall endeavor to conclude local agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled areas of the wounded, sick, infirm, elderly, children and maternity

cases, and for the passage of medical personnel and medical equipment to such areas. In the context of this report, this article shows that evacuation of vulnerable categories cannot be carried out through a general or broad warning alone. It requires practical arrangements, safe corridors, prior coordination, and actual medical capacity to preserve the lives of patients and the wounded. Therefore, a warning covering an area containing hospitals and intensive care patients is not effective or sufficient merely because it is issued, unless it is medically and operationally feasible and accompanied by practical arrangements ensuring protection of patients, the wounded, and medical staff.

55- Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that civilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm, and maternity cases may in no circumstances be the object of attack, but must be respected and protected. Article 19 of the same Convention provides that the protection of civilian hospitals shall not cease unless they are used, outside their humanitarian duties, to commit acts harmful to the enemy, and that protection may cease only after a warning fixing a reasonable time limit has remained unheeded. This is highly important in the Janah file, because the presence of two referral hospitals raises the threshold of verification and precautions, and does not allow the area to be treated as if its evacuation were a simple procedure or capable of implementation merely upon issuance of a warning.

56- Article 20 of the Fourth Geneva Convention protects persons regularly and solely engaged in the operation and administration of civilian hospitals, including those engaged in the search for, collection, transport and treatment of the wounded and sick, the infirm, and maternity cases. Article 21 of the same Convention protects convoys of vehicles or hospital trains, and vessels, used to convey the wounded and sick, the infirm, and maternity cases. These two provisions are useful in analyzing the effect of the Janah warning on medical staff, ambulances, and patient transport, because any evacuation order that does not take these requirements into account may expose the medical service itself to paralysis or danger.

- 57- Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is important in assessing the conditions that push civilians into displacement or prevent their return, because it concerns the free passage of consignments of medical supplies and essential items intended for civilians, especially children and expectant mothers. If warnings, attacks, and destruction of roads and crossings disrupt the arrival of medicine, care, or essential supplies, this enters into the assessment of the coercive environment that makes staying unsafe. Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention also prohibits collective penalties and measures of intimidation or terrorism, and is relevant when assessing whether broad warnings and repeated attacks created a state of collective fear going beyond lawful warning and approaching pressure on the civilian population as a group.
- 58- The First Geneva Convention adds provisions relevant to medical services, particularly where the matter concerns protection of medical units and medical transport. Article 19 of the First Geneva Convention protects fixed establishments and mobile medical units of the medical service, provides that they may not be the object of attack, and requires that they be respected and protected at all times. This article supports the analysis relating to the Janah warning, because any evacuation or threat affecting a medical environment must also be examined from the perspective of the continued ability of medical staff and medical transport to perform their functions.
- 59- Accordingly, the core assessment in this report does not turn on a single question of whether a warning was issued, but on whether that warning was effective, specific, and practicable, and whether the operations accompanying or following it created conditions that practically forced civilians to flee. If broad warnings coincide with repeated attacks, destruction of homes and roads, disruption of access to treatment and food, and the absence of any possibility of safe return, displacement becomes a foreseeable and known result of the pattern of operations, not an incidental effect separate from it.

The Standard of Effective Warning and Its Application to the Facts

- 60- Effective warning in international humanitarian law is not a formal procedure. It is not enough for the attacking party to publish a map, statement, or media message and then claim that it complied with the duty to warn. The purpose of a warning is to actually protect civilians, not to create a legal appearance preceding an attack. For this reason, the warning must be assessed through its practical effect on the population, not merely through its formal existence.
- 61- Effective warning is measured by several interrelated elements. It must be specific in place, so that residents of a wide area are not asked to leave without identifying the source of the danger. It must be clear in time, so that civilians are not confronted with immediate departure that disregards traffic, movement of families, the elderly, the sick, and children. It must also be capable of implementation, meaning that civilians must have a safe route and a place they can reach, and that it must be understandable to those receiving it. It must not be framed in a way that creates general fear beyond the specific military danger. Finally, it must take into account persons who cannot leave by themselves, such as patients, persons with disabilities, the elderly, the wounded, and patients inside hospitals.
- 62- When this standard is applied to the facts addressed in the report, a clear problem appears. Warnings that covered the entire area south of the Litani, dozens of villages, a large percentage of Lebanon's territory, or crowded neighborhoods in the southern suburbs do not appear to be localized warnings linked to a specific danger. They are broad warnings that place civilians under collective pressure, especially when accompanied by actual attacks, rising smoke, casualties, and destruction of homes and roads. In such a situation, civilians can no longer distinguish between real danger and possible danger, and leave out of fear of the worst. Such departure cannot be described as voluntary merely because the civilian left.
- 63- The problem of effective warning becomes even clearer in Janah. An order to evacuate an area containing Rafic Hariri University Hospital and Al-Zahraa

Hospital cannot be assessed as an ordinary warning to the residents of a civilian neighborhood. The presence of hundreds of patients, including intensive care patients, makes feasibility a decisive criterion. If transferring those patients is not practically possible, or if there are no alternative hospitals capable of receiving them, the warning fails the condition of effectiveness. A warning that exposes patients to the risk of interruption of care or unsafe transfer does not protect civilians; it creates a new danger for them.

- 64- Accordingly, the legal question is not whether a warning was issued, but whether that warning was actually capable of protecting civilians. In light of the available facts, the answer is that many broad warnings did not appear as precise measures to reduce harm, but as general messages that pushed the population into displacement without guaranteeing a safe route, suitable shelter, or any real ability to return. This weakens any defense based on the claim that the mere issuance of a warning is sufficient to prove respect for precautions.
- 65- Evacuations and Broad Warnings as a Direct Cause of Forcible Displacement
The legal problem begins with the breadth of the evacuation orders. An order covering dozens of villages or an entire area is not comparable to a warning directed at a building, street, or the vicinity of a specific target. The broader the warning, the greater the need to define the danger precisely, identify a safe route, clarify whether departure is temporary, and indicate when return is possible. In the facts addressed by the report, these elements do not appear with sufficient clarity, while the practical result appears more clearly: broad displacement and hesitation or inability to return.
- 66- On 4 March 2026, residents of the area south of the Litani were called on to leave immediately. This area includes hundreds of thousands of civilians. The warnings then expanded to cover a large proportion of Lebanese territory and later reached towns north of the Litani and outside what was called the buffer zone. This expansion is not a mere numerical detail. It is a legally significant element because the broader and less specific the warning becomes, the farther

it moves away from the function of preventive warning and the closer it comes to collectively pushing the population to leave.

- 67- The wording used in the warnings increases the legal risk. When residents are told that movement or remaining near a certain area, persons, or facilities endangers their lives, without sufficient identification of the source or scope of the danger, the message does not merely warn against a specific location. It creates a general sense that remaining in an entire area is unsafe. In towns where homes, roads, and civilian facilities overlap, this type of warning leads to collective departure even from places that are not clearly linked to a specific military objective.
- 68- The coercive effect becomes clearer when warnings are accompanied by continuing attacks. A civilian who receives a broad warning and then sees nearby attacks, hears of deaths and injuries, or sees roads, bridges, and homes destroyed, does not decide in a vacuum. He moves under field pressure that makes staying dangerous and return uncertain. For this reason, the warning cannot be separated from the attacks that accompany or follow it.
- 69- The evacuations of the southern suburbs and Janah stand out as decisive evidence that the warning pattern did not remain confined to border areas or southern villages, but reached highly sensitive urban and medical environments. In the southern suburbs, the warnings led to a broad departure from a crowded area before later strikes, reinforcing the coercive character of displacement. In Janah, the warning covered an area containing two major hospitals, with hundreds of patients and no sufficient medical alternatives. This raises a double legal defect because a warning is not effective if its implementation exposes patients, medical staff, and civilians to a danger greater than the danger it claims to avoid.

Creating Field Conditions that Render Staying or Returning Unsafe

- 70- Displacement did not arise from a written order alone. It arose from an entire environment that left civilians with limited choices, where broad warnings

coincided with later attacks, damaged homes, unsafe roads, overcrowded shelters, disrupted medical services, and the absence of a clear route back. In this environment, coercion does not require direct physical compulsion. It is enough that staying becomes highly dangerous and return becomes unrealistic for displacement to become a practically imposed result.

- 71- The destruction of homes appears as a direct factor in fixing displacement. A civilian who leaves under the pressure of a warning cannot return if his home has become destroyed or uninhabitable. This reality is confirmed by Rule 132 of customary international humanitarian law, which does not merely require the right of return, but also requires parties to the conflict to respect the property of displaced persons and protect it from unjustified destruction. The right of return remains ineffective and emptied of legal value if civilians are deprived of the material means of return, foremost among them housing. The systematic destruction of homes goes beyond material damage and becomes a legal and practical obstacle preventing the end of displacement. This is reflected in the Reuters evidence, where displaced persons in a school turned into a shelter stated that return was not an option for some of them because homes were damaged and the war continued. This proves that displacement was not a short or temporary movement, but an open-ended condition imposed by both security and housing circumstances.
- 72- The disruption of roads and crossings also turns displacement from temporary departure into impossible return. Civilians need more than the cessation of attacks to return. They need a safe route, basic services, health care, schools, and the ability of institutions to reach the population. When these elements are damaged together, return to the original place becomes unsafe and impractical, even if no explicit order preventing return has been issued.
- 73- This coercive environment takes an even more dangerous form in the southern suburbs and Janah. In the southern suburbs, broad warnings led residents to leave densely populated civilian neighborhoods before later airstrikes, making displacement a direct result of fear and imminent danger rather than a voluntary

choice. In Janah, the warning affected an area containing two referral hospitals with hundreds of patients, including dozens in intensive care. Here, departure is no longer a matter of moving from a home to a shelter; it becomes a matter of life and death for patients who cannot be transferred easily. The effect of warnings in Beirut must therefore be read with greater strictness, because the urban and medical environment makes any broad evacuation order more dangerous and less capable of safe implementation.

- 74- The continuation of attacks after the ceasefire proves that danger did not end merely because calm was announced. The ceasefire did not stop the attacks, and “Israel” continued issuing warnings and carrying out military operations. In this context, it cannot be said that displaced persons remained outside their areas independently of danger. They remain because return may mean exposure to a new attack, entry into an area still under warning, or return to a destroyed home or unsafe road.

Coercive Conditions Rendering Displacement Practically Inevitable

- 75- In this file, coercion does not require that civilians be physically driven away or that each individual be directly forced to leave his home. Coercion can arise from a field environment that makes staying dangerous and return impossible. When broad warnings coincide with repeated attacks, destruction of homes and roads, and disruption of access to medical care and food, displacement becomes a practically imposed result, even if no individual order is issued to each civilian to leave.
- 76- These coercive conditions appear at four interconnected levels. The first is direct fear caused by warnings and attacks: a civilian who receives a general evacuation order and then sees strikes or smoke, or hears of casualties, does not leave under ordinary circumstances but under the pressure of a tangible danger. The second is loss or damage of housing, because a person who leaves a destroyed or uninhabitable home cannot return to it merely because the strike has stopped. The third is damage to roads and crossings, because return requires

a safe route and basic services, not simply the absence of bombing. The fourth is pressure on medical services and shelters, where leaving a danger zone becomes a move into a fragile humanitarian situation that does not guarantee safety, dignity, or treatment.

- 77- In the southern suburbs, coercive conditions appear through the overlap between the warning, the dense urban environment, and subsequent strikes. Leaving crowded neighborhoods is not like leaving an isolated site. It means the collective movement of families, children, the elderly, the sick, and persons with disabilities through crowded streets and under fear of an imminent strike. In such conditions, the warning is no longer merely a warning; it becomes a direct factor in emptying wide civilian neighborhoods.
- 78- When these conditions together lead residents to leave or remain outside their areas, displacement becomes a result connected to the pattern of operations. It is not enough to say that civilians left because they were afraid. The question must be asked: who created the fear, and whether the fear resulted from broad warnings, repeated attacks, and destruction that made staying impossible. If the attacking party knew, or should have known, that these warnings and operations would push civilians into displacement, displacement enters into the assessment of legality and does not remain a collateral humanitarian consequence.
- 79- The Israeli Narrative and Its Assessment
- 80- The Israeli narrative says that evacuation orders were issued to protect civilians from military operations against Hezbollah. This narrative, however, is not sufficient on its own. The law does not prohibit warnings; indeed, it requires them when operations affect civilians. But a warning must be effective, specific, and linked to a clear danger. It must not become a broad warning that pushes residents of entire areas to leave without knowing the real danger or the route of return.
- 81- The problem begins with the scope of the orders themselves. The wider a warning covers villages and areas without identifying an immediate and direct danger, the weaker its function as a lawful warning becomes. Each town

requires an independent assessment, and each warning must be proportionate to the danger it claims to address. Turning a wide area into a zone whose residents are asked to leave raises the suspicion of treating civilians and the civilian environment as a single mass.

- 82- A broad warning cannot be accepted as automatic proof of respect for precautions. An effective warning must be a means of protecting civilians, not a means of placing the burden of danger on them. When the warnings south of the Litani, the southern villages, the southern suburbs, and Janah are examined, the problem does not lie in the mere issuance of the warning, but in its breadth, ambiguity, and difficulty of implementation. Civilians did not always receive a specific warning explaining a nearby danger in a particular location. Rather, they received broad messages asking them to leave entire areas, sometimes in dense urban environments or near hospitals that cannot practically be evacuated.
- 83- The defect increases when the warnings are read together with the attacks that accompanied or followed them. A warning followed by broad bombardment, destruction of homes and roads, or pressure on hospitals and shelters is not examined as an independent text, but as part of a complete military operation. If the effect of that operation is to push residents into displacement, obstruct their ability to return, and force patients to face the danger of transfer or interruption of treatment, then the warning has not performed its preventive function; it becomes part of the conditions that produced displacement.
- 84- The problem also appears after evacuation. The available materials do not show clear arrangements sufficient to protect civilians after they leave or to secure a near and safe return. Field evidence shows that schools became shelters, that tens of thousands lived in collective centers, and that return was not an option for many because homes were damaged and the war continued. This means that the burden of the warning fell in practice on civilians, the Lebanese state, municipalities, and host communities, while the party that issued it continued to present evacuation as evidence of precaution.

85- Linking return to open-ended security conditions undermines the temporary character of evacuation and turns it into a means of pressure on people and place. Protection is not achieved merely by removing civilians from a danger zone, but by enabling them to return when the field reasons that forced them to leave have ceased. The more return remains vague, conditional, or impossible because of destruction and continuing operations, the more coercive the displacement becomes.

Legal Analysis

86- The available materials do not reflect limited incidental displacement. They show broad warnings, collective departure, inability to return, and field conditions that kept residents outside their areas. Under customary international humanitarian law and the relevant Geneva Convention provisions protecting civilians, patients and hospitals, it is not enough for the attacking party to describe a warning as preventive for it to become lawful. The warning must be specific and effective, remain linked to a clear military danger, and must not, by its breadth, method of implementation, and accompanying operations, lead to the collective departure of civilians from their areas or practically prevent their return.

87- In the 4 March incident, the immediate evacuation order for the area south of the Litani was extremely broad. The established fact is that an entire area containing hundreds of thousands was asked to leave. An order of this size cannot be justified merely by referring to operations against Hezbollah, unless the danger is specific and the warning can be implemented in a manner that actually protects civilians. The law does not accept that a warning be turned into a transfer of the entire burden of danger onto the civilian population.

88- Subsequent evidence then shows that the course did not stop. Evacuation orders covered around fourteen percent of Lebanon, then warnings were issued for towns north of the Litani and outside the buffer zone, then new warnings were issued to residents of towns in the south in May, and warnings also reached the

southern suburbs and Janah. These facts place us before a broad and repeated pattern of warnings, not a localized and limited measure. The more the orders expanded after the effects of displacement had appeared, the clearer the ordering party's knowledge of civilian harm became.

- 89- Voluntariness is not measured merely by the civilian's ability to move. A choice is not free when the alternative to leaving is remaining under the danger of attacks, loss of housing, blocked roads, absence of treatment, or uncertainty as to when return will become possible. The displacement of more than one million people, the conversion of schools into shelters, the residence of tens of thousands in collective centers, and the inability of some displaced persons to return because homes were damaged or the war continued are all facts proving that the warnings and attacks created a coercive reality.
- 90- The evacuations of the southern suburbs and Janah stand out as evidence that the pattern affected highly sensitive urban and medical environments. In the southern suburbs, warnings led to broad departure from a crowded area before later strikes, reinforcing the coercive nature of displacement. In Janah, the warning covered an area containing two major hospitals, with hundreds of patients and no sufficient medical alternatives. This raises a double legal defect because a warning is not effective if its implementation exposes patients, medical staff, and civilians to a danger greater than the danger it claims to avoid. A lawful warning must reduce civilian harm, not transfer the danger from the strike area to hospitals, shelters, and roads.
- 91- This pattern raises more than one legal defect at the same time. At the level of distinction, wide areas may not be treated as a single mass merely because potential objectives exist within them. At the level of proportionality, the effect of displacement, loss of housing, disruption of treatment, education, and work may not be ignored when assessing expected civilian harm. At the level of precautions, issuing a general warning that does not identify a safe route and does not open an actual path of return is not enough. A warning that leaves

civilians with no option but to go into the unknown does not perform the protective function intended by law.

- 92- The potential violation is not confined to the wording of the warnings themselves. Destruction of homes, continuing attacks, damage to crossings and bridges, and statements or practices making return conditional or unsafe are all elements that make displacement a foreseeable and, at the minimum, accepted consequence. When the result is this broad and orders continue to be issued after their effects appear, the legal conclusion becomes stronger: there is a definite violation consisting in forcibly pushing civilians into displacement, and the broad warnings were not exercised within the limits of protection but contributed to creating an environment in which staying or returning was unsafe.
- 93- Return emerges as a decisive element. A preventive warning is supposed to be temporary in effect, linked to a specific danger, and to end when that danger ceases. If return remains practically prevented, or becomes unsafe because of destruction of homes and roads or continuing attacks, the legal assessment changes. The matter is then no longer merely a warning preceding an attack; it becomes part of a wider course that pushed residents into displacement and prevented their return.

Responsibility

- 94- Responsibility begins with the decision to issue broad warnings without sufficient identification of the danger and without clear protection arrangements. Responsibility does not stop at the moment the warning is issued. Once broad displacement has appeared, every new warning, every later attack, and every destruction of homes or roads becomes a decision taken with clearer knowledge that civilians will leave or will not be able to return.
- 95- Statements by political and military leadership, and public positions concerning return, become especially important. When broad evacuation orders are issued and the return of residents is then presented as linked to security conditions set by the attacking party, displacement becomes connected to a decision, policy,

or clear acceptance of the result, not merely to passing fear or spontaneous population movement. This reinforces the responsibility of “Israel” for adopting a pattern of operations and warnings that leads to pushing civilians into displacement or fixing their continued absence from their areas.

96- Responsibility does not stop with the first order. After the displacement of hundreds of thousands and then more than one million people, the effects of the warnings and attacks become known. Every new warning, every later attack, and every destruction of homes, roads, or bridges is taken with increasing knowledge that the practical result is further displacement or prevention of return. The continuation of this course after its effects appeared indicates acceptance of the result, use of it as part of military pressure, or at the minimum disregard for its foreseeable effect on the civilian population.

97- Responsibility becomes clearer in the cases of the southern suburbs and Janah. In the southern suburbs, the effect of a broad warning on crowded neighborhoods and large numbers of civilians was foreseeable. In Janah, it was foreseeable that evacuating an area containing two hospitals and intensive care patients would not be an ordinary procedure or one capable of implementation without serious risks. Therefore, issuing or continuing warnings of this kind, without practical arrangements ensuring protection of civilians, patients, and medical staff, opens the door to serious responsibility for creating coercive conditions that pushed civilians into displacement and threatened the continuity of medical care.

98- In view of the breadth and repetition of the warnings, their association with later attacks and the destruction of homes, roads, and crossings, and the attacking party’s foreseeable knowledge of the effect of these measures on civilians, the documented conduct confirms responsibility for grave violations of international humanitarian law. The examination of individual criminal responsibility therefore becomes legitimate and justified, particularly with proof of the chain of orders, knowledge of the consequences, and continuation of the pattern after its effect on the civilian population became apparent.

Legal Conclusion

- 99- When these pieces of evidence are brought together in one sequence, a legal conclusion emerges that is difficult to avoid. The wide displacement of civilians in Lebanon was not an ordinary collateral effect of attacks. It resulted from a connected series of broad warnings, repeated attacks, destruction of homes, roads and crossings, pressure on hospitals and shelters, and conditions that made staying or returning unsafe. The public Israeli narrative has not provided sufficient basis to prove that these warnings were specific, effective and practicable, that they were linked to a clear and confined military danger, or that they actually reduced civilian harm.
- 100- With a sufficient degree of legal certainty, this course constitutes a serious violation of the rules of international humanitarian law relating to the protection of civilians from the effects of military operations, the prohibition of terror, the prohibition of indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, the duty to take precautions and provide effective warning, the protection of civilian objects and medical services, and the prohibition of destroying or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.
- 101- The provisions of the Geneva Conventions support this conclusion, particularly those relating to the protection of the wounded, sick, infirm, and expectant mothers, the protection of civilian hospitals, medical staff, medical transport, and passage of medicines and medical supplies. Evacuating areas where there are essential hospitals and hundreds of patients, including intensive care patients, cannot be assessed as an ordinary warning to residents capable of movement. Here the standard of effectiveness becomes stricter, because a warning that cannot be implemented does not protect civilians; it transfers danger to patients, medical staff, and the health system.
- 102- The decisive legal characterization in this context is that the facts, including the evacuations of the southern suburbs and Janah, establish a broad forcible pushing of civilians into displacement. The warnings affected southern villages, urban neighborhoods, and areas containing hospitals, and were then

accompanied by repeated attacks, destruction, and medical and field danger that made staying or returning unsafe. In this framework, displacement is not understood as a free choice, but as the direct result of coercive conditions created by the operations and warnings, whose effect on civilians was foreseeable and known, rising to the level of a war crime with all its constituent elements.

Section Nine

Report on Damage to Hospitals and Health Facilities in Lebanon in the Context of Israeli Attacks

Introduction

- 1- This report addresses the facts relating to damage sustained by a number of hospitals and health facilities in Lebanon as a result of direct Israeli attacks or attacks carried out in their immediate vicinity. The consequences included material damage, partial or complete disruption of services, injuries or panic among patients and staff, evacuations, and reduced operational capacity in several facilities. The legal assessment is not limited to the narrow question whether a projectile struck a hospital wall or a neighboring building, because the protection afforded to medical facilities does not attach only to the physical structure. It also protects the medical function of the facility, access routes, entrances, parking areas, departments, equipment, staff, patients inside the facility, and wounded persons being transported to or from it.
- 2- The evidence shows that the file does not concern a single isolated incident, but a broad pattern affecting hospitals and health facilities in the South, Tyre, Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, Mays al-Jabal, Beirut, and the southern suburbs. The pattern includes Salah Ghandour Hospital, Tibnin Governmental Hospital, Nabih Berri Governmental Hospital, Mays al-Jabal Governmental Hospital, Jabal Amel Hospital, the Lebanese-Italian Hospital, Hiram Hospital, Rafik Hariri University Hospital, Bahman Hospital, Al-Hayat Hospital, Popular Aid Hospital, and Bint Jbeil Governmental Hospital, as well as other facilities mentioned in official or UN health reports. This scope requires the file to be treated as repeated harm to the health sector, not as scattered incidental damage.
- 3- The report proceeds from a clear legal rule: civilian hospitals and medical units enjoy special protection in armed conflict. That protection is not lost because the hospital is located in a conflict area, because it is near an area where the attacking party suspects military activity, or because it receives wounded persons

belonging to a party to the conflict. A hospital does not become a military objective merely because it treats wounded fighters, transfers patients, or temporarily holds light weapons removed from wounded persons before handing them to the competent authority. International humanitarian law distinguishes lawful medical activity from acts harmful to the enemy, and permits loss of special protection only under narrow conditions: proof that the hospital is being used to commit acts harmful to the enemy outside its humanitarian function, issuance of a prior warning setting a reasonable time limit to cease the harmful act, and failure to comply with that warning.

Methodology

- 4- This report was prepared in a manner consistent with the practical standards of the Berkeley Protocol on open-source investigations. The attached links are treated as materials capable of classification, verification, and graduated evidentiary weight, not as evidence of equal strength. The report distinguishes between official evidence, UN or international medical evidence, international journalistic evidence, visual material published on media or social platforms, and material requiring further geolocation and chronology before it can support an independent legal finding.
- 5- The report relies on corroboration between items of evidence. An incident supported by an official statement, corroborated by visual material, and reflected in an international or medical report carries stronger evidentiary weight than an incident based on a single link or on material that lacks date or location. The analysis also distinguishes evidence proving direct damage to a hospital, evidence proving damage in its vicinity, and evidence proving operational effects such as evacuation, service disruption, or danger to patients and staff.
- 6- The report does not assume that every instance of damage near a hospital automatically amounts to direct targeting of the hospital. However, damage in the immediate vicinity, particularly at an entrance, parking area, or ambulance route, has high legal relevance. It directly enters the assessment of distinction,

proportionality, and precautions, especially where the medical facility was known, clearly identifiable, or had already been damaged in previous incidents.

- 7- Social-media material is treated with caution. It is not excluded merely because of the platform, but it is not relied upon alone when undated or unclear in location. Its value increases when it shows the hospital or its surroundings, or when it intersects with an official statement, a reliable journalistic source, or an independent medical report. The accompanying archive file should preserve each link, screenshot, publication date, account or publishing body, description, key frames, and available spatial and temporal data, in order to support later verification and reduce the risk of deletion, alteration, or link decay.
- 8- The following evidence register is based on the understanding that the links and visual materials have been preserved in a separate archive file and that each link has a companion screenshot showing the publication page and available metadata. The link alone is therefore not the evidence; the evidence is the preserved link together with the visual material, screenshot, and key excerpts **enabling later review.**

Evidence and Factual Correlation

Evidence One

www.moph.gov.lb/userfiles/images/News/25-10-2024%20Press%20conference/Attacks%20on%20health%20sector-Arabic-24-10-2024.pdf

- 9- This official Ministry of Public Health material establishes the broader pattern of attacks against the health sector in Lebanon, including hospitals, health centers, ambulances, and medical personnel. Its evidentiary value is very high for the general context and it serves as a foundational reference to be read together with the incident-specific visual, testimonial, and institutional material.

Evidence Two

www.emro.who.int/images/stories/lebanon/Lebanon-Emergency-Sitrep-22-2026.pdf

- 10- This WHO/EMRO situation report adds an international medical-verification layer to the record. It supports the inclusion of damaged or affected hospitals in a specialized health-sector register. Its value is very high for the general pattern and moderate for individual incidents where further detail is required.

Evidence Three

https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/lebanon/Health_Briefs_Health_Briefs_18_March-28_April_2026.pdf

- 11- This WHO health brief supports the record with general figures on attacks against health care and shows the impact on facilities, personnel, and ambulances. It is highly reliable for context and pattern, while individual events require corroboration from other evidence.

Salah Ghandour Hospital

Evidence Four

<https://www.facebook.com/Lebanosnews/videos/%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%BA%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%91%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A9-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%91%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%87/464740586257802/>

- 12- This visual material documents the aftermath of an attack near the entrance of Salah Ghandour Hospital, reportedly involving a motorcycle at or near the access point. Its legal value lies in connecting the strike to the immediate hospital environment, where patients, medical personnel, and ambulances require safe access.

Evidence Five

<https://www.facebook.com/aljadeedtv.news/videos/%D8%A2%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%BA%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%88%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%91%D8%A8%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1/1266192325681190/>

- 13- This visual material documents the aftermath of an attack near the entrance of Salah Ghandour Hospital, reportedly involving a motorcycle at or near the access point. Its legal value lies in connecting the strike to the immediate hospital environment, where patients, medical personnel, and ambulances require safe access.

Evidence Six

www.facebook.com/alyalamine/videos/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%91%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%91%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A9-

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%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84-
%D8%A3/984192273365717/

- 14- This visual material documents the aftermath of an attack near the entrance of Salah Ghandour Hospital, reportedly involving a motorcycle at or near the access point. Its legal value lies in connecting the strike to the immediate hospital environment, where patients, medical personnel, and ambulances require safe access.

Evidence Seven

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2x1b1dy0X-w>

- 15- This material provides supporting visual or investigative information concerning Salah Ghandour Hospital and the impact of the attack on the medical facility, its staff, patients, or access routes.

Evidence Eight

<https://legal->

[agenda.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%91%D8%A9-](https://legal-agenda.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%91%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%BA/)
[D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-](https://legal-agenda.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%BA/)
[D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-](https://legal-agenda.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%91%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%BA/)
[D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-](https://legal-agenda.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%91%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%BA/)
[D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%BA/](https://legal-agenda.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%91%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%BA/)

- 16- This material provides supporting visual or investigative information concerning Salah Ghandour Hospital and the impact of the attack on the medical facility, its staff, patients, or access routes.

Evidence Nine

<https://www.moph.gov.lb/en/Pages/17/73410/moph-condemns-the-attack-on-salah-ghandour-hospital>

This official Ministry of Public Health statement condemns the attack on Salah Ghandour Hospital and confirms the medical status of the facility and the incident in the official record. It is the strongest reference evidence for this hospital when read with the supporting visual materials.

Tibnin Governmental Hospital

Evidence Ten

<https://www.aljazeera.com/video/newsfeed/2026/4/17/southern-lebanons-only-functioning-hospital-damaged-by-israeli-strikes>

17- This evidence documents damage to Tibnin Governmental Hospital, an operating facility in an area of acute medical need in southern Lebanon. It supports the conclusion that the attack affected the functioning or safety of a protected health-care facility.

Evidence Eleven

www.youtube.com/shorts/9UtDUqs-gLY

18- This evidence documents damage to Tibnin Governmental Hospital, an operating facility in an area of acute medical need in southern Lebanon. It supports the conclusion that the attack affected the functioning or safety of a protected health-care facility.

Evidence Twelve

<https://www.facebook.com/alarabytelevision/videos/%D8%A3%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A->

%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-

%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-

%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A

%D8%A9/926778496642446/

19- This evidence documents damage to Tibnin Governmental Hospital, an operating facility in an area of acute medical need in southern Lebanon. It supports the conclusion that the attack affected the functioning or safety of a protected health-care facility.

Evidence Thirteen

www.mtv.com.lb/news/1681896

20- This evidence documents damage to Tibnin Governmental Hospital, an operating facility in an area of acute medical need in southern Lebanon. It supports the conclusion that the attack affected the functioning or safety of a protected health-care facility.

Evidence Fourteen

www.reuters.com/video/watch/idRW242414042026RP1/

21- This evidence documents damage to Tibnin Governmental Hospital, an operating facility in an area of acute medical need in southern Lebanon. It supports the conclusion that the attack affected the functioning or safety of a protected health-care facility.

Evidence Fifteen

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/16/israel-escalates-attacks-on-medics-in-lebanon-with-deadly-quadruple-tap>

22- This evidence documents damage to Tibnin Governmental Hospital, an operating facility in an area of acute medical need in southern Lebanon. It supports the conclusion that the attack affected the functioning or safety of a protected health-care facility.

Evidence Sixteen

<https://www.mtv.com.lb/news/1613081>

23- This evidence concerns the targeting of a vehicle or strike at the entrance or immediate vicinity of Tibnin Governmental Hospital. Because the entrance is a medically sensitive access point, it is highly relevant to the foreseeability of harm and to the duty to take feasible precautions.

Evidence Seventeen

[www.nna-](http://www.nna-leb.gov.lb/ar/news/368767/)

[leb.gov.lb/ar/news/368767/](http://www.nna-leb.gov.lb/ar/news/368767/)[%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%AB%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%88](#)

24- This official National News Agency / health-emergency update records the casualty toll and date of the Tibnin incident. It is used with the visual evidence to establish the occurrence, timing, and consequences of the attack.

Nabih Berri Governmental Hospital - Nabatieh

Evidence Eighteen

<https://www.facebook.com/LBCILebanonNews/videos/>[%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-](#)

%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%91%D8%A8%D8%AA-
%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-
%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B3/1553925575681137/

25- This material documents a strike near the Civil Defense center in Nabatieh that also damaged Nabih Berri Governmental Hospital. Its value lies in the fact that the same damage environment involved both a medical facility and a rescue facility.

Evidence Nineteen

https://www.facebook.com/bintjbeil.org/videos/%D8%A3%D8%B6%D8%B1%D
8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-
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%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-
%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%AA-
%D9%85%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%89-%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%8A/959902320035395/

26- This visual evidence shows damage to Nabih Berri Governmental Hospital and includes visible identifiers of the Ministry of Public Health / the hospital name, increasing its reliability for location and object identification.

Evidence Twenty

<https://www.lebanon24.com/news/lebanon/1498818/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88-%D8%AA%D8%B6%D8%B1%D9%91%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9>

- 27- This evidence supports the record that Nabih Berri Governmental Hospital was damaged by strikes in its vicinity, making the proximity to the medical facility central to the analysis of precautions and proportionality.

Evidence Twenty-One

<https://www.newsflare.com/video/848471/lebanon-damage-at-nabih-berri-governmental-hospital-due-to-an-airstrike-targeting-a-building-in-its-vicinity>

- 28- This evidence supports the record that Nabih Berri Governmental Hospital was damaged by strikes in its vicinity, making the proximity to the medical facility central to the analysis of precautions and proportionality.

Evidence Twenty-Two

www.moph.gov.lb/en/Media/view/83261/nassereddine-condemns-attacks-on-hospitals-and-medical-staff

- 29- This material documents a strike near the Civil Defense center in Nabatieh that also damaged Nabih Berri Governmental Hospital. Its value lies in the fact that the same damage environment involved both a medical facility and a rescue facility.

Evidence Twenty-Three

<https://nna-leb.gov.lb/en/news/136917/security-update-israeli-airstrikes-target-vicinity>

- 30- This evidence supports the record that Nabih Berri Governmental Hospital was damaged by strikes in its vicinity, making the proximity to the medical facility central to the analysis of precautions and proportionality.

Mays al-Jabal Governmental Hospital

Evidence Twenty-Four

<https://www.moph.gov.lb/en/Pages/127/71685/the-ministry-of-public-health-strongly-condemns-the-targeting-of-mays-al-jabal-hospital>

- 31- This official or supporting material concerns the targeting or impact on Mays al-Jabal Governmental Hospital, confirming its protected medical status and the need to evaluate the incident under the rules protecting medical units.

Evidence Twenty-Five

<https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1496874/mais-al-jabal-government-hospital-evacuated-after-phone-threats.html>

- 32- This source reports the evacuation of Mays al-Jabal Governmental Hospital after phone threats, proving a serious operational effect that goes beyond physical damage and directly affects continuity of care.

Evidence Twenty-Six

<https://www.facebook.com/LegalAgenda/posts/aerial-imagery-analyzed-by-the-legal-agenda-shows-repeated-israeli-military-pres/1487033596792787/>

- 33- This evidence provides visual/geospatial analysis related to Mays al-Jabal Hospital or its vicinity. Its methodological value is high because it relies on spatial analysis and supports the location-based assessment.

Jabal Amel Hospital - Tyre

Evidence Twenty-Seven

<https://www.aljazeera.com/video/newsfeed/2026/3/31/tyre-hospital-hit-five-times-since-start-of-israels-attacks-on-lebanon>

34- This evidence documents repeated damage to a hospital in Tyre, reportedly for the fifth time. The recurrence is legally important because it bears on knowledge of risk and the duty to adjust precautions after earlier damage.

Evidence Twenty-Eight

<https://www.facebook.com/aljazeera/videos/a-hospital-in-southern-lebanon-has-been-subjected-to-israeli-attacks-for-a-fifth/2311362832689250/>

35- This evidence supports the record of damage to Jabal Amel Hospital in Tyre and helps establish the cumulative effect of Israeli attacks on a protected medical facility and its ability to continue care.

Evidence Twenty-Nine

<https://www.nna-leb.gov.lb/ar/news/420552/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84---%D9%85%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-2>

36- This evidence supports the record of damage to Jabal Amel Hospital in Tyre and helps establish the cumulative effect of Israeli attacks on a protected medical facility and its ability to continue care.

Evidence Thirty

<https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/4/3/how-israel-is-destroying-healthcare-infrastructure-in-southern-lebanon>

- 37- This evidence supports the record of damage to Jabal Amel Hospital in Tyre and helps establish the cumulative effect of Israeli attacks on a protected medical facility and its ability to continue care.

Evidence Thirty-One

<https://www.doctorswithoutborders.ca/lebanon-46-days-of-bombardment-strained-healthcare-system/>

- 38- This evidence supports the record of damage to Jabal Amel Hospital in Tyre and helps establish the cumulative effect of Israeli attacks on a protected medical facility and its ability to continue care.

Lebanese-Italian Hospital - Tyre

Evidence Thirty-Two

<https://www.aljazeera.com/video/newsfeed/2026/4/4/witness-records-israeli-strike-on-building-in-lebanons-tyre>

- 39- This evidence concerns damage to the Lebanese-Italian Hospital in Tyre after Israeli strikes. It links the attack to a specific medical facility and supports the analysis of the effect on continued medical service.

Evidence Thirty-Three

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/4/israeli-strikes-damage-hospital-in-lebanons-tyre>

- 40- This evidence concerns damage to the Lebanese-Italian Hospital in Tyre after Israeli strikes. It links the attack to a specific medical facility and supports the analysis of the effect on continued medical service.

Evidence Thirty-Four

<https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2026/04/04/israeli-strikes-damage-hospital-in-lebanon-ministry->

- 41- This evidence concerns damage to the Lebanese-Italian Hospital in Tyre after Israeli strikes. It links the attack to a specific medical facility and supports the analysis of the effect on continued medical service.

Evidence Thirty-Five

<https://www.doctorswithoutborders.ca/lebanon-46-days-of-bombardment-strained-healthcare-system/>

- 42- This medical-source material records damage to medical equipment at the Lebanese-Italian Hospital, including dialysis-related equipment. Its importance is very high because it proves functional harm to treatment capacity, not merely physical damage to the building.

Hiram Hospital - Tyre

Evidence Thirty-Six

<https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1502674/damage-at-hiram-hospital-near-sour-after-israeli-strike-on-abbasieh.html>

- 43- This evidence documents or supports damage near Hiram Hospital in Tyre and contributes to establishing the proximity of strikes to a functioning medical facility and the effect on staff, patients, and continuity of care.

Evidence Thirty-Seven

www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-condemns-israeli-strikes-lebanon-calls-casualty-reports-appalling-2026-04-08/

- 44- This evidence documents or supports damage near Hiram Hospital in Tyre and contributes to establishing the proximity of strikes to a functioning medical facility and the effect on staff, patients, and continuity of care.

Evidence Thirty-Eight

<https://www.trtworld.com/article/5334bddc506c>

- 45- This evidence documents or supports damage near Hiram Hospital in Tyre and contributes to establishing the proximity of strikes to a functioning medical facility and the effect on staff, patients, and continuity of care.

Evidence Thirty-Nine

<https://nhrcib.org/en/archives/6451>

- 46- This evidence documents or supports damage near Hiram Hospital in Tyre and contributes to establishing the proximity of strikes to a functioning medical facility and the effect on staff, patients, and continuity of care.

Evidence Forty

<https://www.doctorswithoutborders.ca/lebanon-46-days-of-bombardment-strained-healthcare-system/>

- 47- This Doctors Without Borders material supports the record of harm to Hiram Hospital, including effects such as shattered glass or injuries to staff, and is highly reliable for the medical and operational consequences.

Rafik Hariri University Hospital

Evidence Forty-One

<https://media.un.org/avlibrary/en/asset/d328/d3286732>

- 48- This evidence documents the strike near Rafik Hariri University Hospital, the surrounding destruction, rescue operations, or the UN/legal response. It supports the proximity and protection analysis for a major civilian hospital in Beirut.

Evidence Forty-Two

www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/10/22/deadly-israel-strike-hits-close-to-beirut-hospital

- 49- This evidence documents the strike near Rafik Hariri University Hospital, the surrounding destruction, rescue operations, or the UN/legal response. It supports the proximity and protection analysis for a major civilian hospital in Beirut.

Evidence Forty-Three

<https://apnews.com/article/da09186fc06d734e0457e6c099f3d992>

- 50- This evidence documents the strike near Rafik Hariri University Hospital, the surrounding destruction, rescue operations, or the UN/legal response. It supports the proximity and protection analysis for a major civilian hospital in Beirut.

Evidence Forty-Four

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-says-strike-beirut-did-not-target-hospital-2024-10-22/>

- 51- This Reuters item contains the Israeli narrative denying that Rafik Hariri University Hospital was targeted, while also reporting damage and the hospital administration's position. Its value is high because it allows the competing accounts to be assessed against the physical and operational effects.

Evidence Forty-Five

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/10/beirut-hospital-attack-civilians-must-be-protected>

- 52- This OHCHR material addresses the attack near Rafik Hariri University Hospital and emphasizes the duty to protect civilians, hospitals, ambulances, and medical workers. Its legal value is very high.

Evidence Forty-Six

<https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/arabic/KPE4OVFWIVOTNCMOJL5ZQKZOGA-2024-10-29/>

- 53- This Reuters fact-check addresses a misleading image linked to the Rafik Hariri Hospital incident. It is important for methodological integrity because it excludes unreliable material and prevents the record from relying on a false visual claim.

Bahman Hospital

Evidence Forty-Seven

<https://moph.gov.lb/en/Pages/18/82841/moph-urges-protection-of-medical-facilities-after-israeli-strike-damages-bahman-hospital-and-causes->

- 54- This official Ministry of Public Health material records damage to Bahman Hospital caused by an Israeli strike on a neighboring building, including material damage and panic or injuries among patients and staff. It is highly reliable for the operational and human impact on the hospital.

Evidence Forty-Eight

<https://www.moph.gov.lb/ar/Pages/0/82837/moph-urges-protection-of-medical-facilities-after-israeli-strike-damages-bahman-hospital-and-causes->

- 55- This official Ministry of Public Health material records damage to Bahman Hospital caused by an Israeli strike on a neighboring building, including material damage and panic or injuries among patients and staff. It is highly reliable for the operational and human impact on the hospital.

Al-Hayat Hospital - Chiyah

Evidence Forty-Nine

<https://www.facebook.com/MetnOnline/videos/%D8%A3%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A->

%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AD-
%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%A8-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-
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%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A/143277108
1121402/

56- This evidence visually records material damage to Al-Hayat Hospital in Chiyah following Israeli strikes on the southern suburbs. It identifies the hospital by name and supports the record, while requiring corroboration by official material or hospital testimony for a complete legal finding.

Evidence Fifty

<https://www.instagram.com/reel/DVwdvSRCLB6/>

57- This evidence visually records material damage to Al-Hayat Hospital in Chiyah following Israeli strikes on the southern suburbs. It identifies the hospital by name and supports the record, while requiring corroboration by official material or hospital testimony for a complete legal finding.

Popular Aid Hospital - Nabatieh

Evidence Fifty-One

[https://www.facebook.com/Lebanosnews/videos/%D8%BA%D9%80%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-
D8%B1%D8%A9-
%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A
%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-
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%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-](https://www.facebook.com/Lebanosnews/videos/%D8%BA%D9%80%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%83%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%91%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-)

[%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%91%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88/1058961432694249/](#)

58- This evidence records a strike near Popular Aid Hospital in Nabatieh. Its value lies primarily in proving geographic proximity; it requires further support if used to establish direct damage inside the hospital.

Evidence Fifty-Two

<https://www.facebook.com/almodononline/videos/%D8%B1%D8%BA%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-/1262823078563274/>

59- This report records that hospitals in Nabatieh increased readiness despite damage from Israeli strikes. Its value is contextual and operational, showing the strain placed on health facilities in the area.

Bint Jbeil Governmental Hospital

Evidence Fifty-Three

<https://www.moph.gov.lb/ar/Pages/127/83248/nassereddine-condemns-attacks-on-hospitals-and-medical-staff>

- 60- This evidence supports the inclusion of Bint Jbeil Governmental Hospital or related southern health facilities in the record of damaged or affected civilian and health infrastructure. Its value is strongest when read with official health-sector sources.

Evidence Fifty-Four

www.annahar.com/lebanon/308298/%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%83%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7

- 61- This evidence supports the inclusion of Bint Jbeil Governmental Hospital or related southern health facilities in the record of damaged or affected civilian and health infrastructure. Its value is strongest when read with official health-sector sources.

Evidence Fifty-Five

<https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/lebanon/Lebanon-Emergency-Sitrep-22-2026.pdf>

- 62- This WHO/EMRO situation report identifies hospitals and health facilities that were damaged or affected, including facilities for which independent visual material is limited. It supports preliminary inclusion in the record but does not, by itself, complete the legal proof for every individual hospital.

Jabal Amel Hospital - Tyre (Additional Evidence)

Evidence Fifty-Six

www.france24.com/ar/%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88/20260603-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9

63- This visual material documents destruction at Jabal Amel Hospital in Tyre following Israeli strikes. It provides external visual corroboration of material damage to a specifically identified medical facility and is important when cross-read with Al Jazeera, MSF, and other visual evidence.

Evidence Fifty-Seven

www.tiktok.com/@aljazeera/video/7646463054795771143

64- This visual material documents destruction at Jabal Amel Hospital in Tyre following Israeli strikes. It provides external visual corroboration of material damage to a specifically identified medical facility and is important when cross-read with Al Jazeera, MSF, and other visual evidence.

Evidence Fifty-Eight

www.youtube.com/shorts/Nok_k3Q-QcQ

65- This short visual material indicates major damage to the intensive care unit of Jabal Amel Hospital after an Israeli strike near the facility. Its value is high because it identifies a critical medical department and shows a direct impact on operational capacity.

Evidence Fifty-Nine

www.youtube.com/shorts/70yjXpB0zqw

66- This visual material documents destruction at Jabal Amel Hospital in Tyre following Israeli strikes. It provides external visual corroboration of material damage to a specifically identified medical facility and is important when cross-read with Al Jazeera, MSF, and other visual evidence.

Evidence Sixty

www.facebook.com/watch/?v=855134207141876

67- This visual material documents destruction at Jabal Amel Hospital in Tyre following Israeli strikes. It provides external visual corroboration of material damage to a specifically identified medical facility and is important when cross-read with Al Jazeera, MSF, and other visual evidence.

Evidence Sixty-One

www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-898130

68- This Jerusalem Post item sets out the Israeli narrative concerning operations in Tyre. It records the claim that Hezbollah operated within civilian neighborhoods and that the hospital was not targeted, while damage to it was described as incidental. It is included as the opposing narrative to be tested against medical and visual evidence of extensive hospital damage.

Evidence Sixty-Two

www.msf.org/israeli-airstrike-causes-death-and-damage-southern-lebanon

69- Doctors without Borders documented that the strike occurred near Jabal Amel Hospital in Tyre, a facility it supports, causing deaths and 127 injuries according to the Ministry of Health, including 39 hospital staff. It also recorded severe damage to inpatient, radiology, and intensive-care departments and the transfer of patients for safety. Its evidentiary value is very high.

Marjayoun Governmental Hospital

Evidence Sixty-Three

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/10/30/lebanon-israeli-attacks-medics-apparent-war-crimes>

70- This Human Rights Watch report documents Israeli attacks on medics in Lebanon and separately addresses the Marjayoun Hospital incident of 4 October 2024. It relies on satellite imagery, the location of a burned ambulance approximately 150 meters from the hospital, a crater blocking the main road, and direct testimony from nursing leadership. Its evidentiary value is very high.

Evidence Sixty-Four

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/MDE1890622025ENGLISH.pdf>

71- This Amnesty International report includes Marjayoun in its investigation of attacks between 3 and 9 October 2024, based on interviews with the hospital director and nursing leadership. It states that Amnesty found no evidence that the hospital or ambulance was used for acts harmful to the enemy and called for investigation as potential war crimes. Its value is very high.

Evidence Sixty-Five

<https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2024/10/4/%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84>

72- This Al Jazeera report records the hospital director's statement that the strike occurred five meters from the main entrance and that full evacuation was decided the same day. It proves the immediate operational effect in real time.

Dar al-Amal University Hospital - Douris, Baalbek

Evidence Sixty-Six

<https://legal-agenda.com/%D8%A5%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%85-18-%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA/>

73- This Legal Agenda communication documents the 22 November 2024 incident in which the residence of Director General Ali Rakan Allam, adjacent to Dar al-Amal University Hospital, was struck, killing him and five hospital workers and damaging hospital facades, ceilings, and doors. It links the attack to a pattern affecting health-care workers.

Evidence Sixty-Seven

<https://www.almanar.com.lb/12824011>

74- This source reproduces the Ministry of Public Health statement mourning the hospital director and describing the attack as adding to war crimes. It confirms the medical status of Dar al-Amal Hospital and its central role in receiving wounded persons in Baalbek-Hermel.

Evidence Sixty-Eight

<https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2024/11/23/%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D9%886-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9>

75- This source reproduces the Ministry of Public Health statement mourning the hospital director and describing the attack as adding to war crimes. It confirms the medical status of Dar al-Amal Hospital and its central role in receiving wounded persons in Baalbek-Hermel.

Hiram Hospital - Tyre (Additional Evidence)

Evidence Sixty-Nine

<https://www.moph.gov.lb/ar/Media/view/85145/13-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1>

76- This evidence concerns the 31 May 2026 incident in the immediate vicinity of Hiram Hospital in Tyre, which caused injuries among hospital workers and serious damage, in addition to earlier damage. It is important because it proves recurrence, professional condemnation, and the accumulation of harm against the health-care facility.

Evidence Seventy

<https://www.aremnews.com/news/arab-world/mp7b3ml>

77- This evidence concerns the 31 May 2026 incident in the immediate vicinity of Hiram Hospital in Tyre, which caused injuries among hospital workers and serious damage, in addition to earlier damage. It is important because it proves recurrence, professional condemnation, and the accumulation of harm against the health-care facility.

Evidence Seventy-One

<https://www.tayyar.org/News/Lebanon/723342>

78- This evidence concerns the 31 May 2026 incident in the immediate vicinity of Hiram Hospital in Tyre, which caused injuries among hospital workers and serious damage, in addition to earlier damage. It is important because it proves recurrence, professional condemnation, and the accumulation of harm against the health-care facility.

Nabih Berri Governmental Hospital - Nabatieh

Evidence Seventy-Two

<https://www.aremnews.com/news/arab-world/jfikwjg>

- 79- This evidence records renewed and consecutive Israeli strikes in the vicinity of Nabih Berri Governmental Hospital, including repeated attacks within a very short time and material damage inside the hospital while staff and patients remained present. It is important for the analysis of recurrence, foreseeability, and the need for reassessment between strikes.

Evidence Seventy-Three

<https://www.vetogate.com/5665094>

- 80- This evidence records renewed and consecutive Israeli strikes in the vicinity of Nabih Berri Governmental Hospital, including repeated attacks within a very short time and material damage inside the hospital while staff and patients remained present. It is important for the analysis of recurrence, foreseeability, and the need for reassessment between strikes.

Extracted Facts

- 81- The evidence concerning Salah Ghandour Hospital establishes that the incident occurred at the entrance, parking area, or immediate surroundings of the hospital. The legal value of this fact lies in the connection between the point of impact and the access environment of a medical facility. The evidence does not show a military objective inside the hospital itself; the account concerns a motorcycle or target outside. The question is therefore whether choosing a point of attack so close to a known protected medical facility respected the required precautions toward patients, staff, and the facility.
- 82- The evidence concerning Tibnin Governmental Hospital establishes that damage affected an operating health facility in an area of acute medical need. The evidence concerning a vehicle or strike at the entrance is particularly important because the entrance is a medically sensitive point. The record does

not show use of the hospital from within for acts harmful to the enemy, nor does it show a specific warning addressed to hospital administration to cease a defined harmful act.

- 83- The evidence concerning Nabih Berri Governmental Hospital shows damage resulting from strikes on buildings or areas in its vicinity, including an incident involving the Civil Defense center. The visible material and official statements connect the damage environment with both a hospital and a rescue facility, making the duty of precautions particularly acute.
- 84- The evidence concerning Mays al-Jabal Hospital records both direct allegations of targeting and operational effects, including evacuation after threats and visual/geospatial analysis. These materials show that harm to a hospital may occur through direct impact, intimidation, access disruption, or forced suspension of services.
- 85- The evidence concerning Jabal Amel Hospital, the Lebanese-Italian Hospital, and Hiram Hospital in Tyre shows repeated damage to health facilities and, in several incidents, functional harm to critical departments such as intensive care, radiology, inpatient wards, or dialysis-related capacity. Damage to such departments cannot be treated as ordinary material damage; it directly impairs care for vulnerable patients.
- 86- The evidence concerning Rafik Hariri University Hospital, Bahman Hospital, Al-Hayat Hospital, Popular Aid Hospital, Bint Jbeil Governmental Hospital, Marjayoun Governmental Hospital, and Dar al-Amal University Hospital confirms that the impact extended beyond one geographic area and included direct damage, nearby explosions, evacuation, panic, staff injuries, damage to ambulances or access routes, and disruption of continuing care.

Applicable Rules

- 87- The applicable framework is the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary international humanitarian law. Civilian hospitals and medical units enjoy special protection. The core rule is that medical facilities must be

respected and protected at all times and may not be made the object of attack so long as they do not commit acts harmful to the enemy outside their humanitarian function.

- 88- The protection of a hospital does not disappear because it is located near fighting, because it receives wounded fighters, because its staff treat persons belonging to a party to the conflict, or because guards are present for security. Loss of protection requires a specific harmful use, a warning setting a reasonable time limit, and non-compliance with that warning. Without these conditions, the medical protection remains intact.
- 89- The rules of distinction require a separation between civilian objects and military objectives. The rules of proportionality prohibit attacks expected to cause incidental civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. The rules of precautions require constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects, verification of targets, choice of means and methods with the least feasible harm, and effective warning where circumstances permit.
- 90- These duties apply with particular force to hospitals, ambulances, entrances, access roads, parking areas, and the operational environment of medical care. Damage that blocks access, causes evacuation, destroys equipment, injures staff, or prevents patients from receiving treatment must be included in the assessment of civilian harm.

the Israeli Narrative and its Narrative

- 91- The Israeli narrative, where available, generally denies an intention to target hospitals or asserts that attacks were directed at military activity in the surrounding area. Such a denial may be relevant to the assessment of direct intent, but it does not end the legal inquiry. International humanitarian law also addresses foreseeable incidental harm, failures in precautions, and disproportionate attacks.

- 92- If Israel argues that a hospital lost protection because of harmful use, it must show specific facts: what harmful act was being committed from within the hospital, why that act fell outside the humanitarian function, what warning was given, what time limit was provided, and why the hospital failed to comply. A general claim of Hezbollah presence in a neighborhood or military activity nearby is not legally sufficient to remove hospital protection.
- 93- Where the declared target was a vehicle, person, building, or object near a hospital, the inquiry shifts to whether the attackers knew or should have known the location of the hospital, whether the expected blast, fragmentation, access disruption, panic, evacuation, or equipment damage was assessed, and whether less harmful timing, angle, munition, or method was feasible.

Legal Analysis

- 94- The evidence does not establish that the hospitals identified in this report were being used from within to commit acts harmful to the enemy in the strict sense required by the Geneva Conventions. Nor does the record establish that legally valid warnings were issued to the hospitals, identifying a harmful act and providing a reasonable time to cease it. The starting legal position is therefore that special medical protection remained in force.
- 95- The incidents at hospital entrances, parking areas, immediate surroundings, and ambulance routes raise serious issues under the rules of precautions. Even when the declared target is outside the hospital building, the attacker must factor in the location and function of the protected medical facility. A hospital entrance is not an ordinary urban point; it is a critical path for patients, ambulances, staff, and rescue operations.
- 96- Repeated harm to the same hospital or to multiple health facilities in the same operational environment heightens the standard of knowledge. After earlier incidents, the location of the hospital, the risk of damage, and the operational consequences should have been known and incorporated into targeting procedures. Continued attacks without effective adjustment point to possible

flaws in verification, rules of engagement, proportionality assessment, or command supervision.

- 97- The operational effects are legally significant. Evacuation of a hospital, suspension of a department, damage to intensive care, radiology, dialysis equipment, or ambulances, injuries to staff, panic among patients, and interruption of treatment are not incidental facts of low value. They are part of the civilian harm that must be anticipated and weighed before an attack.
- 98- The documented pattern indicates serious grounds to examine violations of the duties to respect and protect medical units, medical personnel, medical transport, and the wounded and sick. It also raises questions under the rules of distinction, proportionality, precautions, and effective warning. The repeated nature of the damage makes the file suitable for further investigation into possible war crimes.

Responsibility

- 99- Potential responsibility does not depend solely on proving that every hospital was intentionally selected as the direct target. Responsibility may also arise from a failure to take feasible precautions, from launching disproportionate attacks, from treating protected hospitals as though their protection had fallen without satisfying the legal conditions, or from continuing an operational pattern despite knowledge of repeated harm to medical facilities.
- 100- Responsibility may attach to those who planned, approved, executed, or supervised attacks in the vicinity of protected medical facilities, including where they knew or should have known the hospital's location, the likely civilian and medical harm, or the repeated effect of similar attacks. The duty of command is not limited to refraining from unlawful orders; it also includes preventing recurrence, correcting targeting practices, and investigating credible indications of violations.
- 101- International criminal jurisprudence, including cases such as Galic, Strugar, and Blaskic before the ICTY, is relevant because it moves the assessment

beyond physical damage toward knowledge, control, and the capacity to prevent. Responsibility may extend to commanders and planners where they knew, or had reason to know, of the civilian or protected character of an object or of the clear risk created by their operational pattern, and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent, stop, or punish violations.

102-In this context, the assessment cannot stop at the pilot or immediate operator. It extends to the political and operational command structure that prepared, authorized, executed, or reviewed the attacks, including air force commanders, air-base commanders, squadron commanders, and officers responsible for planning, targeting, and operations, where their actual connection to the decision, knowledge of foreseeable risks, or failure to correct the pattern can be established.

Legal Conclusion

103-The attached evidence permits the conclusion that a broad number of hospitals and health facilities in Lebanon sustained direct or indirect damage as a result of Israeli attacks or attacks in their immediate vicinity. The damage affected buildings, entrances, parking areas, equipment, operational capacity, patients, health workers, and the ambulance and rescue environment. The evidentiary strength varies from incident to incident, but the intersection of official, UN, medical, journalistic, and visual evidence is sufficient to establish a serious pattern of harm to the health sector.

104-The evidence record, in its current form, does not prove the presence of military objectives inside the hospitals covered by this report. Nor does it prove that these hospitals were used from within for acts harmful to the enemy in the narrow sense required by the Geneva Conventions. The special protection of the hospitals therefore remained in place. Any claim that this protection was lost requires specific proof of harmful use, a clear prior warning, a reasonable time limit, and non-compliance.

- 105- The facts raise serious indications of violations of the rules protecting hospitals and medical units, medical personnel and transport, distinction, proportionality, and precautions. The suspicion is particularly serious where attacks occurred at entrances, parking areas, or adjacent surroundings, and where repeated harm affected medical equipment, critical departments, or continued operation of the facility.
- 106- This conclusion does not assume that every incident was a direct attack on the hospital. The analysis distinguishes direct targeting, unlawful incidental harm, failure of precautions, and unlawful disproportionality. That distinction does not reduce the responsibility of the attacking party where the medical facility was known, the harm was foreseeable, practical alternatives were available, and warning was absent, unproven, or insufficient.
- 107- The file warrants an independent investigation into targeting orders, coordinate maps, collateral-damage estimates, warnings if any, alternative means and methods, and post-incident internal-review records. The conclusion is not a final indictment; it is a documented legal basis showing that the facts exceed scattered incidental damage and reveal a pattern requiring serious accountability and further verification under international humanitarian law.

Section ten

Targeting of Cultural and Archaeological Property

Introduction

- 1- This report sets out the facts concerning the targeting of cultural, archaeological and religious property in Lebanon, or its direct exposure to danger, as a result of Israeli military operations. The report is based on publicly available and verifiable evidence, including reports by international agencies, statements issued by UNESCO and specialized heritage organizations, audiovisual material, and mutually reinforcing media reports. The evidence was assessed by identifying the source, the date of the incident, the location, the nature of the cultural property, the type of damage, the relationship between the damage and the military operation, and the consistency of the different accounts.
- 2- The report does not treat these incidents as ordinary damage to buildings. The evidence concerns classified archaeological sites, historic buildings, heritage markets, historic castles, churches and religious sites, and the vicinity of sites inscribed on the World Heritage List or placed under a protection regime announced by UNESCO. The legal assessment therefore does not stop at the rules protecting civilian objects, but moves to a stricter special legal regime: the regime for the protection of cultural property in armed conflict.
- 3- The facts acquire additional significance because, on 18 November 2024, UNESCO announced the granting of provisional enhanced protection to thirty-four cultural properties in Lebanon, at the request of the Lebanese authorities and under the mechanisms of the 1954 Hague Convention and its 1999 Second Protocol. This enhanced protection is not presented here as a direct treaty obligation binding Israel under the 1999 Second Protocol, because Israel is not a party to it. It is presented as evidence of the exceptional value of the sites, of prior knowledge of their sensitivity, and of the heightened level of caution required when planning and conducting military operations.

- 4- Israel is a party to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and to its 1954 First Protocol. The rules protecting cultural property, particularly the duty to respect such property, the prohibition on attacking it, the prohibition on using it or its immediate surroundings for purposes that expose it to danger, and the obligation to exercise special care to avoid damaging it, are also customary rules binding in both international and non-international armed conflicts.
- 5- The report proceeds from a central rule, the special protection enjoyed by cultural property is not lost by a general allegation of military activity in the city or area. Removing immunity from cultural property requires a narrow and exceptional legal threshold. That threshold consists of imperative and specific military necessity, based on the actual and direct use of the property itself, or of its immediate surroundings, for military action; the absence of a practical less harmful alternative; and the adoption of special precautions that take account of the cultural value of the site. This is not a threshold of military convenience, operational ease, or general suspicion. It is an exceptional threshold that is neither presumed nor inferred from a general context.

Methodology

- 6- This report applies the Berkeley Protocol on Open Source Investigations. Each public item was treated as an indication requiring assessment before it was incorporated into the legal conclusion. Media reports, photographs and videos were not treated as final proof in themselves. They were examined in light of their source, publication date, content, geolocation potential, connection to the incident, and consistency with other independent or specialized sources.
- 7- The methodology separates three levels of evidence. The first is direct evidence establishing physical damage or military presence at a specific cultural property, such as images, video footage, or field reports identifying the location and damage. The second is supporting evidence, which reinforces the incident through an independent source, an official statement, or a statement by a

specialized heritage organization. The third is contextual evidence, which establishes the cultural value of the site, its inclusion on the World Heritage List, its placement under enhanced protection, or prior knowledge of the surrounding risk.

- 8- The report also distinguishes between direct damage to cultural property, damage or risk in its immediate surroundings, and military use or control of the property. This distinction is necessary because legal responsibility does not arise only when the monument itself is destroyed. Responsibility may also arise when military action is conducted in its immediate surroundings and exposes it to destruction or damage, or when the property is used or transformed into a military position, even if the final degree of physical damage has not yet been fully determined.
- 9- For the purposes of the legal analysis, the report does not rely on the enhanced protection granted to certain Lebanese sites as a direct treaty obligation binding Israel under the 1999 Second Protocol, because Israel is not a party to it. That protection is used as evidence of the exceptional value of the sites, of prior knowledge of them, and of the heightened level of caution required when conducting military operations within or around them. The direct treaty basis applicable to Israel remains the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1954 First Protocol, in addition to the rules of customary international humanitarian law.
- 10- The report also adopts a cautious approach to the Israeli narrative. A narrative referring to the targeting of military infrastructure or Hezbollah positions is not accepted as a legally sufficient justification unless it links each strike to a specific cultural property or its immediate surroundings and demonstrates that protection was lifted according to the standard of imperative military necessity. General references to military targets or infrastructure were therefore not considered sufficient. They were tested against the decisive legal question: whether the cultural property itself, at a specific moment, had become an actual military objective that could not be dealt with by a less harmful means.

Evidence and Factual Corralation

Evidence One

<https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/lebanon-34-cultural-properties-placed-under-enhanced-protection>

11- This is UNESCO's statement on the granting of provisional enhanced protection to thirty-four Lebanese cultural properties on 18 November 2024, following a request by the Lebanese authorities. It establishes that a number of Lebanese sites, including World Heritage sites such as Baalbek and Tyre, were internationally known and identified as highly sensitive cultural heritage. Its legal value does not lie in proving a specific strike, but in establishing the cultural value of the sites, prior knowledge of them, and the heightened duty of care required when military operations are carried out in their vicinity.

Evidence Two

<https://lebanon.un.org/en/283868-lebanon34-cultural-properties-placed-under-enhanced-protection>

12- This United Nations Lebanon publication concerns the placement of Lebanese cultural properties under enhanced protection. It has supporting value because it repeats the UN content through another UN platform and confirms that the protection included sites located near recorded strikes, including Baalbek and Tyre. Its relevance in this report is that it reinforces the elements of knowledge and prior risk and prevents the affected cultural sites from being treated as unknown or unidentified places.

Evidence Three

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-strike-destroys-ottoman-era-building-near-baalbek-ruins-2024-11-07/>

13- This report concerns the destruction of the Ottoman-era al-Manshiyah building in Baalbek as a result of an Israeli strike near the Baalbek temples, which are inscribed on the World Heritage List. It links a specific Israeli strike to direct

damage to an Ottoman heritage property in the vicinity of a world archaeological site. Its value is high because it identifies the incident, the location, the nature of the building, and its proximity to the archaeological site, and because it relies on a reliable international source and clear field material.

Evidence Four

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gM8FXiqqLpg>

14- This audiovisual material concerns the strike that destroyed an Ottoman building near the Baalbek ruins. Its value lies in providing visual support for the destruction of al-Manshiyah and in allowing still frames to be extracted showing the location, rubble and surrounding damage. It is not relied upon alone as final proof, but it strengthens the visual aspect of the incident, particularly when compared with pre-strike images and images of the adjacent archaeological site.

Evidence Five

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XuMmaHZ5_G8

15- This is additional video material on the destruction of the historic al-Manshiyah building in Baalbek. Its value is that it visually supports the Baalbek incident and shows the damage to an Ottoman heritage property in the immediate surroundings of the Baalbek archaeological site. It is used as supporting visual evidence and should be preserved, with still frames extracted and compared with pre-strike images of the site.

Evidence Six

<https://www.instagram.com/p/DCE6BwMsXj4/>

16- This visual post concerns the heritage al-Manshiyah building in Baalbek and its destruction near the Baalbek ruins. Its value is moderate because it is an Instagram post and requires verification of the account, the origin of the images, the date of publication, and whether the images were reused from another source. It is nevertheless useful as supporting visual material if it matches Evidence Three and the other videos.

Evidence Seven

<https://www.gettyimages.com/photos/baalbek-lebanon>

17- This is a collection of professional images of Baalbek, including images related to strikes and damage in the vicinity of Baalbek Castle and the archaeological site. Its visual value is high because this type of image database usually provides the photographer's name, date and description. In the final evidentiary file, the relevant images should be selected individually, with the image number, description and date fixed, rather than relying on the general search page.

Evidence Eight

<https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2026/03/10/lebanon-ancient-city-tyre-hit-by-strikes-minister-calls-for-unesco-intervention>

18- This report concerns an Israeli strike that hit the vicinity of the ancient city of Tyre and caused physical damage to the entrance of the al-Bass archaeological site, as reported by the Lebanese Ministry of Culture. It links an Israeli military action to a specific archaeological site within the World Heritage city of Tyre. Its value is high because it does not merely refer to Tyre in general, but identifies the al-Bass site and its entrance or surroundings, making the incident capable of direct connection to the special protection of cultural property.

Evidence Nine

<https://lebanon.icomos.org/icomos-lebanon-statement-urgent-alert-on-the-forced-displacement-of-the-tyre-district-ongoing-strikes-on-unesco-world-heritage-sites-and-sites-under-enhanced-protection-and-the-systematic-destruct>

19- This specialized statement addresses risks and strikes affecting the Tyre district, the al-Bass site, the Castle of Chamaa, and Beaufort Castle. Its value is very high because it is issued by a specialized heritage body and provides a professional assessment of the nature of the sites and their heritage value, rather than merely a media account. It is relevant to several incidents in the report, particularly the impact on the vicinity of al-Bass, the exposure of the Tyre site to danger, the

systematic destruction attributed to Israeli forces at Chamaa Castle, and the danger or military control at Beaufort Castle.

Evidence Ten

<https://www.icomos.org/news/icomos-statement-on-immediate-and-grave-threats-to-lebanons-cultural-heritage>

20- This international specialized statement, issued on 17 October 2024, concerns immediate and grave threats to Lebanon's cultural heritage. It does not prove one specific strike, but it establishes that the risk to Lebanese heritage was internationally known and publicly declared from an early phase of the escalation. Its value in the report is contextual and legal, because it reinforces prior knowledge and shows that harm to cultural property was neither unexpected nor unforeseeable.

Evidence Eleven

www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/10/24/israel-bombs-lebanons-ancient-city-of-tyre

21- This photographic report concerns Israeli bombing of the ancient city of Tyre, which is inscribed on the World Heritage List. Its value is visual and contextual. It establishes strikes inside a city of world archaeological value and permits spatial analysis when the strike locations are compared with the boundaries of the archaeological city or its buffer zone. It does not, by itself, prove direct damage to each monument, but it reinforces the exposure of the archaeological surroundings of Tyre to danger.

Evidence Twelve

<https://www.facebook.com/aljazeera/videos/attacks-in-lebanon-threaten-unesco-world-heritage-site/961293739576083>

22- This video concerns the danger faced by the al-Bass archaeological site in Tyre after a missile or strike fell within the site or its close boundaries. Its value is high because it visually links military action to the vicinity of a World Heritage

archaeological site. It is connected to the Tyre and al-Bass incident and reinforces Evidence Eight and Evidence Nine.

Evidence Thirteen

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/28/israel-intensifies-attacks-on-southern-lebanon-killing-at-least-16-people>

23- This item includes an image from an international photo agency of an Israeli strike on Tyre dated 28 May 2026, showing a fireball and smoke inside a city of world archaeological value. Its value is that it visually establishes the continuation of strikes within the city of Tyre. It still requires precise geolocation between the image location and the boundaries of the archaeological site or buffer zone. It is used as contextual visual evidence of the risk posed to the archaeological surroundings.

Evidence Fourteen

<https://www.albawaba.com/news/israel-carries-out-violent-airstrikes-1628694>

24- This item includes images of Israeli strikes on Tyre, including an image of a fireball and smoke and an image of damage assessment at a strike site inside the city. Its value is supporting and visual. It assists in establishing damage inside the historic city, with the need to geolocate each image against archaeological sites or their immediate surroundings.

Evidence Fifteen

https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/lebanon-warns-idf-strikes-on-hezbollah-put-heritage-sites-in-serious-danger

25- This item includes an image of damage in Tyre and reports a Lebanese warning that the strikes placed heritage sites in serious danger. Its value is supporting because it combines a visual element with an official or semi-official statement concerning the danger to heritage. It is used with caution because of the nature of the publisher, and should be linked to Ministry of Culture statements and specialized evidence.

Evidence Sixteen

<https://www.dawn.com/news/2003533>

26- This item includes photographs of the aftermath of Israeli strikes in Sidon and Tyre dated 28 May 2026. Its value is visual and contextual because it establishes the effects of strikes inside and around Tyre. Each image requires geolocation to determine its proximity to the archaeological site or buffer zone.

Evidence Seventeen

<https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/10/13/israeli-attacks-destroy-ottoman-era-market-in-lebanon>

27- This photographic report concerns the destruction of the Ottoman-era market in Nabatieh as a result of Israeli attacks. Its value lies in providing direct visual material on damage to a historic urban fabric, not merely a written account. It is linked to the Nabatieh incident and establishes that the damage affected a historic market of heritage value, supporting its characterization as damage to cultural property or to an urban ensemble of historical importance.

Evidence Eighteen

<https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1431198/apocalyptic-scene-in-nabatieh-israeli-aviation-destroys-several-centuries-old-souks.html>

28- This report concerns the destruction of the centuries-old historic souks of Nabatieh. Its value is high as supporting evidence because it provides a field description of the destruction of the historic market. It is linked to the preceding evidence to strengthen the Nabatieh incident and establishes that the damage did not affect isolated commercial shops, but rather a heritage fabric with accumulated historical value.

Evidence Nineteen

<https://www.newarab.com/news/israeli-strikes-destroy-lebanons-historic-nabatieh-market>

29- This report concerns the destruction of the historic market in Nabatieh as a result of Israeli strikes. Its value is moderate to high as supporting evidence from another independent source. Its main function is to provide multiple-source corroboration of the same incident, strengthening the reliability of the conclusion that the historic market suffered wide destruction, rather than the matter resting on a single image or isolated account.

Evidence Twenty

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/19/nabatieh-israeli-attacks-airstrikes-lebanon-hezbollah>

30- This report concerns the impact of Israeli attacks on Nabatieh and refers to the destruction of historical landmarks and an Ottoman market in the city. Its value is supporting and contextual. It does not replace the photographic evidence, but it links the destruction of the market to the broader context of strikes on Nabatieh and confirms the incident through an independent international media source.

Evidence Twenty-One

<https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2026/04/17/lebanon-appeals-to-unesco-to-intervene-amid-fears-protected-citadel-has-been-destroyed>

31- This report concerns Lebanon's request for UNESCO intervention after fears that Chamaa Castle, a historic castle protected or of special heritage value, had been destroyed. Its value is high because it relies on official action by the Ministry of Culture and identifies a specific site. It is directly related to the analysis of direct destruction of cultural property, not merely exposure of its surroundings to danger.

Evidence Twenty-Two

<https://www.lebanon24.com/news/lebanon/1512308/%D9%82%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A->

%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-

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%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%88%D9%89-

%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A9

32- This report concerns an urgent complaint submitted by the Ministry of Culture and the Directorate General of Antiquities to UNESCO regarding Chamaa Castle, after information that the site had been destroyed by Israeli forces. Its value is supporting because it conveys an official Lebanese process concerning a specific cultural property. It should be linked to Evidence Nine and to any subsequent satellite imagery or field images.

Evidence Twenty-Three

<https://ocula.com/magazine/art-news/lebanon-israel-heritage-attacks-unesco/>

33- This report concerns attacks or damage affecting Lebanese heritage, focusing on Chamaa Castle and other heritage sites. Its value is supporting and moderate to high because it reinforces the Chamaa Castle incident from another independent source. It does not replace official or specialized evidence, but it is useful for source cross-checking.

Evidence Twenty-Four

<https://apnews.com/article/5c4421bef28c5860a438c2892bc2983b>

34- This report concerns Israeli strikes near Beaufort Castle in South Lebanon. Its value is high because it is issued by a reliable international agency and establishes military action near a historic cultural property. It is connected to the exposure of the site to danger, even if it does not alone establish the degree of physical damage inside the castle.

Evidence Twenty-Five

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-crusader-castle-seized-by-israel-symbol-bloody-history-2026-06-01/>

35- This report concerns Israeli forces' seizure of Beaufort Castle, a twelfth-century Crusader castle of significant historical value. The value of this evidence is high because it establishes a fact different from shelling: military control over a historic cultural property. It relates to responsibility for using or bringing a cultural site into the military sphere, even before the extent of physical damage inside the castle is determined.

Evidence Twenty-Six

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/01/israel-sends-message-beaufort-castle-lebanon>

36- This report concerns Israeli control of Beaufort Castle and its historical and military symbolism. Its value supports Evidence Twenty-Five because it explains the symbolic, political and military dimension of control over the castle, and highlights that the site was not merely a geographic point but a historical property with deep meaning in Lebanese memory.

Evidence Twenty-Seven

<https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2026/5/31/%D9%82%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%81-%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AC>

37- This report and general image concern Beaufort Castle after the announcement of Israeli control over it. Its value is that it establishes the presence of the castle in the theatre of operations and reinforces the fact of control or military use of a historic cultural site. It does not alone prove physical damage, but it is important for linking the castle to the operational context.

Evidence Twenty-Eight

<https://www.dawn.com/news/2004134>

38- This item includes images of Beaufort Castle, including photographs appearing to show Israeli personnel or flags within the castle or on it. Its visual value is high in establishing control or symbolic military use of a cultural site. The original images should be preserved and the source of each image identified, particularly whether it comes from an independent source or an Israeli military source.

Evidence Twenty-Nine

<https://www.mtv.com.lb/en/news/Local/1701156/photos--the-israeli-flag-raised-over-beaufort-castle>

39- This item includes images of the Israeli flag raised over Beaufort Castle. Its value is not in proving physical damage, but in establishing the transformation of the cultural site into a symbolic military position. This is legally significant because the duty to respect cultural property prohibits using it or bringing it into the military sphere in a manner that exposes it to danger.

Evidence Thirty

https://www.instagram.com/p/DY_3rUsAjBs/

40- This visual post concerns historical and cultural sites in South Lebanon, with reference to the vicinity of Beaufort Castle and the strikes or danger to which it was exposed. Its value is preliminary and indicative. It is not relied upon alone as final evidence. Its main usefulness is to direct further research toward original images or additional field sources.

Evidence Thirty-One

<https://www.instagram.com/p/DY7WGtOjWgd/>

41- This visual post concerns Lebanon's warning of Israeli strikes near UNESCO-protected heritage sites, particularly in the south and in Tyre. Its value is moderate because the original source of the images or video must be established. It is used as supporting evidence, not as conclusive proof.

Evidence Thirty-Two

<https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/6/3/israels-invasion-of-southern-lebanon-devastates-centuries-of-history>

42- This visual and analytical report concerns the impact of Israeli operations in South Lebanon on historical heritage, with images, maps and context concerning sites such as Tyre and Beaufort Castle. Its value is high as a composite visual source because it links multiple incidents within a single historical context. It is used to reinforce the existence of a pattern, not to prove each incident independently.

Evidence Thirty-Three

<https://www.vpm.org/npr-news/npr-news/2024-12-23/what-the-israel-hezbollah-war-did-to-lebanons-cultural-heritage-sites>

43- This report concerns the impact of the war on Lebanon's cultural heritage sites, including religious and heritage sites in the south, Tibnin Castle, and damaged churches. Its value is that it expands the scope of the facts beyond Baalbek, Tyre and Nabatieh, and establishes that damage or risk also affected other religious and heritage sites. It is used to establish the general pattern, not as a substitute for opening a separate file for each site.

Evidence Thirty-Four

<https://www.ft.com/content/2715cb60-25e4-49eb-8707-38f70ddaee40>

44- This report concerns the damage or destruction of multiple Lebanese heritage sites and reports a local heritage organization's assessment that a number of heritage sites were damaged or destroyed during a specified period of operations. Its value is high as a composite record from a reputable international outlet, but in the final report each site mentioned in it should be broken down into an independent incident if it is to be used to establish specific responsibility.

Evidence Thirty-Five

<https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/05/lebanons-churches-mosques-and-archaeological-sites-damaged-israeli-strikes>

45- This composite report concerns damage to churches, mosques and archaeological sites in Lebanon as a result of Israeli strikes. Its value is that it identifies additional sites requiring independent verification and reinforces the conclusion that there was a broad pattern of harm to cultural and religious property. It is not relied upon alone to prove every incident, but it is useful in building an initial map of affected or endangered cultural property.

Evidence Thirty-Six

<https://apnews.com/article/0d1220d7f23ca2ca66e9030b36fefa9c>

46- This report concerns the destruction of the town of Mhaibib in South Lebanon, a village with local memory and religious or historical sites. Its value is moderate to high in establishing the destruction of a local heritage environment, but it requires support through images or statements specific to the shrine or historical site affected. It is used to widen the pattern beyond internationally known sites.

Evidence Thirty-Seven

<https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/lebanons-heritage-is-disappearing-under-israels-bombardment/>

47- This investigation concerns the damage to Lebanese heritage under bombardment, with a focus on lesser-known sites in addition to Baalbek and Tyre. Its value is analytical and contextual because it helps draw the broader map of cultural damage. Each incident mentioned in it should nevertheless be converted into a separate file if it is to be used as direct evidence.

Evidence Thirty-Eight

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=quO-Xo0pJgc>

48- This video concerns UNESCO's granting of enhanced protection to a number of heritage sites in Lebanon. Its value is contextual and visual because it explains the UN protection framework and provides media material showing that the sites were known and identified before the continuation or expansion of operations. It does not prove a separate targeting incident, but it supports the elements of knowledge and exceptional value.

Evidence Thirty-Nine

<https://mei.edu/arts-culture/lebanese-heritage-under-siege>

49- This analytical article concerns Lebanese heritage under threat and refers to sites in the south, churches, pilgrimage sites and historical centres exposed to danger or damage. Its value is contextual because it helps identify additional sites and broaden the picture of the pattern, but it is not sufficient alone to establish a specific incident without direct sources.

Evidence Forty

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Jd4bUgpNq8>

50- This visual material reportedly concerns Tibnin Castle or damage associated with it. Its potential value is visual, but it requires technical verification before inclusion as final evidence, by preserving the video, identifying the date of filming, comparing the scenes with earlier images of the castle, and fixing the coordinates. Its main usefulness is that it opens an additional verification path regarding Tibnin Castle within the pattern of damage to historical sites in the south.

Factual Background

51- The evidence concerning Baalbek establishes that an Israeli strike destroyed the Ottoman al-Manshiyah building in the immediate surroundings of the Baalbek archaeological site, which is inscribed on the World Heritage List. Evidence Three establishes the core incident, while Evidence Four, Evidence Five, Evidence Six and Evidence Seven support it visually and contextually. These

materials show that the damage did not affect an ordinary building, but an Ottoman heritage property within a historical fabric connected to a world archaeological site. The incident establishes two linked elements. First, a heritage property in its own right was destroyed. Second, the strike occurred in the surroundings of a known and identified world site.

52- The evidence concerning the city of Tyre establishes that Israeli military operations took place inside an archaeological city inscribed on the World Heritage List and in the vicinity of protected archaeological sites. Evidence Eight establishes the impact on the vicinity or entrance of the al-Bass site, and Evidence Nine reinforces this from a specialized heritage perspective. Evidence Eleven, Evidence Twelve, Evidence Thirteen, Evidence Fourteen, Evidence Fifteen and Evidence Sixteen provide visual and contextual elements concerning the continuation of strikes inside Tyre and its surroundings. The incident therefore moves beyond an isolated report and becomes an incident supported by a chain of mutually reinforcing evidence, some of which identifies the archaeological site, while other evidence establishes the recurring risk to the ancient city and its surroundings.

53- In Nabatieh, Evidence Seventeen, Evidence Eighteen, Evidence Nineteen and Evidence Twenty establish that the historic market suffered wide destruction as a result of Israeli airstrikes. The photographs and mutually reinforcing reports show that the damage did not affect isolated commercial premises alone, but rather a historical urban fabric forming part of the city's urban and social memory. This places the market within the concept of urban ensembles of historical and artistic value, which are covered by the protection granted by the 1954 Hague Convention to property of great importance to the heritage of peoples.

54- The evidence concerning Chamaa Castle, especially Evidence Nine, Evidence Twenty-One, Evidence Twenty-Two and Evidence Twenty-Three, establishes that the site suffered serious destruction or was exposed to a serious risk of destruction, prompting the Lebanese authorities to seek UNESCO intervention.

Evidence Nine describes a medieval castle with special religious and heritage value and refers to systematic demolition by Israeli military equipment. The nature of the damage described here goes beyond the logic of collateral effects of an airstrike, because it points to a direct physical ground act using bulldozers or equipment, which raises the legal gravity of the incident.

55- As for Beaufort Castle, Evidence Twenty-Four, Evidence Twenty-Five, Evidence Twenty-Six, Evidence Twenty-Seven, Evidence Twenty-Eight and Evidence Twenty-Nine, supported by Evidence Thirty, Evidence Thirty-One and Evidence Thirty-Two, establish that Israeli forces entered or militarily controlled the castle and that the site came within the sphere of military or symbolic presence. This fact raises responsibility independent of the question of physical damage. Military presence inside a historic cultural property, or control over it, exposes it to danger and turns it into part of the operational environment, which is in substance prohibited by the duty to respect cultural property.

56- Taken together, the facts reveal a consistent pattern rather than an isolated incident. Baalbek represents direct damage to a heritage property in the vicinity of a world site. Tyre represents harm to the vicinity of a classified archaeological site. Nabatieh represents the destruction of a historic urban fabric. Chamaa Castle represents direct destruction or serious danger to a cultural and religious site of special protection. Beaufort Castle represents military use or military control of a historic site. The facts concerning Tibnin Castle, Mhaibib, churches and religious and heritage sites in the south, which appear in Evidence Thirty-Three through Evidence Forty, support the existence of a wider pattern of harm to cultural and religious property, although each site requires a separate verification file.

The Israeli Narrative and its assessment

57- The Israeli narrative is that the military operations in Baalbek, Tyre, Nabatieh and South Lebanon targeted military infrastructure belonging to Hezbollah, including command centres, weapons depots, launch sites, infrastructure and

positions. With respect to Beaufort Castle or its surroundings, Israel presents the site within the context of control over a strategic height and an area of military importance in South Lebanon. The Israeli narrative also repeatedly states that measures are taken to reduce harm, including warnings, the selection of specific targets, or the use of precise means.

58- This narrative does not negate the established facts and does not remove the legal protection of cultural property. Alleging the existence of a military target in a historic city or near an archaeological site does not alter the nature of the cultural property or lift its special protection. Historic cities do not become a single military block because an armed party is present in some parts of them. Each cultural property requires an independent assessment, each strike requires an independent justification, and each use of the site or its surroundings requires imperative and specific military necessity.

59- The weakness of the Israeli narrative lies in the absence of precise site-specific explanation. It does not show that the al-Manshiyah building itself was being used militarily at the moment of the strike, despite what Evidence Three through Evidence Seven establish. It does not provide a specific basis justifying the impact on the entrance or vicinity of the al-Bass site, despite what Evidence Eight, Evidence Nine and Evidence Twelve establish. It does not explain how a military target inside the historic market of Nabatieh was distinguished from the surrounding heritage fabric, contrary to what Evidence Seventeen through Evidence Twenty show. It does not justify the systematic demolition attributed to Israeli forces at Chamaa Castle according to Evidence Nine and Evidence Twenty-One through Evidence Twenty-Three. Nor does it explain the legal basis for turning Beaufort Castle into a site of military or symbolic control in light of Evidence Twenty-Four through Evidence Twenty-Nine.

60- Protection is not lifted by a general formula. A warning may be one element of precaution toward the population, but it does not replace the duty to respect cultural property. The use of precision munitions does not justify a strike if the target is unlawful or if the expected cultural damage is clear and known. The

Israeli narrative therefore remains legally insufficient because it provides a general military framework and does not satisfy the precise legal conditions required to lift protection from each cultural property.

Applicable Rules

- 61- The applicable law begins with the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. This Convention is binding on Israel as a party. It defines cultural property as movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, including monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular, archaeological sites, groups of buildings of historical or artistic interest, and centres containing a large amount of cultural property.
- 62- Article 4 of the Convention imposes the duty to respect cultural property. This duty includes refraining from using cultural property or its immediate surroundings for purposes likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict, and refraining from directing any act of hostility against it. This means that protection is not limited to the walls of the monument, the stones of the castle, or the church building, but extends to the immediate surroundings when military action there is capable of exposing the cultural property to danger.
- 63- The only narrow exception is imperative military necessity. This expression must be read as a higher standard than military convenience. The general tactical importance of the area is not enough. The presence of a military site nearby is not enough. Operational ease is not enough. What is required is that the cultural property itself, by its actual function at the moment of attack, has become a military objective; that harming it is imperatively necessary; and that there is no practical alternative capable of achieving a similar military advantage with less harm.
- 64- The relevant customary rule also confirms that special care must be taken to avoid damage to buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, education or

charitable purposes, and to historic monuments, and that property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people may not be the object of attack unless imperatively required by military necessity.

- 65- The fact that Israel is not a party to the 1999 Second Protocol does not alter this. Non-accession to the Second Protocol does not release Israel from the 1954 Hague Convention, the 1954 First Protocol, or customary rules. The Second Protocol's interpretation of imperative military necessity also has important interpretive value because it reflects an accepted development in the understanding of that exception, even if it is not a direct treaty obligation binding on Israel. The inclusion of certain Lebanese sites under enhanced protection, as established by Evidence One and Evidence Two, remains important evidence of the exceptional value of the sites and of prior knowledge of them.
- 66- The 1954 First Protocol, which Israel has ratified, must be placed in its correct position. It is not the central legal basis for prohibiting bombardment or attacks. It relates primarily to preventing the export of cultural property from occupied territory, its seizure, and its return. It becomes important, however, in cases of field control or temporary occupation of a cultural site or its surroundings, because it prohibits treating cultural property as booty or as property that may be moved or disposed of. Its relevance is therefore clear in cases of control over a cultural site, as in Beaufort Castle, or in any incident in which removal or tampering with cultural property is proven.
- 67- The customary international humanitarian law rules protecting civilian objects, distinction, precautions, and cultural, religious and historical property also apply. If the facts move into a situation of effective control or occupation, the rules of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the 1907 Hague Regulations concerning public and private property and the prohibition of destruction not justified by military necessity are added. These rules do not permit destruction or use of cultural property merely because it is located in a militarily sensitive area. They require a specific and compelling justification.

Legal Analysis

- 68- The Baalbek incident, according to Evidence Three and the supporting Evidence Four, Evidence Five, Evidence Six and Evidence Seven, establishes that Israel carried out a strike that destroyed an Ottoman building in the immediate surroundings of a world archaeological site. Al-Manshiyah cannot be separated from the historical environment in which it is located. It was not an ordinary structure in an ordinary city, but part of the Ottoman and historical fabric surrounding the Baalbek site. When a strike occurs within this area, the duty of planning and verification becomes more stringent, because expected damage is not measured only by the number of damaged buildings, but also by the nature of the site, its cultural value, and its connection with a known world archaeological environment.
- 69- In the absence of a specific Israeli justification proving that the al-Manshiyah building itself was being used in an actual and direct military manner at the moment of the strike, its destruction remains unlawful. Alleging the existence of a target in the wider surroundings is not enough to lift protection from a cultural property in its own right. Under the standard of the 1954 Hague Convention and customary law, proximity to a military objective is not enough, and general operational interest is not enough. What is required is that the cultural property itself lost its protection because of a direct military function, and that harm to it was an imperative military necessity with no alternative. That condition does not appear in the available Israeli narrative.
- 70- This analysis is consistent with the reasoning adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Strugar, concerning the shelling of the Old Town of Dubrovnik. The Tribunal did not treat the Old Town as a collection of ordinary buildings, but as an entire historical and cultural fabric, and considered that the absence of military objectives inside the site or in its immediate surroundings made the destruction unjustified by military necessity. This standard is directly useful in the Baalbek case, because the strike did not hit

an empty urban space, but a heritage property within a highly sensitive historical area.

71- In Tyre, Evidence Eight, Evidence Nine, Evidence Eleven and Evidence Twelve, supported by Evidence Thirteen through Evidence Sixteen, establish that damage or danger occurred in the vicinity of a classified archaeological site and within a buffer zone or area close to a world site. The al-Bass site is not an unknown or incidental place. It is part of the archaeological memory of Tyre and of its protected area. Damage to the entrance or vicinity of the site places the operation within a clear cultural protection framework. It is therefore insufficient to say that the city witnessed military activity or that the strikes targeted Hezbollah infrastructure. The attacking force had to establish that the military objective was specifically identified within the affected area, that there was no practical less dangerous alternative, and that the vulnerability of the archaeological site was taken into account before execution.

72- Here, the importance of enhanced protection appears without making it a direct treaty obligation binding Israel under the 1999 Second Protocol. The inclusion of the site or its surroundings under a declared protection regime, as shown by Evidence One and Evidence Two, establishes that the exceptional value of the site was known and that knowledge of the risk was not theoretical. Even though Israel is not a party to the Second Protocol, it remains bound by the 1954 Hague Convention and customary rules, and the declaration of enhanced protection becomes additional evidence that any military operation near Tyre should have been subject to a higher standard of care.

73- In Nabatieh, Evidence Seventeen, Evidence Eighteen, Evidence Nineteen and Evidence Twenty establish that shelling led to the destruction of a historic market forming part of the city's urban memory. The legal argument here is not only that the market was a civilian object, but that it was an urban ensemble of historical value. The 1954 Hague Convention protects not only single monuments, but also groups of buildings and centres of historical or artistic importance. The destruction of the market therefore cannot be treated as ordinary commercial or

urban damage. The harm affected an urban fabric whose value had accumulated over time.

74- No general justification based on military activity in the city is sufficient. The law does not allow an entire city or an entire historic market to be transformed into a target because of the presence of an armed adversary in the area. If a military objective existed within or near the market, the duty of precaution required the selection of a means that would not destroy the historical fabric, or refraining from the strike when the cultural damage was wide and certain. Strugar is again relevant, because the Tribunal stressed that striking a historical fabric can only be justified by specific and direct military necessity, not by a general military campaign in the area.

75- Chamaa Castle presents a more serious incident. Evidence Nine and Evidence Twenty-One through Evidence Twenty-Three refer to the destruction or systematic demolition of a cultural and religious site of special value. This act, by its nature, differs from an airstrike that might be claimed to have affected the site incidentally. Demolition by equipment presupposes forces on the ground, time to assess, the ability to stop, and the possibility of issuing clear orders. The standard of responsibility therefore becomes stricter. If the cultural property was under control or within reach of ground forces, the duty of respect becomes direct and practical, and it is no longer acceptable to invoke a general operational urgency.

76- In this case, imperative military necessity cannot be presumed. A direct and immediate danger emanating from the castle itself must be proven, not from the area generally, and it must be shown that demolition was the only means to remove that danger. In the absence of such justification, the demolition constitutes a direct unlawful act against cultural property. The Al Mahdi case before the International Criminal Court is useful here, because the Court treated the destruction of mausoleums and historic buildings in Timbuktu as a crime in itself, not as a passing material loss. In the Court's reasoning, the value of the

cultural site is not reduced to stone or property; it extends to the collective memory and cultural identity of the community.

- 77- In Beaufort Castle, Evidence Twenty-Four through Evidence Twenty-Nine, supported by Evidence Thirty through Evidence Thirty-Two, establish that military control over the site or its introduction into the military sphere is an independent breach. The law prohibits not only the destruction of cultural property, but also its use or the use of its immediate surroundings in a manner that exposes it to damage. When a military force enters a historic castle and uses it as a position of control, symbolism or deployment, it brings the site into the logic of military operations. This, by itself, exposes it to the risk of retaliation, targeting, tampering or damage resulting from positioning. It is not necessary to wait for part of the castle to collapse before the violation arises.
- 78- The relevance of the 1954 First Protocol is clearer here. Control over a cultural site imposes a duty not to dispose of, remove, or tamper with its contents, and imposes a duty of preservation. If the control occurs in the context of occupation or temporary effective control, the responsibility of the controlling force becomes more stringent. From this perspective, Beaufort Castle is not merely a high point in the battle. It is cultural property subject to an independent duty of respect and protection, separate from its topographical or military usefulness.
- 79- The destruction of religious and cultural sites must also be understood through its effect on the identity of the community. The ICTY, in *Kordić and Čerkez*, addressed the destruction of mosques and religious and cultural institutions within a wider context affecting the existence and memory of a community. This reasoning is important in the Lebanese facts because it prevents each incident from being fragmented and isolated from the others. The issue is not one building here, a castle there, and a market elsewhere. It is a repeated pattern affecting the civilian, religious and historical memory of multiple areas, as supported by Evidence Thirty-Three through Evidence Forty as general contextual indicators.
- 80- The possible Israeli argument that Hezbollah used civilian or historical areas does not change the result. Even if an adversary's use of the vicinity of cultural

property is proven, it does not grant the other party an open licence to destroy. The law requires the test of imperative necessity and precautions; it does not remove protection. If the property itself is used militarily, the lifting of protection may only be considered to the extent and for the time strictly required. If the use is in the city or nearby, protection remains, and the obligation shifts to selecting means that do not harm the cultural property.

81- Three levels of breach must be distinguished. The first is direct damage to cultural property, as with al-Manshiyah, the Nabatieh market, and Chamaa Castle. The second is exposing a classified site to danger through strikes in its immediate vicinity, as with Tyre and Baalbek. The third is military use or military control of a cultural site, as with Beaufort Castle. Each level creates separate legal responsibility, and the three levels need not be present in every incident for a breach to be established.

Responsibility

82- Israel's responsibility arises first from breach of the duty to respect cultural property under the 1954 Hague Convention. This duty is directly binding on Israel. Israel breached it by conducting operations that destroyed or damaged cultural property, by exposing classified archaeological sites to danger, and by militarily controlling or using historical sites. The fact that Israel justifies the operations by reference to Hezbollah does not alter this, because a general justification does not meet the condition of imperative military necessity for each cultural property individually.

83- Responsibility arises second from breach of the duty to refrain from using cultural property or its immediate surroundings for purposes likely to expose it to destruction or damage. This is particularly clear in Beaufort Castle, according to Evidence Twenty-Four through Evidence Twenty-Nine, where the castle was transformed into a site of military and symbolic control. It also appears in Chamaa Castle, according to Evidence Nine and Evidence Twenty-One through Evidence Twenty-Three, where the evidence refers to direct or systematic

demolition of a cultural site. Bringing a cultural site into military action empties protection of its content, because the site becomes part of the theatre of operations instead of remaining outside it.

84- Responsibility arises third from breach of the special duty of precaution. The affected or endangered sites were not unknown or ambiguous. Baalbek and Tyre are known world sites, as established by Evidence One and Evidence Two. Beaufort Castle and Chamaa Castle are visible historical landmarks, as shown by Evidence Nine and Evidence Twenty-One through Evidence Twenty-Nine. The historic market in Nabatieh is a known part of the city's heritage fabric, as established by Evidence Seventeen through Evidence Twenty. Protection statements and international and specialized warnings, especially Evidence One, Evidence Two, Evidence Nine and Evidence Ten, made the cultural nature of these sites undeniable. Ignorance therefore cannot be invoked, and the damage cannot be treated as unforeseeable.

85- Responsibility arises fourth from the absence of specific site-based justification. It is not enough for the attacking force to announce that it targeted military infrastructure in the city. It must prove that the cultural property itself lost its protection at a specific moment and because of an actual military function. It must prove the absence of practical less harmful alternatives. It must prove that the decision was taken at an appropriate level and on the basis of accurate information. The absence of these elements makes harm to cultural property unlawful.

86- International jurisprudence confirms that responsibility does not stop at direct material responsibility. In *Strugar*, responsibility was not limited to the person who physically carried out the shelling. The Tribunal examined command responsibility, control, knowledge and the duty to know. This is important for the Lebanese facts because the shelling, demolition and control of cultural sites are not spontaneous acts detached from the command structure. They are organized military operations requiring reconnaissance, target selection, orders and field follow-up.

- 87- Potential individual responsibility appears most clearly in incidents of demolition or control. An airstrike may raise arguments concerning intelligence, speed and operational assessment. Demolition by bulldozers, or control over a castle and the raising of military symbols on it, are physical acts extended over time. They allow assessment, withdrawal and the issuing of orders. This makes the element of knowledge and control clearer, and makes command responsibility more capable of proof.
- 88- The Al Mahdi case is useful in highlighting the nature of the harm created by these acts. The International Criminal Court did not treat the destruction of the mausoleums in Timbuktu as damage to stone or real estate, but as an attack on the memory and identity of a community. This applies to Baalbek, Tyre, Beaufort Castle, Chamaa Castle and the Nabatieh market. These sites do not represent material property only. They carry national, spiritual and cultural value that exceeds ownership or local residence and extends to Lebanese society and the common heritage of humanity.
- 89- The reasoning in Kordić and Čerkez also helps in assessing the pattern. When damage recurs across multiple religious and cultural sites, the analysis can no longer be confined to an isolated incident. It becomes necessary to examine the sequence of facts and their cumulative effect on collective memory. In the Lebanese file, the facts do not appear as a single error at one site. They appear as a pattern affecting historical buildings, heritage markets, archaeological sites, castles, churches and religious sites across several areas, as supported by the evidence as a whole, particularly Evidence Thirty-Three through Evidence Forty as indicators of the breadth of the pattern.
- 90- Responsibility is not limited to material compensation. The destruction of cultural heritage creates collective and symbolic harm that is difficult to fully repair. Rebuilding stone may be possible in some cases, but restoring historical authenticity and the memory attached to the site is not a simple engineering matter. Cultural harm must therefore be included in the assessment of

responsibility as an independent harm, not as a secondary appendix to general civilian damage.

91- Accordingly, Israel bears international responsibility for breaching its treaty obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention and for breaching customary international humanitarian law rules protecting cultural property. In the gravest incidents, especially direct demolition, military control over a cultural site, or targeting the vicinity of a classified site with knowledge of its nature, the facts also establish potential individual responsibility of commanders and perpetrators whenever decision-making, knowledge or effective control is proven.

Legal Conclusion

92- The evidence establishes that Israeli military operations caused direct damage to cultural property in Lebanon, exposed classified and protected archaeological sites to direct military danger, and used or controlled historical sites in the context of combat operations. The established facts include the Ottoman al-Manshiyah building in Baalbek, according to Evidence Three through Evidence Seven; the vicinity of the al-Bass archaeological site in Tyre, according to Evidence Eight, Evidence Nine and Evidence Eleven through Evidence Sixteen; the historic market in Nabatieh, according to Evidence Seventeen through Evidence Twenty; Chamaa Castle, according to Evidence Nine and Evidence Twenty-One through Evidence Twenty-Three; and Beaufort Castle, according to Evidence Twenty-Four through Evidence Thirty-Two, in addition to other religious and heritage sites in the south according to Evidence Thirty-Three through Evidence Forty.

93- The legal rules establish that these properties enjoy special protection that is not lifted by a general military narrative. Immunity is lost only if the cultural property itself, at a specific moment, becomes an actual military objective by virtue of its function; the military necessity is imperative; there is no practical less harmful alternative; and special precautions have been taken to protect the

cultural value of the site. Israel has not established these conditions in the incidents examined.

- 94- The strongest legal basis is the 1954 Hague Convention, which Israel has ratified, and the customary rule prohibiting attacks on cultural property and requiring special care to avoid damaging it. The 1999 Second Protocol is not used here as a direct treaty basis against Israel, but as an interpretive reference supporting the concept of imperative military necessity and as a framework highlighting the importance of enhanced protection in proving knowledge and the exceptional value of the sites. The 1954 First Protocol is used in its proper place, namely in situations of control or occupation, and in preventing the removal or tampering with cultural property.
- 95- International jurisprudence confirms the strength of this conclusion when integrated into the legal analysis and responsibility. Strugar, concerning Dubrovnik, establishes that shelling a World Heritage site or historical fabric without specific military necessity constitutes unlawful destruction of cultural property. Kordić and Čerkez shows that destruction of religious and cultural sites may form part of a wider pattern affecting the identity of the community. Al Mahdi confirms that the destruction of cultural heritage is a crime in itself and that its harm goes beyond material loss to collective memory and cultural identity.
- 96- On that basis, the report concludes that Israel violated the duty to respect and protect cultural property under the 1954 Hague Convention and customary international humanitarian law, and that the facts establish its international responsibility. The gravest facts, particularly direct demolition, military control over a cultural site, or targeting the vicinity of a classified site with knowledge of its nature, also establish potential individual responsibility of commanders and perpetrators whenever the decision, knowledge or effective control is proven.

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